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
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CHINA: AN ANALYSIS

CHINA

AN ANALYSIS

By
FRANK J. GOODNOW

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PREFACE

The author of the following chapters was the legal adviser of the Government of the Chinese Republic and resident in Peking during parts of the years 1913 and 1914. During his stay in China he became much interested in the problems which were presented to the Chinese for solution. He had many conversations with Chinese and Europeans who had lived in China anent things Chinese. He also read many books written in English on China, and as well some written in other languages.

When he returned to this country he continued his interest in China, and, being called upon to speak frequently on things Chinese, was perforce obliged to formulate somewhat definitely his impressions and conclusions. In the autumn of 1917 he delivered a number of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston which set forth the conclusions he had reached. These lectures, as then delivered, are the foundations of the little book which he now ventures to publish. His intention was to publish the book before, but the press of other duties and the almost continuous and kaleidoscopic changes in Chinese conditions which have taken place since 1917 brought it about that that intention was not carried out. It is hoped, however, that recent developments in China and in her interna-

tional relationships will have served to increase any interest which the conclusions reached may possibly have.

No one can be more conscious than the author of the inadequacy of the treatment which has been accorded in these chapters to a very complex and comprehensive subject. Much which is of great importance has received either no or very brief mention. The only justification for the book, if it has a justification, is its point of view. The author has attempted to picture Chinese life against a European background. The contrast of what have appeared to him to be the salient features of Occidental and Oriental Civilization has helped him to reach conclusions which he ventures to believe are correct with regard to the Chinese problem. It is hoped that this contrast will have the same effect in helping those who read the book in their understanding of a subject which cannot be said to be generally well understood.

The chapter on Philosophical China was published in the March number, 1922, of "The Chinese Students' Monthly."

Acknowledgment is gratefully made of the help which the author has received from many friends, but particularly from Dr. Charles Keyser Edmunds, at one time President of Canton Christian College.

FRANK J. GOODNOW.

The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, January 25, 1926.

I

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ORIGINS

I

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ORIGINS

China was to us all as children a sort of topsy turvy land. We were told that it was on the other side of the earth just under our feet. Not comprehending the forces of the universe, some of us in our youth were even accustomed to regard the Chinese as in some mysterious way walking with their heads downward, and otherwise behaving in an incomprehensible manner.

Although these childish impressions have undoubtedly for the most part been corrected, there is still much in Chinese life, as in all Oriental life, which puzzles even the adult observer of occidental origin. Many little things there are so different from what they are with us. Thus the Chinese when using tools with a cutting edge like a plane or a saw pulls them toward himself on the cutting stroke instead of pushing them away from himself as we do. The meat on the breast of the Chinese wild turkey is dark while that of the legs is white. The Chinese and indeed the

ordinary Oriental also sometimes commits suicide when he desires to impress his point of view upon one with whom he has become involved in an irreconcilable conflict—a method of emphasis which does not appeal to the European. These facts can hardly fail to recall to us the ideas of our childhood.

In more important respects the diversity between the Chinese and ourselves is just as great. They are pacifist. We are militaristic. They are quietists. We are advocates of the strenuous life. They carry *laisser faire* to the verge of anarchy. We believe in a strong government. They are idealists. We come perilously near to being materialists. They are agnostic. We are in comparison with them religious. They adore literary ability. We worship science. And thus we might go on.

So convinced, indeed, is the average European of the radical differences between us and the Chinese and indeed the Oriental generally, that he willingly subscribes to Kipling's dictum that

> "East is East, and West is West,
> "And never the twain shall meet."

The more, however, one studies the problems presented by China at any rate, the more

one comes to the conclusion that, as an American missionary once expressed it, "the Chinese are after all just folks like ourselves." The differences which at first appear to be due to some peculiar racial quality, while real and of great importance, are nevertheless later seen to be for the most part explicable by conditions of environment and by historical development.

It is the purpose of the following pages to call attention to some of these conditions and to recall, if only in a very sketchy way, some of the most important events in the centuries long history of China.

What strike the foreign observer of things Chinese most forcibly are, the great age of Chinese national life, the unprogressive character of Chinese social and political institutions, and the persistence of Chinese culture. As the problem has presented itself to one observer at any rate these characteristics are in large measure explained by economic conditions on the one hand and by the intellectual and philosophical attitude of the people on the other. The intellectual attitude of the Chinese is in its turn in large measure to be attributed to the peculiarities of the Chinese

language. The attempt will therefore be made before we address ourselves to the problems of modern China to treat briefly of its physical conditions and its origins and of its economic, intellectual and philosophical life.

There is perhaps no section of the earth the geographical features of which have so profoundly influenced its inhabitants as that portion of central Asia which lies between the Himalaya Mountains on the west and the Pacific Ocean on the east. Topography on the one hand and climate on the other, have up to the present time almost controlled the fate of the populations which have for so long a time dwelt in this region.

China, as this section of central Asia has come to be called by Europeans, presents on the one hand many resemblances to, and on the other offers many contrasts with, that portion of the United States which lies between the Rocky Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. In the first place it lies on the eastern shore of a continent and consequently has a climate which is characterized by extremes of heat and cold unmitigated by prevailing western winds blowing from a moderating ocean.

In the second place, stretching as it does from about fifty degrees north to several degrees south of the northern tropic, China has much the same varieties in normal climate which are noticeable in this country. The fundamental geographical conditions of China and of the eastern portion of the United States are so similar that these two sections of the earth have necessarily much in common.

At the same time, minor but very important geographical dissimilarities between these two sections are to be noticed. The important topographical features of North America group themselves along an axis which runs from north to south, while those of China follow the rising and the setting of the sun. The mountains and the rivers of North America run from the pole to the equator, while those of China run from west to east. Differences of climate which would naturally tend to form a northern and a southern section are in the United States moderated, but in China intensified by topography. Communication from the north to the south is facilitated in North America by the mountain and river system. In China, however, no communication by natural means is possible except between

the east and west. China proper, that is the "eighteen provinces," as they are often called, exclusive of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet, consists of a number of river valleys, viz: The Peiho in the north, the Huangho, or Yellow River, and the Yangste Kiang in the center, and the Pearl and West Rivers in the south. All of China's important rivers rise in the mountains of the west and flow in a southeasterly or easterly direction into the Pacific Ocean. It is significant of the importance of river communication that each of the three great commercial centers of China is situated at the mouth of one of these rivers, Tientsin, at the mouth of the Peiho; Shanghai, near the mouth of the Yangste; and Canton, near the mouth of the West River. That there is no city at the mouth of the Yellow River is due to the fact that "China's Sorrow," as the Yellow River is called, is not navigable. This river has, because of its unmanageability, contributed through its inundations rather to disaster and misfortune than to commercial prosperity.

The south and the north differ from each other also in certain respects which cause life

in the two sections to be quite different. In the south the rainfall is more abundant, the land is lower, and the soil for reasons which will later be set forth is less subject to erosion than in the north. The result is that in the south the rivers for the most part always have sufficient water to make navigation possible and are less liable to floods than is the case in the north. The main work of transportation is therefore carried on in the south on the rivers, which are supplemented by innumerable canals used as well for purposes of irrigation.

The abundance of water in the south also facilitates the cultivation of rice, which, because of lack of water, cannot be grown in the north. The ease of transportation in the south, further, diminishes the possibility of serious famines, except as the result of extraordinary inundiations. In the north, however, any serious failure of crops in a particular section is almost certain to be followed by food scarcity. For the only means of transportation is by draft animals which will during a journey of any length consume all the food that they can carry.

The more favorable conditions of the south

have thus made possible the presence of a denser population than can ordinarily be supported in the north. On the other hand the less favorable situation of the north, combined with the colder climate, has had as one of its effects the development of a hardier race than is to be found in the south. Some have believed that the superior strength of the northern Chinese, who for centuries have been the rulers of the country, is due also in some measure at least to the fact that they are not a rice-eating people, but subsist on grains and millets which give them a greater vigor.

Both climate and topography thus join in the separation of a north from a south China. This distinction of two rather clearly differentiated sections will probably become more marked in the future history of the country in so far as artificial means of communication, such as railways, are not provided. For a study of the geology of this region reveals the fact that almost all the supply of coal and most of that of iron have been found in the north. This is because in prehistoric times the whole of modern China lying between the thirtieth and forty-fifth parallels was a vast

inland sea. The northern part of this area was submerged much longer than the southern and consequently was much less denuded. The result is that the coal measures are far more widely distributed and are of greater size north than south of the Yangste.

Furthermore, in the north are to be found many igneous rocks near which may be noticed indications of rich metallic deposits. If China ever becomes industrial in character, it would seem that industrial and manufacturing enterprises, particularly those which are based on the exploitation of minerals and metals, must find their home in the north rather than in the south.[1]

While the physical conditions of the north are thus favorable for the development of industry the south is eminently suited to agriculture. Agriculture, however, has for many centuries been the prevailing occupation of the northern peoples as well. At the same time it finds among them a welcome, which is inhospitable as compared with that which it receives in the south.

No. 1 At the present time, however, geological investigation has not been sufficiently extensive nor thorough to justify us in reaching certain or definitive conclusions as to the whereabouts of mineral deposits.

Up to the present time, then, as has just been indicated, the Chinese have been preponderantly if not exclusively an agricultural people as well in the north as in the south. Some have believed that their devotion to the tilling of the soil is due to the fact that their forefathers, who gave its character to Chinese civilization, had something in the nature of a religious reverence for agricultural pursuits, that the plow had for them somewhat the same sacredness which the cow had for the Aryan conquerors of India, as the symbol of the pursuits which their ancestors followed in the original home of the race.

It is not, however, necessary to go so far afield in our search for an explanation of the Chinese love of agriculture. For probably nowhere is there a section of the earth's surface so well fitted for its pursuit as is China. China is situated, as we have seen, in the subtropical and temperate zones. It is for the most part well watered by rivers, some of the most important of which, much like the Nile, have their regular periods of inundation due to the melting of the mountain snows. During the floods vast amounts of silt are brought down to enrich what otherwise might become

an impoverished soil. This is particularly true of the Yangste, which has a seasonal rise of forty feet at Hankow.

Furthermore, China lies to the north of an ocean which, except for a few islands, extends as far south as the equator. The climate is on that account what is sometimes called a "monsoon climate." When in the spring the earth begins to turn its northern hemisphere to the sun, and the intense heat of the northern summer causes great bodies of heated air to rise from the arid plains of Mongolia and the Gobi deserts to the north, the south wind begins to blow, weighted with moisture from the southern ocean. The monsoon breaks and its effects are felt even in the northernmost parts of north China. The rains come in that section of the country about the end of June, and last for six or eight weeks. They are thus coincident with the period of greatest heat. No conditions could be more favorable for crop development than are these. Intense heat even in latitudes quite far north combined with abundant moisture make an environment which can hardly be excelled in the encouragement which it gives to vegetable growth.

Finally, it is to be noticed that the soil formation of the northern provinces of China has one characteristic which has hardly its analogue elsewhere. Much of China north of the Yangste River is covered with a deposit known to geologists as loess, which is rich in soluble salts, principally of lime. This deposit varies in depth from more than a hundred feet in the highlands of the west to a few inches in the eastern districts. This loess is a remarkably fertile soil, producing without manure abundant crops and is easily worked because of its friable and homogeneous character. Further, the mechanical constitution of its mass is such that for long periods it holds water far underneath its surface. The growth of crops like winter wheat which mature before the breaking of the monsoon and thus permit the planting of a second crop, whose development is favored by a combination of heat and moisture, is facilitated by the loess deposit.

The great fertility of the loess is due, however, in large measure to the fact that almost every year a new surface is exposed. Its friability makes it most susceptible to aqueous erosion, while lack of moisture reduces it to a

fine dust which is carried away by every gust of wind. When we remember that for seven or eight months of the year there is no rain in north China owing to the dry northwest winds which blow from the arid regions of central Asia and that during the wet summer the rains are frequently torrential in character, we can well understand that there has been for centuries an almost progressive deterioration of the soil in many parts of the loess regions. In some districts of the province of Shantung where the loess deposit is least thick, this deterioration has proceeded so far that the underlying lime stone formation has been completely exposed. The districts in which this has taken place have ceased to be agricultural and at the present time only afford a precarious existence to a few flocks of undersized sheep.

The erosion of this loess deposit is also one of the primary causes for the appalling inundations of the Yellow River. For in those places in which the current is least rapid the enormous quantities of eroded soil remaining in suspension fall to the bottom which is gradually raised until the river overflows its banks and devastates vast regions. The

Yangste Kiang, however, is because of topographical conditions much more manageable, and, through its transportation of great amounts of silt, serves as a means to renew the soil fertility in the districts which it traverses. It has also built up in its delta a large acreage of new lands of great productivity.

The ease with which the loess is borne away by the high northwest winds is the cause of phenomena which perhaps are unexampled elsewhere. These are the dust storms for which Peking and almost all north China are famous. These storms occur usually in the late winter and early spring and last for several days. During their continuance the skies are darkened and the dust is so dense and at the same time so penetrating that all who can do so remain under shelter with windows and doors tightly closed. When these dust storms are over everything is found to be covered with a fine yellowish powder. It is believed by some that the loess has in past ages been deposited over China by these prevailing westerly winds.

Topography and climate have thus brought it about that no other great section of the

earth is naturally better suited to the pursuit of agriculture than is China. This fact has had a controlling influence on Chinese civilization and accounts in large measure for its long duration. For, until comparatively recently, the permanent prosperity of any section of the earth, indeed the continued existence of its civilization has been dependent upon the maintenance of its agricultural productivity. It is only within very recent times that industry as opposed to agriculture has been made the basis of any country's economic life. And those countries which have replaced agriculture by industry have been able to do so only because they have found it possible to draw for their food supply on newly opened lands which produced more than was needed for home consumption. This dependence on other lands could naturally be justified only through control of the sea over which the necessary transportation might proceed without interruption. The situation in western Europe during the Great War shows the danger to industrial states paying little attention to agriculture which may arise from loss of the control of the sea.

China is probably the only country in the

world at the present time which has been able to maintain its civilization from a time whence the mind of man runneth not to the contrary. Empires have come and gone since the Chinese state was founded. Religions have been established, flourished and declined since Confucius taught. Civilizations have arisen and disappeared since the Chinese first came to our notice as members of organized human society. Languages have grown up and passed away since the legendary Tsang Chieh devised the Chinese characters. But China has in all these centuries maintained her social and political organization, her civilization and her language almost unchanged. For the basis of her economic life has been agriculture, which because of her favorable geographical conditions could be carried on without loss of soil productivity. There is thus ample reason for finding in the character of the environment in which they have lived the explanation of the love which the Chinese have for tilling the soil.

At the same time it may not be denied that tradition has it that the Chinese were not the original inhabitants of this part of the earth and that the aborigines whom they supplant-

ed followed pastoral rather than agricultural pursuits. No one, however, really knows whence the original Chinese came. Indeed, no one even knows that they came from anywhere and were not themselves an aboriginal people.

But as Professor Giles says: "No one seems to think they can possibly have originated in the fertile plains in which they are now found. It appears indeed," he adds, "to be an ethnological maxim that every race must have come from somewhere outside of its own territory." However that may be, the Chinese have since anything has been known about them always had this passion for agriculture. They have manifested little if any of the *wanderlust* of the nomad. They have abhorred hunting and have discouraged the raising of animals which might make great demands on the soil. They have even regarded trees with a certain animosity, as at the same time cumbering good land which might be tilled and as discouraging plant growth through the shade which they cast. The only tree whose cultivation has been encouraged is the mulberry, its leaves forming the food of the silkworm. For the making of

silk has from an early time been an important domestic industry.

One of the results of this passion for agriculture and this failure to recognize the economic value of trees has been the deforestation of practically all of northern China and most of southern China, where it was possible without too great exertion to reach the trees. This deforestation is due of course as well to the extreme length of Chinese civilization. For generation upon generation has felt the need of wood for fuel and for purposes of house construction which must be satisfied. And this need has been great because of the vast populations with which China has for so many years been blessed.

It is unquestionably true that the Chinese have for many centuries known of the fuel value of coal. Marco Polo, who lived in China in the thirteenth century, speaks of the use there for fuel of a black rock which was crushed and mixed with clay before it was burned. Until the discovery of coal in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century it was commonly believed that Marco Polo either was deceived or was drawing upon his imagination when he made this statement. But the

present inhabitant of Peking cannot go through the streets of the city without seeing the coal merchant mixing his coal balls, as they are called, in the same way in which his ancestors in all probability mixed them in the days when Marco Polo wrote.

But although the use of coal as fuel is undoubtedly of great antiquity, nevertheless it never could have been general, but has been for the most part confined to the neighborhood of the pit's mouth. For the means of communication have been so poor that the transportation of bulky commodities, such as coal, to any distance has been impossible.

China is then a section of the earth where conditions have been in the past most favorable for agriculture. The main industry of the people has always been agriculture. To it most other things have been sacrificed. The character of the people has been moulded by their bucolic life. Because of their favorable situation as well as because of their intelligence in their pursuit of their favorite occupation they have been able to perdure as no other people. At the same time it cannot be denied that there are evidences of a gradual deterioration of the soil particularly in the

rather arid regions of the north. This is due probably in part to the deforestation to which attention has been called. It is due also, many think, to the increasing aridity which would seem to be characteristic of all central Asia.

The vast stores of minerals and metals which are to be found in the north will, however, in case China becomes, as she probably will become, an industrial country, afford the economic basis for the future development of a civilization different from that which has been due to the agricultural life of the past.

The physical conditions of China are thus in large measure responsible for two things which cannot fail to arrest the attention of the student of her life. The first is the long duration of Chinese civilization, made possible by conditions so favorable for the pursuit of agriculture. The second is the natural division of the country into a north and south China. Attention has already been directed to the differences between north and south.

Something further must be said with regard to the length of Chinese civilization. That China has the oldest existing civilization is, of course, such a commonplace that it seems al-

most an insult to the intelligence to call particular attention to it. At the same time it is a fact which must continually be borne in mind by those who would attempt to understand the problems of modern China. It will be well, therefore, for us to consider the matter for a moment.

When then did Chinese civilization originate? To answer this question is somewhat difficult. Tradition places the golden age of China about 3000 B. C. Reasonably exact historical data begin about two thousand years later. At that time, however, there was such an advanced state of civilization that we are justified in believing that the beginnings of Chinese life were much earlier. In 1000 B. C. the third of the earlier dynasties, viz the Chou dynasty had occupied the throne for at least a century. It was preceded by the Hsia and the Hsiang dynasties. These in their turn are supposed to have followed at least two mythical emperors, Yao and Shun, who are assigned to the period from 2357 to 2205 B. C. On the later date the great Emperor Yu, who during the reign of Shun had been successful in saving the people from a devastating flood, is said to have founded the Hsia dynasty.

These facts, if facts they are, we obtain from one of the Confucian classics viz the Shu Ching or Book of History. References in this work to eclipses fix pretty definitely early Chinese dates.

Although it would probably be impossible to adduce sufficient proof to satisfy the historiographer that Yao and Shun and Yu ever really lived or did what has been attributed to them, at the same time their actions are even now cited by the older Chinese who have studied the Confucian canon as worthy of present imitation. Ancient precedents are very real even in these modern days. The continuity of Chinese national life is made manifest in no better way.

But whenever Chinese life did actually begin we are justified in assuming that the original Chinese state was to be found along the banks of the Yellow River in northern China. There is some evidence to support the theory that this state was founded by a light-haired, blue-eyed people, coming from somewhere in the west to settle among a brunette race who had long occupied this and adjacent portions of central Asia, but who had not been able to develop anything of importance in the way of

civilization. Some have thought these newcomers were an Aryan race.

In this original Chinese state great progress had been made when it first attracts attention. A written language had been devised, agriculture had been highly developed and the arts both of war and of peace were so well advanced that Chinese civilization was being gradually imposed upon the surrounding peoples particularly to the south and west. These peoples were quite different racially from the Chinese. Even now there is a marked difference between the Hakkas, of Kwangtung, and some of the other southern provinces, and the central Chinese—as great a difference as there is between the central Chinese and the northern Chinese. These racial differences are great enough to aggravate considerably the fundamental differences between north and south which have been mentioned. The extension of Chinese institutions, to which attention has been called, was accompanied by a modification of the governmental system. It was originally monarchical, it gradually became feudal in character. This feudal form of government existed in the later days of the Chou dynasty at the time

Confucius lived, that is, in the sixth century B. C. The rivalries of the different feudal states and the increasing weakness of the imperial power are the facts which stand out most prominently in the political works of the great philosopher. His system was framed with the purpose of bringing through, among other things, the adoption of a rather crude system of international law, order out of the chaos into which Chinese life was gradually sinking.

This original Chinese state came to be known as the "Middle Kingdom." In accord with the ideas so commonly held by peoples who regard themselves as superior to barbarian neighbors, the "Middle Kingdom" was considered by its inhabitants to be the center of the world. Its inhabitants were accustomed also to refer to themselves as the "Great Nation," a term which is still used, at least by the Chinese not as yet acquainted with the nations of the Occident, to distinguish themselves from other peoples.

The terms China and Chinese used so universally at present are terms which are never applied to themselves by the people of the

"Middle Kingdom" except in intercourse with foreigners; and, as affecting the whole country and people, are themselves of foreign origin. Among the states which were formed as the result of the expansion of the original Chinese state and its subsequent disintegration in the later days of the Chou dynasty was the state of Hsin or Chin, from which the term China has come. This state was situated far to the northwest and was probably in closer contact than any other of the feudal states with the nomadic peoples who inhabited what is now Mongolia and with whom the Middle Kingdom was in constant conflict. The Tartars or Huns, as these people were called, were more warlike and less civilized than the Chinese. As a protection against their incursions was built the Great Wall which, when completed about 250 B. C., stretched from the shores of the Gulf of Pechili in the northeast far back into the interior of the continent.

The state of Hsin was less purely Chinese probably than any other of the feudal states. Its ruling house and its people both had quite an admixture of Tartar blood, which was being continuously renewed as a result of their relations with their Tartar neighbors. Hsin

had on this account a more warlike spirit and a greater military capacity than were possessed by the other states of the Empire. About 250 B. C. the Prince of Hsin conquered the other states, overthrew the Chou dynasty and made himself supreme in all China.

Seldom do we find in the history of any country a man who combined in himself such consummate ability, such grandiose purposes and such radical views as the Hsin conqueror of the "Middle Kingdom." He has gone down in history under the name of the First August Emperor, Shih Huang Ti. His assumption of this title seems to have been but a part of his purpose to make an absolute break with the past. Convinced that the feudal system, with its recognition of quasi royal powers in the feudal princes, would ultimately lead to the destruction of the country, he made such political arrangements as gave a death blow to that regime which has never been able to develop since in China. He organized his empire into provinces under central control and thus laid the basis for the political organization which has subsequently been retained with but slight modifications.

The First August Emperor's political

plans met, however, with opposition from the scholars, who seem at this early date to have attempted to assume somewhat the same role which they subsequently played in the country. The scholars quoted to him the maxims of the revered sages of the past, and with the conservatism which often characterizes the learned classes endeavored to preserve inviolate the ancient institutions. The Emperor's answer to their protests was brutal but effective. In the first place, he ordered that all the books in the Empire be collected and destroyed with the exception of those having to do with divination, medicine and agriculture. This would appear to have been one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of the recorded instances of the conflict between humanistic and scientific studies, which has apparently continued to be waged even to the present day. Finding, however, that the philosophy of the classics, which was largely political in character, was preserved in the memory of the scholars who continued their opposition to his plans, the First August Emperor summoned them to his court and had eight hundred of them beheaded. For these acts, which were particularly offensive to the Chinese be-

cause of their veneration of learning, his memory has always been execrated.

The First August Emperor's name is also associated with the Great Wall. Although this remarkable undertaking did not originate with him he completed it, and made it a bulwark of the greatest value against the fierce tribes of the north with whom he waged successful war.

The purpose of the First August Emperor of himself establishing a new dynasty was not, however, fulfilled. He was succeeded by a weak son, whose feeble hands dropped the reins of government. This son, soon after his succession, was dethroned and was followed by a peasant chieftain who after a struggle lasting three years established himself on the throne in 206 B. C. The posterity of this peasant warrior under the name of the Han dynasty ruled over China for four centuries. While the personal aims of the First August Emperor were thus not realized, his political plans were nevertheless successful. The form of government which he established was adopted by his successors and has remained the model to which the Chinese have reverted when after periods of disturbance particular

dynasties have been overthrown to be succeeded by others whose founders have won the crown on the field of battle. In all its essential elements it has been retained even by the alien conquerors of China. It was thus made the foundation of the system adopted by the Manchu dynasty so recently overturned. At present, as has often been the case in Chinese history, there is a tendency, probably only temporary, toward decentralization and local chieftains have obtained and are now wielding large powers.

The First August Emperor, therefore, left a permanent impress on the political organization of China. The success of the centralized non-feudal system of government which he established and which was adopted by his successors of the Han dynasty was most marked. Indeed, the Han dynasty had in the opinion of the Chinese such a glorious history that they still refer to themselves as "Sons of Han."

One effect then of the work of the First August Emperor was to relegate feudal ideas to the limbo of the past. This early recognition of the advantages of centralized government has had a marked effect on Chinese

character. It made impossible the continuous strife between feudal princes which was so general a feature of most European countries until a comparatively recent time. It facilitated the development of a national feeling which was almost co-extensive with the territorial limits of Chinese civilization. As this civilization ultimately spread to almost all of the world known to the Chinese, there was developed the idea of the world state which was subject to the rule of the Son of Heaven, as the Emperor was called, to whom, and to whom alone, the mandate of Heaven to rule the world had been given.

Under these conditions somewhat the same situation developed in China as is to be found about the same time in Europe. Just as the consolidation in the Roman Empire of most of the world known to the Romans brought with it the Pax Romana, so the centralization of political power in the Son of Heaven brought about a Chinese peace which was only now and then disturbed as the result of the fall of an old and the rise of a new dynasty. All the world not part of China which was known to Chinese was deemed tributary to the Son of Heaven.

In Europe the destruction of the Roman Empire led to the development of feudalism and later to that of so-called National States, all of which inherited the Graeco-Roman civilization. But notwithstanding their common heritage they have since the fall of Rome been almost continually engaged in struggles for supremacy and have been during the Great War locked in an internecine conflict which threatened the very existence of European culture. In China, however, no such permanent disintegration of the political system established by the First August Emperor had taken place prior to the fall of the Manchu dynasty. China has more than once been the prey of a foreign conqueror, and has also more than once experienced periods of disorder. But the innate vigor of Chinese civilization has been so great, the culture of her conquerors and neighbors has been so inferior, that she has been able since more than two centuries before Christ to keep the Empire intact notwithstanding the natural conditions noted which make for a division into a north and south and which have in her history several times resulted in such a temporary separation.

One result of this difference in political history has been that while Europe has since the fall of Rome been in arms and has thus become militaristic China has until subject to occidental influences been pacifist. Of the various classes recognized in the social system, viz: the scholars, the farmers, the artisans, the merchants and the soldiers, the soldiers had for centuries been held as the lowest in the estimation of the public. Whether this pacifist attitude has paid from the pragmatic point of view it is difficult to say. That Chinese civilization has been both pacifist and permanent may not be gainsaid. Its long duration certainly constitutes a pacifist argument. At the same time the helplessness of the country in the face of the militaristic civilization of Europe during the past century or more and her present weakness before the aggressiveness of her vigorous neighbor, Japan, may be cited as evidence of the futility of pacifist contentions.

China's physical conditions and the events of her early history have then had a controlling influence on her development and on her philosophy of life. Nowhere else in the world perhaps are conditions so favorable for the

permanence of a civilization whose economic basis is to be found in agriculture. Topography and climate have favored the development of two separate sections, and at times in her history have conquered. But on the other hand her culture has been so homogeneous and so compelling that by and large separatists have had to succumb to centralizing influences.

China's agricultural life, together with the supremacy during most of her history of the centralizing influences which have been noted, have made possible the development of a pacifist attitude toward life. The growth of pacifism has also been encouraged by the philosophy of Confucius, which, as we shall see later, has been all but universally accepted by the Chinese people.

Because of her agricultural life certain economic conditions have developed which explain many things otherwise perplexing to the student of things Chinese. To a consideration of these economic conditions the next chapter will be devoted.

II

ECONOMIC CHINA

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Attention was directed in the last chapter to the favorable geographical situation of China for the pursuit of agriculture and to the passion which the Chinese have from earliest times had for cultivating the soil, which has always been the occupation of the masses of her people.

When we speak of agriculture we are apt perhaps to regard it as an occupation whose main purpose and result are the growth of food products. Living, as we do, in an age of industry, in which great emphasis is laid on the exploitation of metals and other non-vegetable products such as wool and leather, we do not conceive of agricultural production as furnishing most of the articles in use. We Europeans—and Americans may be classed as Europeans from this as well as from almost every other point of view—have lived so long in what has come to be called an Iron Age that it is difficult if not impossible for us to understand a civilization whose economic

basis is vegetable rather than mineral and whose processes are agricultural rather than industrial.

If, however, we cast our eyes back on the conditions which existed in the United States no longer than one hundred years ago, we find a life which made little demand on the mineral kingdom and in which most articles in use were of vegetable origin. The fuel which was used was obtained from the forest, the houses in which our ancestors sought shelter were built of wood. The old oaken bucket which hung in the well was, it is true, if the poet is to be believed, an iron bound bucket, but it undoubtedly was the successor of a bucket whose oaken staves were bound together by wooden hoops. The flax and wool which our grandmothers spun and wove, both products of the farm, were fashioned into their final form through the use of distaffs, spinning wheels and looms in the construction of which metals were most sparingly used. The spinning wheel of our grandmothers was, for example, so made that actually the only metal used in it was the spindle. Wooden dishes, wooden or horn spoons were to be found in the house; wooden rakes and wooden forks

were commonly the implements employed in the field. Use was made of steel tools only when an edge necessary for cutting was required.

We of the present day are so accustomed to the use of metals for most of the things which we need that it is difficult for us to conceive of conditions under which articles not mineral nor metallic are not in common use. Coal has generally replaced wood as fuel. Iron or steel has become the principal material for city building. Our latest vehicles are the pressed steel railway car and the metal motor car itself driven by a power which comes from the mine rather than the farm. This change in our life has been due to the supplementing of agriculture by manufacturing, to the substitution of the miner for the farmer.

Because of this replacement of vegetable by mineral we often consider ourselves the superiors of our ancestors who knew none or very few of the things to which we are accustomed. We often refer contemptuously to the farmer as a "Rube" or a "Hayseed" from whom little that in our pride we call "up-to-date" may be expected. But if we pause for a moment to consider we can hardly

fail to conclude that the agricultural life of our forebears gave promise of greater permanence than the life which we ourselves lead. The articles which they used could be indefinitely reproduced through ordinary agricultural processes. Those which now minister to our needs are made of materials which were stored in the bowels of the earth during its formation. Our ancestors were living on their income, we are every day of our existence encroaching on our capital. When the store of minerals upon which we are drawing is exhausted, the economic basis of our life will have disappeared except in so far as the discoveries of science may give us substitutes for the materials which we now use.

The experiences of recent days are instructive. Certain countries which were not by nature provided with stores of the minerals necessary to modern European life and which had trusted to uninterrupted commercial intercourse for the ability to import what they needed, began during the war to suffer distress. The demands for certain products such as petroleum have become so insistent that even in this country, which is its main producer, we are told that we shall be obliged to

curtail its use and that unless vast new stores are discovered there will not be enough for our needs even in times of peace. Now petroleum like coal and iron, having most of the characteristics of a mineral, if it may not be of mineral origin, cannot be reproduced by any process which man has as yet discovered. If, however, we can substitute for it a hydrocarbon of vegetable origin like alcohol we may hope to use it during an indefinite period since we can reproduce it any time by resorting to the tilling of the soil.

If we then compare modern European with ancient European civilization we may say that from the economic point of view, the former has a mineral, while the latter had a vegetable basis. The former is industrial, the latter was agricultural. Now China has not at the present time developed beyond the agricultural stage. It is from the economic point of view in much the same situation in which Europe was two thousand years ago and in which Europe remained until within the last two or three hundred years. Almost everything the Chinese use is made of a vegetable material which can be reproduced by agriculture.

Attention has been called to the conditions which existed in this country in the pioneer days. The conditions in China now are much what they were here then. In the days of the American pioneer great use was made, however, of leather and wool, animal and not vegetable products, although produced on the farm as an incident to agricultural pursuits. In China on the contrary, leather and wool are sparingly used. This is because the population is so dense that land cannot be spared for the support of animals. It must be used for the production of food for human beings. The production of animal food for men, with the incidental production of wool and leather, would necessitate the use of land which if devoted to the production of vegetable food would feed a greater number of human beings. Therefore, leather and wool may not be produced in sufficient quantities to supply any great number of the people with clothing or footwear. Vegetable materials must be used for clothing as well as for feeding the people.

The scarcity of wood due to the deforestation which has been so common in China has further made it impossible to rely on wood for fuel. Such fuel as is used consists for the

most part of the gleanings of the fields, which after the harvest are raked and scraped time and time again by the children, who use for the purpose rakes made of bamboo, a vegetable material, until every wisp of straw and hay that can possibly be collected has been gathered. Indeed, fuel is used by the great mass of the Chinese merely for the purposes of cooking and only incidentally for purposes of warmth. Houses are usually so built that the products of combustion are led from the cook stove through the house by means of flues in a raised floor called a "kang." Upon this the family sleeps in the cold nights of winter. In this way the fuel used serves the double purpose of cooking and of heating the house. When not resting on the "kang" the people increase the amount of their clothing as the temperature falls. In the hot summers their clothes are of the lightest description and most scanty in quantity. In winter as well as in summer they are made of cotton, again a vegetable material, but in winter are quilted with cotton wool and are from half an inch to an inch thick. It can readily be imagined that a Chinese clad in several of these quilted suits presents a picture of rotund

prosperity which may not altogether accord with the real facts.

The use of metals in China is even more sparing than was the case in this country in the days of the pioneer. Some of the expedients to which resort is had, in order to save metals, are most ingenious. All of the pots and pans used for cooking are as thin as is consistent with the required strength. The purpose of this method of construction is two fold; to save both metal and fuel. Tools, like the axe, have only the amount of metal necessary to give a cutting edge, the weight required to give force to the blow being obtained by adding to the metal edge a heavy block of wood.

Under such conditions the demands upon the soil are naturally very heavy. It is expected to give to man directly his food, his clothes, his fuel and most of the tools with which he works. But the long duration of Chinese civilization has taught the Chinese how to bring about a nice adjustment between their needs and their methods of life. A stable equilibrium has been reached which, if not subjected to disturbance due to outside influences, would have permitted them to live

for an indefinite future in the same way in which they have lived during the long centuries of their past history.

"Farmers of forty centuries," as Professor King calls them, they have been able to cultivate their fields for nearly four thousand years, and yet to maintain the fertility of the soil. Even now after centuries of cultivation their lands produce much more per acre than the fields in this country which have been tilled for not more than fifty years. The Chinese have been able to achieve this result notwithstanding the fact that they have not had recourse to chemical fertilizers. Because of the lack of animals they have, furthermore, not been able to make use in any large degree of ordinary animal manures. Their success has been due to what is really a very scientific rotation of crops and to the knowledge, which has been acquired in a purely empirical manner, of the effect upon the soil of the growth of nitrogenous plants, some of which they have for centuries been accustomed to plough in at the proper seasons. They have also been careful to save all night soil and sewage, and use everything suitable, even the mud and weeds in the canals, for making com-

post heaps which are drawn upon to supplement more active fertilizers. Most of the manure which is used is furthermore applied in liquid form and applied to the plants, rather than to the soil itself.

Professor King, whose "Farmers of Forty Centuries" is probably the most interesting book written on Chinese agriculture, says: "In selecting rice as their staple crop; in developing and maintaining their system of irrigation and drainage, notwithstanding they have a large summer rainfall; in their system of multiple croppings; in their extensive and persistent use of legumes for enriching the soil; in their rotation of crops and their use of green manure to maintain the humus of their soils and for composting; and in the almost religious fidelity with which they return to their fields every form of waste which can replace plant food removed by the crop, China and Japan have demonstrated a grasp of essentials and of fundamental principles which may well cause western nations to pause and reflect."

The physical arrangement of the fields in China also makes possible the preservation of their fertility. All fields, which are usually

very small, are for all practical purposes level. If they are not so by nature their owners terrace them, guarding the lower edge by an artificial ridge which holds the water and thus prevents erosion in case of heavy rains, while at the same time permitting the water after irrigating the upper fields to fall gently upon the lower levels, and thus do double or treble work. The soil which notwithstanding these precautions may be washed up against the artificial ridges of the fields will after the harvest be carried back to the places whence it came.

Finally the Chinese are accustomed to do their planting in such a way that a second crop is started before the first one is reaped. Where rice is the second crop, it is planted in special hills and then transplanted to the places where it is to mature after the first crop has been harvested. Much land is thus saved or at any rate its more intensive cultivation is made possible.

In these ways then, the Chinese have been able to keep up the fertility of their fields during the many centuries they have been under cultivation and are at the present time in the less productive lands of the north ob-

taining usually two and in some cases three crops every year. Where wheat is the first crop the yield of the wheat alone is considerably larger than the yield of the average wheat lands in this country.

The long experience which the Chinese have had in tilling the soil has taught them also that many plants which are unknown to the European are fit for food. Thus Bishop Bashford says in his interesting book on China that the Chinese use for purposes of food for man four hundred and seventy-eight species of plants, not counting varieties, and adds that he has collected the native names of thirty-two plants which he has been unable to identify. The Chinese have also discovered that most, if not all, the necessary constituents of a permanently nutritious diet for human beings can be obtained from vegetables. Proteins, fats and carbohydrates are found in the beans, particularly the soy or Manchurian beans, in the grains and millets and in the many plants, like rape, from which vegetable oils are expressed to take the place of the butter and other animal fats so commonly used by the European.

It would, of course, not be correct to say

that animal food finds no place in the Chinese dietary. Eggs are often used, for the Chinese is an adept poultry raiser, having invented and used a primitive sort of incubator and brooder, as he has most other things, long, long before the European ever thought of them. He also eats large quantities of fish even far away from the sea shore, using his rice fields and the artificial ponds which are almost the necessary incidents of all farms, particularly in the south, as hatcheries. Pigs also are an almost universal feature of the Chinese rural landscape. For the Chinese has learned by experience both that the pig will thrive on what man cannot use and that pork is the most cheaply produced animal food. It must not be supposed, however, from what has been said that China is not a land of plenty for him who can afford to pay the price. It is doubtful whether anywhere in the world there is a greater abundance of delicacies which tempt the palate. Not only are the articles of food many and good, but also nowhere else except perhaps in France, is cooking so well done.

As man cannot live by bread alone, so no people, however passionately devoted it may

be to tilling the soil, can by the exclusive devotion of its energies to agriculture develop and maintain such a civilization as has existed for centuries in the Middle Kingdom. There has, of course, been almost from the beginning of Chinese history a considerable portion of the population which has been engaged in commerce and industry. The large cities, such as Tientsin and Hankow, Cheng-Tu and Soochow, Amoy and Canton, are themselves evidence of the divorce of numbers of people from the soil. We have no statistics which throw any light on the numbers of the population who are devoted to agriculture, commerce or industry respectively. Indeed, China is not a favorable soil for the cultivation of the statistical habit. All that the student of the country can obtain is an impression which may be qualitatively correct. A quantitative conclusion of value it would be impossible to draw. But it is certainly true that many persons in the country follow industrial pursuits in the sense that they confine their activities to the making of finished products out of the raw materials which are extracted from the soil. Some of these persons also work in little shops or factories situ-

ated in the cities and having no connection with the farm. But a great deal of industrial work is carried on as an incident of farm life in the months when distinctly agricultural labor is impossible. All grain is thus ground on the farm, and most of the clothes and tools are likewise made there. Furthermore, apart from the banker, who often combines with high finance the humbler function of the pawnbroker, the merchant is hardly distinguishable from the artisan. The finished product is usually sold in the place in which it is manufactured. Those who are engaged in the business of transportation such as the carter, the porter and the boatman constitute, however, a distinguishable class.

Just as was the case not more than two or three hundred years ago in Europe, there is thus a great deal of household industry incident to the prevailing farm life, while the manufacturer usually sells to the consumer the goods which are fashioned in his own factory. This rather primitive economic system is, however, slowly passing away, as a result of contact with the Occident. Foreign trade has furthered the development of the wholesale merchant who gathers tea and silk for

export, and receives from abroad for sale in the interior, cottons and other articles not of domestic production. Furthermore, the great supply of cheap labor has attracted western entrepreneurs, who in greater and greater numbers are establishing factories on the European model in many of the treaty ports such as Shanghai. Finally, as it is becoming known that China has vast and practically untouched stores of the minerals, such as coal, and the metals such as iron, which constitute the life blood of European civilization, the foreigner is every day employing more and more of the native population in extractive industries which have fallen under his control.

And yet so vast is China, and so great is its population, that it probably may truthfully be said that the contact of the country with the Occident has produced hardly more than a ripple upon its economic surface. China is still, as it has been for centuries, a predominantly agricultural country, with a slight amount of incidental, mainly household, industry. Its means of communication are so meagre and so poor in quality that no great interchange of commodities is possible. Most

of the community life is not only agricultural in character. It is as well a life which is self-contained and is intolerant of outside influences. As the great mass of the people lived two thousand years so they live now. Their horizon is necessarily narrow, and their life is hard.

The population is so numerous that notwithstanding their efficiency in agriculture they are still in large measure dependent for their continued existence on the favor of the elements. What they sow they may not be able to reap. Inundations and droughts may reduce the population of large sections to starvation. Every family must look to the labor of its members for ability to live. Little time can be given to the care of others. Indeed, little time is available for anything but work.

The life which the average Chinese in the nature of things must lead cannot fail to have a profound influence on the national character. The Chinese may have solved the problem of permanent national existence as no other nation has. But the very methods which they have adopted have had for their result a product which differs from that of the less

permanent civilizations with which we Europeans are more intimately acquainted.

In the first place, the Chinese have developed a passion for children which is hardly second to their passion for agriculture. There may, perhaps, be a connecting link between these two passions. One of the things which obtrudes itself upon the notice of the traveler in the rural districts is the great number of children who are to be seen working in the fields. It would seem that a child is an asset rather than a liability when the tilling of the soil is the principal occupation. Hence early marriages and large families. We know thus that in those countries where the factory legislation prohibits or limits the work of children, where children are liabilities rather than assets, marriages are postponed and birth rates fall. The predominantly agricultural life of China would thus seem to be one of the causes of its great population.

But the great population which the country possesses reacts upon its economic situation. The prevailing agricultural methods would be impossible of application and the results which have been described would be impossible of attainment were it not for the presence

of the great numbers of human beings from whom labor can be obtained. The intensive cultivation, which is the distinguishing characteristic of Chinese agriculture, would be impossible were it not for the veritable swarms of laborers available. Chinese production per acre is, as has been pointed out, far in excess of our production. If, however, the man employed and not the acre cultivated is taken as the unit of measure, we find American methods more productive, shocking as they may be to him who considers alone the possibilities of the land. In China land is dear and mankind is cheap. In America, however, land is abundant but labor is scarce.

A further result of the Chinese manner of life is that it discourages or at any rate fails to encourage the development of capacity for co-operation. Rural life in itself is an obstacle to the development of such capacity. The population is too scattered, the social groups are too small to make co-operative activity easy. Chinese rural life is particularly hostile to co-operative action on any large scale, because of the self-sufficiency of the rural communities due in its turn to the practical absence of means of communication. The

struggle for a mere existence also is so severe, owing to the vast number of mouths to be fed, that the growth of that amount of altruism which is necessary for effective co-operation is well nigh impossible.

Almost the only instance of effective co-operation outside of the family, to which attention will be directed later, is to be found in the gilds which are very influential among the industrial and mercantile classes. The Chinese gild, like the modern European trade union, is, however, an organization not for co-operative production, but rather for the maintenance of a monopoly price, for the most part, for services rendered.

Apart from the family and the gild, instances of co-operative groups are comparatively rare. No such thing as the modern corporation was known in China until it had been imported from Europe, and almost every distinctly Chinese corporation which has been established has been a failure. This failure has been attributed by some observers to a general lack of trust among the Chinese in each other. There are also quite a number of customs which would lead one to conclude that the Chinese do not as a matter of fact

have great confidence in each other. Thus it is quite a common thing to find in business transactions that the contracting parties furnish sureties who guarantee that they will carry out what they undertake. Often the gilds of which the contracting parties are members act as such guarantors. Where this is done the guarantors are almost as relentless in their endeavor to punish those through whom they suffer loss, as is the modern Surety Company in its pursuit of a defaulter whom it has bonded. The existence of the American bonding company would, however, be as good a reason for our assuming that Americans generally distrust each other, as that the existence of the guarantor in China proves a mutual distrust among the Chinese.

The truth is, it would seem, that past Chinese economic life has not encouraged co-operation. China has been the place of small things. Business has been retail in character. The pursuit of agriculture does not call for the combination of effort which is necessary for the exploitation of minerals or the operation of a great transportation enterprise.

The great emphasis which the Chinese social system lays on the obligation of loyalty

to the family, has also militated against successful co-operation outside of the family group. When the claims of the family and those of any other economic group like a corporation conflict, it is the family which wins. An officer of a corporation owes his first duty to the members of his family. Only after they have been taken care of may the shareholders be considered. The sense of fiduciary obligation to any one not a member of the family is not keen. Under these conditions the successful operation of corporations is naturally difficult.

It may, however, be reasonably expected, that just so soon as China becomes less exclusively agricultural and as the bonds of family loyalty are relaxed, the capacity for greater economic co-operation will develop there as it has developed elsewhere.

One of the causes and at the same time one of the results of the existing incapacity for co-operation is the policy of *laisser faire* which from time immemorial has been characteristic of China. Attention will be called later to this feature of Chinese life. Just now notice will be directed to only one of its phases which ought to receive some treatment

in connection with our consideration of economic China. This is the currency system, which cannot fail to have a great influence on the economic life of the country.

The currency is almost everywhere else the subject of rather comprehensive and drastic governmental regulation. In China, however, like most other things which elsewhere receive attention at the hands of the government, it has been almost completely neglected.

The only Chinese coin which until recently was in existence is a copper coin to which the European has given the name of "cash." It is still in general use and as coined has a hole in the center through which a string may be passed, as the cash are usually, on account of their small value, to be found in strings of about one hundred. While the cash was for a long time the only coin in use, it was not itself so much a measure of value as a token. The measure of value was the tael. A tael, however, was a figment of the imagination and had no actual existence. A tael was—and for that matter is—theoretically a certain number of grains of silver of a certain fineness, and the cash is theoretically a thousandth part of a tael. Most small transac-

tions outside of the treaty ports are carried on in cash, but transactions of any magnitude are in taels. To settle money balances of tael transactions silver bullion was formerly used. Silver bullion was also used by all persons who travelled any distance from home, since the transportation of the amount of copper cash necessary for a longer than momentary life would be so expensive as to make travelling impossible. When you travelled then, you took silver bullion with you and when you desired to obtain copper cash therefor, you went to one of the great parasitical class of money changers who have developed as a result of these currency conditions, and hacked off a piece of silver from one of your ingots. Then the serious business of life began. In the first place you and your money changer would not agree upon the purity of your silver. The determination reached would be the result of compromise. For the ingot was not stamped and there was no means of assaying it. After you had agreed upon the fineness of your silver, you would have by similar methods to reach an agreement as to the weight of the piece you had cut off. For the Chinese system of weights and

measures was in just as confused a state as the currency. Fineness and weight having been determined you would have to agree upon the number of strings of cash you would get. For while theoretically there are a thousand cash in a tael many practical reasons bring it about that in the particular district the rates of exchange—each district had its own rate—would be such that you might get more, would probably get less, but might be certain that you would not get exactly the theoretical number. Apart from the variation due to local exchange rates the practical reasons why you would get less than a thousand cash per tael were that the string which ought to have one hundred cash would not have exactly that number. So fine were calculations made in China, that some allowance must be made for the value of the string upon which the cash were strung, as well as for the time which the stringer of the cash had taken in stringing them. Furthermore, local custom had also an influence in determining the number of cash on a string of supposedly a hundred.

To avoid part of the trouble incident to the use of silver ingots the foreigner in the days when the Spanish-milled dollar was in gen-

eral use throughout the world introduced it into China, where it was recognized as having a certain number of grains of silver of a certain fineness. Later the Spanish dollar was replaced by the Mexican dollar which came from the Philippines and the term "Mexican" has come among the foreign population to indicate the silver dollar.

Of recent years the Chinese government has itself coined silver dollars. The ordinary silver dollar now is what is called the Pei Yang dollar and has general currency throughout China, particularly in the north. There are, however, other dollars like the Manchurian dollar which have less silver in them and against which one must be on one's guard.

Since the introduction of the Pei Yang dollar the government has coined also twenty-cent and ten-cent pieces which are supposed to be a fifth and a tenth of the dollar respectively, but which, like most Chinese coins, are not really what they are supposed to be. If one is frugally minded in his use of pieces of money smaller than the "big dollar," as it is called, one takes his big dollars to the money changers and obtains anywhere from $1.10 to

$1.40 in small pieces for them. One finds at the hotels a most suspicious willingness on the part of the rickshaw boys to give either five or ten of the small pieces for a big dollar, and many are the tenderfoot tourists who are caught by these supposedly kindly offers.

Two other facts with regard to the currency system should be mentioned. In the first place, there are issues of bank notes. Any one who has a bank, and any one may establish one, may issue notes and there is no governmental provision for a cash reserve for their protection. Furthermore, these notes have merely a local circulation. A bank having branches in different cities such as Shanghai and Peking will generally receive in Peking only at a discount its notes issued in Shanghai.

Finally accounts bearing interest are often kept at the banks in taels rather than in dollars. But as there are no taels in existence, to pay a debt contracted in taels you must get dollars from the bank and as banks are not usually conducted as philanthropic institutions you must pay the bank for the privilege of obtaining dollars from an account kept in taels.

When you deposit, as you often must, dollars in a tael account, a similar sacrifice on your part is demanded. If therefore you make too many changes from taels to dollars and dollars to taels you will find that ultimately the bank will have a claim to all the money which you have deposited in it.

This description of the currency system of China has been given not because of any purpose of recommending it for adoption, since these pages are not addressed particularly to bankers, to whom alone the system is calculated to make an appeal. It has been thought, however, that China's solution of the currency problem, if solution it may be called, is a reasonably fair example of what happens in that country as a result of the extreme *laisser faire* policy which has been adopted. Public convenience, and social efficiency have been sacrificed in the interest of a parasitical class of money changers and bankers who cannot be said to contribute in any except perhaps in a negative way to the public welfare. The only possible argument which can be adduced in favor of the existing currency system is that, inasmuch as there is no such thing as legal tender, money is much in the position of

a commodity. Money is thus used like any other commodity as a factor in a transaction which has many of the characteristics of barter. Its value with regard to existing debts may not therefore be changed in such a way as to defraud the creditor or oppress the debtor. But any such advantage is very problematical and there are many reasons for believing that the existing system is of advantage only to the money changer whose superior knowledge enables him to fatten at the expense of other classes.

Various attempts have been made to change the system. But the vested interests, as they are deemed, of the banker and the money changer have been up to the present too strong for the reformer.

Some of the most striking characteristics of Chinese life are thus at any rate in part to be explained by economic conditions. The immense population, with the consequent severity of the struggle for existence, the incapacity for productive co-operation, and the *laisser faire* policy, all are in some measure traceable to the simple self-sufficient community life carried on in an agricultural environment. These characteristics also would

logically result from the philosophical system which for so many years has been all but universally accepted. That it has also had its influence on Chinese life is not susceptible of doubt. One cannot, however, banish at least a suspicion that it itself may in some degree be an effect rather than a cause. Confucianism, to which our attention will be directed later, is so in harmony with Chinese behaviour, its theories are so consistent with Chinese practice that one can not help feeling that it was formulated to explain if not justify a manner of life which was already a fact. Its universal acceptance has unquestionably caused it to exercise an influence on the conduct of life which is as great as that of any other philosophical system elsewhere. But that the economic conditions of the country go a long way in offering an explanation of the kind of life which the Chinese lead is hardly susceptible of denial.

III

INTELLECTUAL CHINA

III

INTELLECTUAL CHINA

While the economic conditions of China resulting from topography and climate have greatly influenced Chinese civilization, the intellectual development of the people has in large measure been moulded by the peculiarities of the language.

Chinese has two characteristics which distinguish it from the languages of Europe. In the first place it is not an alphabetical language. It depends, so far as concerns its written form, on what are called characters. These characters are at the present time ideographs rather than pictographs though there is plenty of evidence of their pictographic origin. It would hardly be worth our while to spend any time in the consideration of the way in which the present ideographs have developed out of the pictographs. The important thing is that the written language is not based upon a phonetic alphabet. Each word, or perhaps it would be better to say, each simple idea is represented by a particu-

lar character which under no circumstances is used to represent any other word or idea.

As a result of this peculiarity a tremendous demand is made on the memory of one who learns to read and write. If we look back upon the beginnings of our own education, we shall recognize that in learning to read we had to tax our memory with the arbitrary acquisition of only thirty-six symbols. We had to learn the twenty-six letters of the alphabet and the ten digits. Most other things which we learned did not demand alone the exercise of memory but also called on us to use our reasoning powers. Words were built up out of letters in a more or less logical way. The development of a science of mathematics so facilitated by the use of the arabic numerals which we have adopted also made possible and necessary resort to exact reasoning.

The Chinese has had, however, to cumber his memory with hundreds if not thousands of symbols whose knowledge must for the most part be arbitrarily acquired. Little if any demand is made on the reasoning powers. It is estimated, for example, that in order to read an ordinary newspaper one must be able

to identify with ease twenty-five hundred characters. The more learned a scholar is, the more must he tax his memory and the less opportunity will he consequently have to resort to reasoning processes. For a really learned man must know five or six thousand characters. It is seldom that even the most learned scholar will possess the knowledge of more than fifteen thousand, and there are something like forty thousand in existence.

The handicap of the Chinese is thus a great one although the experience of the Japanese would seem to indicate that it is not insurmountable. The Japanese have, it will be remembered, used the Chinese characters for centuries. They still have, however, within recent years become, comparatively speaking, a literate people. But some Japanese have estimated that a man who goes through the various school grades including the university has, because of the necessity of learning the Chinese characters, to spend several years more than he would have to spend if the language made use of a phonetic alphabet. It is also to be remembered that the Japanese use in the affairs of daily life, not connected with literature, philosophy or education, a

phonetic alphabet which must help them considerably in memorizing the characters.

Many European students of Chinese have expressed the opinion that it is hopeless to expect that the ability to read and write fluently will ever be general among the Chinese so long as a substitute for the characters in the nature of a phonetic alphabet is not adopted. If this opinion is justified the Chinese may not be expected to become in the near future a literate people. Certainly at the present time only an insignificant per cent of the population can read or write anything but the simplest things. It is to be noticed that such an alphabet has already been devised and some progress has been made in causing it to be adopted. If this movement is attended with success the conditions of Chinese intellectual life will be greatly changed.

So far as the ability to read and write is a necessary prerequisite of an education the Chinese may not be expected soon to become an educated people. So far as a public opinion is formed by reading even such ephemeral writings as are to be found in the newspapers of which a large number have been recently established and in the periodical press a pub-

lic opinion which is the result of any such thing as a consensus of the judgments of many minds is at present impossible.

It is not too much to say that the great mass of the people at the present time are, because of the difficulty of the language, both ignorant and inarticulate, and that there is little reason to look forward to any immediate improvement in these respects. The great majority of the people are at present at the mercy of the intelligent and designing so far as an education which is based on the ability to read and write might serve as a protection. No wonder that on the one hand they are a prey of a self-seeking priesthood and on the other fall easy victims to the wiles of corrupt officials and petty politicians.

A further disadvantage under which the Chinese suffer from not having an alphabet is the lack of a most convenient means of classification. Dictionaries, encyclopaedias, gazetteers, digests and directories, of which Europeans make such general use, do, it is true, exist in China but the information they contain is awkwardly classified and therefore inconveniently available. This difficulty occasioned by the absence of an alphabet is not

insuperable, but it adds to the burden of life and diminishes efficiency.

The second characteristic of the language to be noted is the difference between the written and the spoken word. The language is fundamentally monosyllabic. Each monosyllabic sound is, however, spoken in a number of tones. The number of these tones varies in the different parts of the country. In the official or Mandarin dialect, as it is called, which is the most widely used, there are four tones. In the Cantonese there are eleven. But including all the tones it is estimated that there are not more than eight hundred distinguishable sounds. These eight hundred sounds must do duty for thousands of characters, each representing some idea. Each monosyllabic sound has thus a great number of meanings. The meaning of a sentence may consequently be clear when written, but unintelligible when spoken. That is, the written language appeals to the eye rather than to the ear. It is said that good written Chinese, when read aloud, cannot be understood even by the educated who must see the characters before they can be sure of the meaning.

While the written Chinese is monosyllabic

the spoken Chinese tends to be bisyllabic. That is two syllables which express the same general idea are used together to express the thought intended to be conveyed. Each of these syllables when used alone may mean a number of things but the combination can convey only the desired meaning. This peculiarity of the spoken Chinese gives much of its character to the Pidgin English which is so commonly used in the south of China. When in speaking Pidgin English you ask someone to look at anything, you say "Take a look see" and not "Take a look." "Look-see is a literal translation of the Chinese "Kan Chien." The sound "Kan" means "look" and the sound "Chien" means "see" among a lot of other meanings but "Kan "Chien" itself means only "look" or "see."

But even with this help the spoken Chinese is not always immediately intelligible. It is said even that when two Chinese are conversing they often have to wait until the context of what is being said appears, before they understand definitely what is the purport of the conversation. Educated men in conversation also often refer to the characters in order to make plain the meaning of their

spoken words. The difficulty of understanding the spoken Chinese is increased because of the fact that the language is not inflected. There are no such things as tenses, or cases, or even generally numbers. Indeed, there is some reason to say that there are not clear distinctions between what we in other languages call parts of speech. The Chinese language may be called impressionistic. The symbol or the sound is intended to convey an idea, rather than an exact statement. This peculiarity is probably due to its pictographic origin.

Attention has been called to the fact that the means of communication are so inadequate that the country is composed of a great number of isolated self-sufficient communities. The natural result has been the development particularly among the uneducated of many different spoken dialects. The sound used in one section for a certain idea will be subjected to a slight variation in some other district or it may happen that quite different sounds may be used in different sections for the same thing.

The written language appealing as it does to the eye rather than to the ear is, however,

universal throughout the entire country. All those who read and write can understand each other when they commit their thoughts to writing. Indeed, the written language has for centuries been used beyond the boundaries of the Middle Kingdom. It is also the written language of Korea and Japan. When read aloud in Korean, however, it will not be understood by either Japanese or Chinese. The conditions are the same as they would be in case English, French and German were all written in characters and not in letters. The same character in all three languages would indicate for example a horse, although it might be pronounced *cheval* by a Frenchman and *Pferd* by a German.

Language conditions in China are therefore somewhat the same as they were in Europe before the development of the present literary modern languages, when Latin was the only written language of the literate classes. What was known as learning and what was called knowledge were confined to the few who had the time and money to acquire the universal language. It was only with the development of French and English and German and Italian as both spoken and written languages in

which thoughts of value could be worthily expressed that anything in the nature of general education was possible. And it was only as education became general that a public opinion of any effectiveness could develop.

Hence what once was in Europe is what now is in China. The intellectual life of the people has been and still largely is controlled by the so-called learned classes, very few in number, who exercise somewhat the same tyranny over thought as was exercised by the scholarly classes at one time in Europe. The great masses of the people in China are, as they were once in Europe, illiterate and inarticulate. China has always had, however, one advantage as compared with Europe. Her intellectual leaders have had little if any connection with an ecclesiastical organization. The fact that the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was at the same time the possessor of political power and the High Priest of the nation, has saved China from the disturbances which in Europe arose out of the struggles for supremacy between State and church. Furthermore, the distinctly philosophical, non-religious character of what was regarded as orthodox thought has saved China from

much of the religious persecution and ecclesiastical intolerance which have played so prominent a role in European history. There have been, it is true, attempts made to suppress both Buddhism and Taoism when these religions, if such they may be called, have endeavored to obtain political control. There have also been one or two instances of a ruthless suppression of Mohammedanism where the Mohammedans have tried to rebel against the central government, but as a general thing the pages of Chinese history are free from stories of religious wars and ecclesiastical intolerance finds there a very small space.

The peculiarities of the Chinese language have then had a great influence in putting the control of the Chinese people into the hands of a very small class, and in hindering the developing of anything in the nature of a government which was popular in that it admitted the participation of any number of the people. But its influences were even more far reaching than this. It developed an attitude of mind in the educated classes which was distinctly philosophical and literary rather than scientific.

It is to be remembered that no nation with

which the Chinese had come into close contact until within the last two hundred years had a written language. Those nations like the Koreans and the Japanese with which China's relations were the most intimate, even adopted the Chinese characters for their written language. The Chinese were not only the only people in that part of the world who could express their thoughts in written and therefore in permanent form. They were also necessarily the only nation of which they themselves had any knowledge which had a literature. The other peoples of the world they naturally regarded as illiterate, uncivilized barbarians and themselves they looked upon as a sort of chosen people, the "Great Nation" as they often still call themselves.

The main ground for a distinction between themselves and their neighbors was to be found in the fact that they had this wonderful written language and this unexampled literature. Ability to use this language and a knowledge of its literature were naturally therefore the only criteria which were possible in reaching a judgment as to an individual's intelligence. The more one knew of the language and literature the more of a

scholar he was. Ignorance of that language and that literature was a sign of lack of intelligence and culture. Never was there a people, indeed, which has paid such a tribute as has the Chinese to learning. No matter how poor the scholar might be he was regarded as vastly superior to the man of wealth without learning. Thus scholars formed the first class in the social structure.

But the acquisition of the language was a task which had no end. A lifetime even was not sufficient to learn all that might be learned. Furthermore, the uninterrupted duration of Chinese civilization has necessarily had as a result the production of a literature which is almost unexampled in its extent. Printing from blocks was invented in China as early as the ninth century of the Christian era and has been in use ever since. Of itself it has led to the multiplication of books. The written language of two thousand years ago has not, as in Europe, fallen completely into disuse and been replaced by comparatively modern tongues. There has been an extraordinarily long period during which the language has had time to develop and delicacy in forms of literary expression to be cultivated.

Probably in no other language or literature have so many conventions arisen, violation of which will result in denying to the violator the ear of the cultivated classes. So strong is the tyranny of these conventions that one is almost forced to believe that an occasional relapse into barbarism would have been an advantage to the intellectual life of the country. For conventional forms of expression have been so much emphasized as ultimately to cause the substance of what was to be expressed to be neglected.

One of the conventions which the Chinese adopted is that allusions must continually be made to the classics and in such a delicate way that the passage which is the subject of the allusion may be recalled at once to the mind of the reader, and at the same time not be forced violently upon his attention. The cultivated writer and the cultivated reader must each have at his tongue's end the text of all the books which have been accorded the dignity of being included among the classics. The Bible and Shakespeare have played somewhat the same role in the English language as have the classics in Chinese. But it would seem that the Chinese classics have been far

more important as molders of literary expression.

It has been said that the written language appeals to the eye rather than to the ear. This fact has added difficulties to the task of the Chinese scholar. Just as in our language some sounds are more pleasing to the ear than others, so certain Chinese characters strike the eye with peculiar favor. Just as some sounds balance others in European tongues, so some combinations of Chinese characters look better when placed over against each other. Where poetry is concerned rhyme and rhythm are supplemented by contrasted characters.

The appeal made by Chinese to the eye has, finally, brought it about that handwriting has attained almost to the same dignity as has art. The script of one who would be regarded as a cultivated man must be in the approved style. In the old days a scroll beautifully written setting forth a quotation from the classics, had the same value as a picture.

Literary accomplishment, according to the extremely conventional standards adopted, assumed great practical importance when the habit became fixed more than a thousand

years ago of choosing all the important officials as the result of competitive examinations of a literary character. The competitors were secluded in booths for two or three days, even being obliged to bring their food with them. The supreme test was the writing of what was called an "eight-legged essay" on some theme which was announced. What the eight legs of this kind of essay were it is difficult to say. European educated Chinese have, however, said, when asked if it would be fair to compare the eight-legged essay with such an artificial form of writing as a sonnet, that it would be quite fair, except that the eight-legged essay was much more difficult.

It is almost impossible for us in this country to picture to ourselves a condition of things in which all of our chief officials would be men who had obtained their positions as a result of a successful competition in the composition of sonnets, and whose main preparation for the competition had been a long and arduous course of study of a classical literature whose principal purpose was to cultivate comprehension of and admiration for the moral law. Yet this was apparently the condition under the old regime in China.

These examinations have since the establishment of the Republic been abandoned, but it is doubtful if any satisfactory substitute for them has been devised, although under the present method of appointment considerable emphasis is still laid on learning. Furthermore, in very recent times, largely because of the development of the vernacular newspapers, the language commonly employed to express the written word has lost much of its classical nicety and is approximating much more closely than was formerly the case the vulgar spoken word.

Beyond fixing the character of education through competitive examinations, the government did in the old days practically nothing for the schools. It certainly made no provision either for them or for the teachers, and left the would-be scholar to obtain his education through his own efforts. The schools were private enterprises usually conducted by scholars who had failed at the competitive examinations to secure the coveted official positions. The content of the education imparted at these schools was controlled by the nature of the examinations for which they were intended to fit the student and was

therefore exclusively literary. No attention whatever was paid to mathematics even of the simplest kind. Such a thing as science was unknown as a part of education. This is not the case at present. Now the government both at Peking and in the provinces is doing a good deal in the establishment and maintenance of schools, universities and technical schools.

Education being thus confined to the study of language and literature, a learned profession outside of literature was impossible in the old days. The non-religious character of the Chinese mind, to which our attention will be directed in the next chapter, discouraged the development of the theologian. There is, indeed, quite a Buddhistic and Taoist literature, but this did not find a place in the educational system and no class of learned theologians developed as was the case in Europe.

Nor was there ever until recently a class of professional lawyers in China. Why, it is difficult to say. For, notwithstanding Confucius' disapproval, a code of written law developed and decisions under it have been reported. This law was, however, entirely criminal in character. Breach of contract

was a penal offense rather than a ground for the award of damages. Furthermore, the judicial system has for centuries not been a good one. It has not had the confidence of the people, who have usually settled their troubles by arbitration.

There is on record an interesting decree of the Emperor Kang Hsi, who lived in the early part of the 18th century, which evidences the public's estimation of the courts and also their feeling as to the importance of a well regulated and upright judicial system. Complaint had been made to the Emperor as to judicial abuses. His decree in answer to these complaints was as follows:

"The Emperor, considering the immense population of the Empire, the minute division of landed property, and the notoriously litigious character of the Chinese, is of opinion that lawsuits would tend to increase to a frightful extent, if people were not afraid of the courts, and if they felt confident of always finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude himself concerning his rights, contests would be interminable, and the half of the empire would not suffice to settle the lawsuits of the other half.

I desire, therefore, that those who have recourse to the courts be treated without any pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear before the judges. In this manner the evil will be cut up by the roots; good citizens, who may have difficulties among themselves, will settle them like brothers by referring them to arbitration. * * * As for those who are troublesome, obstinate and quarrelsome, let them be ruined in the law courts—that is the justice that is due them."

The government manifested an interest in the administration of the law by the courts only when the public order was directly affected. The settlement of family affairs was left to the head of the family while the business relations of the commercial classes were adjusted by the merchants themselves, either by negotiation or through their gild organization.

So far as concerns the pleadings in the cases which did come before a judicial tribunal these were attended to by its ministerial officers. These officials were dependent on fees and gratuities for their living and by their actions, which often were corrupt,

brought the administration of justice into a greater disrepute than follows the behavior of the worst of those "shyster" lawyers, fortunately few in number, who seem to be an incident of most European systems of justice.

As a result of these conditions, there was then not only no learned bar, but as well no class of lawyers who had the respect of the people. Those who were engaged in the administration of the law had thus no public influence whatever. As a class they were unable to furnish those leaders either in the formation of public opinion or in political development who are so prominent a feature of European life. Modern China is providing a class of lawyers learned in the law, but it is certain that they do not as yet occupy anything like the place which the bar fills in European and American life.

What was true with regard to the administration of the law was also in a large measure applicable to the practice of medicine. It is, indeed, the case that, although there were formerly no real lawyers, there were physicians. But medicine was a trade rather than a profession. There was no systematic medical instruction. There was no obligation

upon a physician who thought he had discovered an effective remedy to make it known to his brother doctors. His discovery was treated as a trade secret, which he was accustomed to use himself and then to pass along to his successor who was often his son or his nephew.

Furthermore, Chinese medicine never included any surgery. The doctors practiced what is called acupuncture, which consisted in pushing needles sometimes hot and sometimes cold into different parts of the body with the hope of alleviating particular ailments. But dissection was not practiced and any scientific knowledge of anatomy was impossible.

The history of medicine proper is, however, a very long one in China. It will be remembered that among the three classes of books excepted from destruction by the First August Emperor in 250 B. C. were those which treated of medicine. It was hardly possible that during this long period of development a great many valuable remedies would not be discovered if only empirically. What is true in so many other directions is undoubtedly true here. That is, the Chinese discovered empirically a great many things which

the European discovered later through the application of the scientific method. So it is probably true that the Chinese doctors have many remedies which are of great value. Indeed, even at the present time the great majority of Chinese have greater confidence in their own than in European educated physicians, although they do recognize that European surgery offers them much which the regular Chinese practitioner cannot promise them.

One of the results of the position of medicine in China is that the physicians as a class have not been able to render anything like the same service which European intellectual life has received from physicians. It is to the physician that Europe owes the beginnings of that scientific development which is the distinguishing characteristic of European intellectual life. All the men who started the great scientific movement in Europe soon after the Renaissance were medical men. Even such men as Galileo, who although not physicians, contributed so much to the European's knowledge of scientific truth, were frequently led to the pursuit of science through their work as medical students.

Until very recent times the only learned man in China was then the scholar versed in linguistic and literary lore. As official he controlled the political development of the country. As a member of the class of literati he moulded her intellectual life. And he had neither the time nor the inclination to devote himself to the pursuit of anything but philosophy and polite literature, the humanities, as we have come to call them. The study of natural phenomena was regarded as unworthy of the attention of the scholar, and was left to the illiterate classes.

The illiterate classes did, however, an immense amount of work along these lines. But because either of a racial incapacity or of the lack of trained intelligence they never seem to have had much more than a glimmer of scientific truth. They discovered a great many things of importance and they invented some very ingenious processes, but they seem rarely to have caught the general significance of what they did. They thus discovered the magnetic needle, but they used it mainly for the purpose of ascertaining the southern exposure of lands, which was believed to be particularly good for graves, or for finding the

way over trackless plains. The compass was thus in the old days sometimes attached to vehicles. The Chinese also invented gunpowder but they used it practically only in firecrackers. In the one case they did not see that the compass could be used for navigation although they were great navigators. In the other case they did not apply the explosive force which they discovered to the propulsion of projectiles or use it for rending the rocks which obstructed their rivers or in which their stores of minerals were concealed.

In other words such knowledge as the Chinese had of the phenomena of nature was not accompanied by any great capacity for generalization. Someone has contrasted culture with the *Kultur* about which we have heard so much a few years ago. He said that culture has emphasized a reverence of the past and has neglected the consideration of the future, while *Kultur* has looked forward rather than backward. If we accept this distinction China has had culture rather than *Kultur*. She has not attempted to control the future through the conquest of nature by scientific generalization but has been content to occupy herself in the contemplation of her

glorious past and to regulate her conduct in accordance with the admonitions of departed sages.

It sometimes seems as if the almost total lack of the scientific spirit which was so long characteristic of the Chinese might have been due to their failure to pay attention to mathematics. Whether because of the undue emphasis on literary studies or to the difficulty of using the Chinese figures in mathematical calculations, the scholar trained in the regular Chinese way is unable to solve some of the simplest mathematical problems. The rule of three which our children learn at an early age was not so long ago a mystery to most Chinese students. Of course a certain amount of mathematics is necessary in all business transactions and the Chinese have always been famous for their commercial capacity. How then, it will be asked, do they carry on their business unless they have some mathematical ability? The answer is that their mathematics are practical and concrete rather than theoretical and abstract. They thus use for the purposes of calculation a frame of beads, similar to the abacus. They have acquired such facility in its use that they solve

with great rapidity and accuracy all such problems as ordinarily arise in commerce such as problems in exchange. But they use this frame for even the simplest additions, appearing to be unwilling or unable to do them without its assistance.

It is doubtful, however, if the Chinese are in any way peculiar in their lack of scientific ability except as compared with the European. As a matter of fact it would appear, as Dr. Martin, who was for many years resident in China as a missionary, points out, that it is not the Chinese but the European who is the sport among the races of men. The European alone of all peoples has developed the scientific spirit. This development had its beginnings in the days of the Greeks but was arrested apparently as a result of the contact of the Greek with the Asiatic. Asiatic political, philosophical and religious ideas after the days of Alexander the Great, and particularly after the establishment of the Roman Empire, controlled European thought and it was only after its emancipation from these influences at the time of the Renaissance that the European spirit began again to manifest itself in its former vigor.

It is furthermore only within the last few hundred years, that is since its devotion to science, that European civilization may be said to show any superiority to the Chinese. Perhaps no better description of conditions in China six hundred years ago is to be found than that given by Marco Polo. Marco Polo came from Venice, at that time probably the center of European civilization. He was in a position to know what the European civilization of the day, and European civilization at its best could offer. And yet he could not conceal his astonishment at the magnificence of the court of the Chinese Emperor, at the power and prosperity of the country and at the high character of its civilization.

On the basis of an intellectual life devoted to the study of philosophy and literature which was the life at the time of both China and Europe, Chinese civilization probably surpassed European civilization. The character of its art was higher, the luxury of its life was greater, the prosperity of its people was more widespread. Its social and political institutions were such that many of the evils of European life, like serfdom, and the other abuses of the feudal regime which China had

centuries before outgrown, were not to be found. Religious persecutions which have been so prominent features of European life found little place in China. By almost any standard by which we might measure it Chinese civilization would have to be judged the better.

That Europe has since that day surpassed China would seem to be due almost entirely to the fact that in the last three or four hundred years the European has been devoting himself with increasing energy to the study of science. It would be impossible to enumerate here even a few of the many advantages, as compared with the conditions of Chinese life, which the European has derived from the pursuit of this policy. Attention may properly be called, however, to the fact that he has almost annihilated distance through the improvement he has made in the means of communication. The railway, the steamship, the airplane, the telegraph, the telephone and the wireless, all inventions which have become possible through the application of the methods of science, have enabled him to acquire an efficiency which the world has never before seen. He has been able to do what he has

done because he has learned, again as the result of scientific studies, how to extract from the bowels of the earth, the metals and minerals which he has needed and how to treat them so that they may become adapted to the various purposes to which they are to be devoted.

The ability to carry on the vast enterprises which modern transportation and the exploitation of mineral products require is dependent, however, upon a capacity for co-operation. This capacity may be regarded as an intellectual or moral quality which is the peculiar possession of particular peoples. It may be considered that it is theirs not because they have acquired it as the result of a course of disciplinary training but rather because it was born in them. It is well, however, before we reach such a conclusion, to look back upon both the political and economic history of the European. If we do so we find that when our present mode of economic life began we Europeans did not have this power of co-operation to anything like the extent to which we now possess it. The story of our attempts at corporate action for example — for the corporation is the most

common means through which economic co-operation has been secured—is a story of a long series of failures which have only recently been followed by success. We Europeans have learned our lesson by doing. It is very doubtful whether we have any peculiar co-operative capacity. We have been obliged to learn the lesson in order to lead the lives we now lead and we have learned from our early failures.

That other nations who have not had the recent intellectual experiences of the European can learn the same lesson which he has learned there is little reason to doubt. That they will learn the lesson when their economic conditions make it necessary for them to do so is practically certain.

The ability of the Chinese to change their intellectual attitude toward life is predicated upon their possession of a high degree of intelligence. The history of their past accomplishments would seem to indicate that we have the right to make such an assumption. The fact that the Chinese are an Asiatic race ought not to count against them in our estimates of their possibilities. For the Japanese, also an Asiatic race and a race which

has not in the past shown anything like the originality and intellectual power of the Chinese, has within the past few decades adopted many of the ideas of the European. They not only have been successful in the pursuit of this policy. They have themselves made some very marked contributions to European science.

Attention has been directed to the intellectual life of the Chinese in order to offer an explanation for some of the things which at first perplex the foreign student. It has been felt also that a comparison of the more recent achievements of the European mind, both with what was formerly done in Europe and with what is now done in China, would help us to see what has made China what she is, and if we may judge from European experience, also to see what is needed to enable China to solve the problems which her contact with Europe has brought up for solution.

What China would seem particularly to need at the present is a change in her intellectual life. She should cultivate the study of science, and, while not abandoning her linguistic and literary activities, greatly curtail them even if by so doing she changes somewhat her con-

ventional standards. *Kultur* should if not supplant at any rate supplement culture.

The intellectual life of China, which has been described, has of recent years been considerably modified by the leaven of occidental learning. This leaven has been introduced through the work of the many missionary educational institutions established in the country, in large part as a result of American effort; through the education abroad, to quite an extent also in America, of Chinese young men and women; and through the adoption in the modern Chinese educational institutions at home of western ideas.

The immediate effect of these western influences has, as would naturally be expected, been in large measure unsettling and destructive rather than conservative and constructive. This effect has been due in part to the fact, that, although the Chinese would appear to be aware that such superiority as the west possesses is largely due to the attention which has been paid to science, the foreign educated Chinese students have preferred with their literary and philosophical traditions to devote themselves to philosophical rather than to scientific studies. The re-

sult has been that young western educated China has too often acquired the belief that a change in philosophical ideas is what is needed for the regeneration of the country. Confucian ethics and philosophy, which have been in the past such important factors in Chinese life, have been relegated to a subordinate position if not absolutely cast aside, and the attempt has been made to substitute for them an occidental theory for the conduct of life for which the Chinese people are not yet prepared. The traditional Chinese theory of life is closely tied up with the prevailing economic and social conditions and cannot safely be abandoned or even greatly changed until those conditions have themselves been subjected to modification.

It would seem to be unfortunate, although it may be expected, that the attitude of young China is what it is. For under all the turmoil on the surface there has been going on a steady and marked change in economic conditions. It is, therefore, to be regretted that the young men and young women who are China's hope should not be preparing themselves more generally than would seem to be the case to take the lead in the changes in

economic conditions now going on and to go on in the future. For it is only as they make themselves ready for the new economic life which is bound to come that the direction and control of the movement will fall into the hands of Chinese and China will be able to free herself from those foreigners who have been attracted to the country, almost exclusively by the consideration of the pecuniary gain which they believe they will be able to make.

A further effect of the attention which has been paid by young China to philosophical rather than to scientific studies has been the neglect to consider the close relations which exist between political institutions and economic and social conditions. The result has been a willingness to ascribe an undue effectiveness to paper constitutions based for the most part upon a consideration merely of the institutions of other countries, and framed with little regard to the conditions of China. There has been altogether too much theory in much of the work which young China has done and is doing and too little of that practical common sense resort to which is so necessary to effective reform.

It is sincerely to be hoped that a more nearly correct conception of the problem will soon be entertained—that a beginning along this line has already been made is to be recognized—and that the young China of the future will, so far as concerns their own conduct, see more clearly than as yet they do that the salvation of the country lies not so much in a sudden change in their philosophy of life as in an improvement in their economic conditions. One of the necessary prerequisites of this improvement is their retention of control of the development of their resources. The realization of such a purpose is in its turn in large measure dependent upon the devotion of the present generation to scientific and technical rather than to literary and philosophical studies.

IV

PHILOSOPHICAL CHINA

IV

PHILOSOPHICAL CHINA

In an opinion in one of the United States Supreme Court reports it is said that religion has to do with man's "relations to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His being and character, and of obedience to His will." It is added that the first Amendment to the United States Constitution, which forbids Congress to pass any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," was never intended to be "a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society. With, however, man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted."

As opposed to this conception of religion, in almost every people we find a body of thought which has to do with the relations of

man, not to his Creator, but to his fellows, and with the general conduct of a mundane life. This body of thought is often spoken of as philosophy.

If we adopt this distinction we may perhaps be justified in saying that the Chinese are a philosophical rather than a religious people. Their relations to a Creator have apparently given them little concern. The conduct of this earthly life has, however, been a subject of absorbing interest. This is not to say that the Chinese have been, or even now are, free from superstition. Indeed, few peoples are more prone to credulity than they. The lack of the development among them of what we in the Occident speak of as science has caused them to reach the most puerile conclusions with regard to the causes of many natural phenomena. As a result they fall easy victims to priests or medicine men who extort from them large sums for protecting them from the malevolence of a host of evil spirits. These priests, furthermore, have constructed shrines at which offerings may be made to effigies of historical heroes and mythical personages to whom mystical powers are attributed. At the same

time, the Chinese fail to accord to their images that reverence which springs from a truly religious feeling. Sometimes where their petitions and offerings have not in their opinion had the desired results, they will drag an offending image from its shrine and subject it to reproaches and indignities in the hope of causing it to feel a higher sense of obligation for past favors.

By some students the belief is expressed that in days long gone by the Chinese did have what resembled very closely a religion. Within the last few centuries, however, the only evidences that such was the case, which are manifest in the ordinary life of the people, are on the one hand the ceremonies incident to ancestor worship, and on the other, the official worship of heaven and the powers of nature formerly participated in by the Emperor at the capital and by the principal magistrates in the chief cities.

Ancestor worship would seem to be due both to the desire to do reverence to the departed heads of the family, as a part fulfillment of the obligation of filial piety, and to fear that the spirits of the dead may, if not appeased, exercise unfavorable influ-

ences upon the fortunes of the living. Ancestor worship thus savors a good deal of animism which resembles superstition rather than religion. So far as concerns its animistic side it is encouraged for their own profit by a distinctly sordid priesthood.

The official worship carried on in former days by the Emperor and the magistrates, but since the establishment of the republic fallen into disuse, was apparently a sort of sublimated pantheism. What was worshipped was nature and the moral law rather than a personal God. The Emperor was accustomed to go in great state to the Temple of Heaven at Peking and after spending the night in seclusion, at daybreak of the New Year, to confess his sins and making sacrifices, to implore for his people the favor of Heaven for the coming year.

The characteristics of both ancestor worship and of this official religion, if such it may be called, was that it made no provision for a professional priesthood. The Emperor, the "Son of Heaven," as he was called, was himself the High Priest and alone was competent to make sacrifices and intercede with Heaven for the people. Possessing, as he

did, the Mandate of Heaven to rule, he was believed to be responsible for what of good or evil had happened during the year that had expired.

In the case of ancestor worship it is the head of the family alone who can officiate. This worship is very simple and consists in little more than doing reverence to the dead, whose tablets stand in a prominent place in the house and represent them as the objects to be revered. It is only when the dead are to be buried that resort is had to a professional priest.

Apart from the official worship and ancestor worship the two principal religious or quasi-religious influences in China have been Taoism and Buddhism. The former was in origin distinctly animistic, and is indigenous to China. The latter came into China through Tibet, about 500 A. D. Chinese Buddhism belongs to the Northern School, the Greater Vehicle, as it is called, and consequently lays considerable emphasis on a life after death which is, however, not eternal and from the temporary torments of which the sinner may be relieved through the efforts of Buddhist saints and priests. Chinese

Buddhism has become very corrupt. Its priests, like the Taoist priests, prey on the superstition and credulity of the people. But apart from the powers which priests, both Taoist and Buddhist, claim to exercise over the influences of nature and the behavior of a host of malevolent spirits, including those of ancestors—powers which are recognized by the ignorant—neither Taoism nor Buddhism has any great effect on the moral life of the people. The morals of the Chinese are controlled by a distinctly non-religious philosophical system.

Students of Chinese philosophy are inclined to recognize two rather distinct philosophical influences, which have been exerted, for the most part in two separate periods in the history of the country's thought. The first influence was one of transcendentalism and mysticism, and is closely connected with Taoism. It had almost a monopoly in the early history of the people from 2500 to 400 B. C.

As a philosophy this transcendentalism found its highest embodiment in the teachings of Lao Tzu, the "Venerable Philosopher," who lived about the end of the period.

From a philosophical point of view, its goal was quietism. From a practical point of view, its results have been superstition. It has taken on the name of Taoism from the philosophical work attributed to Lao Tzu called the *Tao Teh Ching* or the Book of the Way of Virtue. "Tao" in Chinese is "the way," and has somewhat the same connotation as the "Logos" of the New Testament.

Lao Tzu's *Tao Teh Ching,* which dates from about 550 B. C., has been described as "one of the most eminent masterpieces of the Chinese language; one of the profoundest philosophical books the world has ever produced." Indeed, it is so profound as to be almost unintelligible to the Western mind. The philosophy which it inculcates is an antisocial philosophy. In somewhat the same way as Buddhism it finds the supreme good for the individual in quietism and indifference. Among its most famous passages are the following: "Both heaven and earth endure a long time. The cause of their endurance is their indifference to long life. Thus the wise man, indifferent to himself, is the greatest among men." "Heaven is eternally

at rest, yet there is nothing that it does not do." "He who humbleth himself shall be exalted; he who exalted himself shall be humbled." "It is the way of reason not to act from any personal motive; to conduct affairs without feeling the trouble of them; to taste, without being aware of the flavor; to account the great as small and the small as great; to recompense injury with kindness."

The emphasis which the *Tao Teh Ching* lays upon the necessity of following natural inclinations, and the desirability of not exhibiting anxiety in the pursuit of anything, even of virtue, led Yang Chu, a disciple of Lao Tzu, who lived in the 4th century B. C., to inculcate in his book, "The Garden of Pleasure," a most thoroughgoing Epicureanism. "Enjoy life and take one's ease," he says, "for those who know how to enjoy life are not poor, and he that lives at ease requires no riches." "If we hasten to enjoy life we have no time to trouble about what comes after death." Yang Chu, however, never had among the Chinese much recognition as a philosopher. A certain moral severity, almost a puritanism, has character-

ized most Chinese philosophic thought, to which his views were abhorrent.

While Yang Chu developed one side of Lao Tzu's teachings, another disciple, Mo Ti, who dates from the 5th century B. C., was the exponent of a certain utilitarian, if not pragmatic, altruism, with which he tried to credit Lao Tzu. He formulated three tests of truth: (1) Is the doctrine in accordance with the spirit of the universe? (2) Is it in accordance with the teachings of the ancients? (3) Will it stand the test of experience? He maintained that love stands all these tests. He believed that nature was full of love and gave man the sun, moon and stars, rain and warmth, flowers for beauty, and grain for food. Love or universal benevolence was therefore in accord with the spirit of the universe. Mo Ti also maintained that the ancient sages sought to help the people. Benevolence was therefore right when judged by the second test. Finally he claimed that selfishness was the cause of all evil. Mo Ti condemned the fatalism and quietism of Lao Tzu and approved a strenuous life as contributing to the advancement of the race.

The most brilliant expounder of Lao Tzu,

however, was Chuang Tzu, who lived in the 4th century B. C. He exhibited the same mysticism which is characteristic of Lao Tzu and the same indifference to the affairs of this life, having evidently a suspicion, to say the least, that there may be another life which begins when this one ends. In one of his most famous passages he asks:

"How then do I know but that the dead repent of having previously clung to life?" to which he answers:

"Those who dream of the banquet awake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation and sorrow, awake to join the hunt. While they dream, they do not know that they dream. Some will even interpret the dream they are dreaming; and only when they awake do they know it was a dream. By and by comes the Great Awakening, and then we find out that this life is really a great dream. Fools think they are awake now. * * * Once upon a time I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, fluttering hither and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. I was conscious only of following my fancies as a butterfly, and was unconscious of my individuality as a

man. Suddenly I awoke, and there I lay myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a man, dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I am a man."

The philosophy of Lao Tzu and his expounders has been regarded as distinctly heretical by the recognized orthodox school and their works are not given a place in the accredited Chinese Classics. Its mysticism and lack of pratical value have further prevented it from making much of an appeal to the intelligent classes. Its concrete manifestations finally have become little more than the devices and expedients of a system of magic which in the hands of the Taoist and Buddhist priests alike has been used for the purpose of playing upon the superstitions and fears of the ignorant. A system of philosophy which originally had considerable dignity, has become little more than a scheme of necromancy and geomancy. At the present time, it lays great emphasis on the powers of departed ancestors over the lives of the present generation, and of certain supposedly natural influences upon individual and public welfare. Ancestors must be

appeased by properly situated graves. Life, in general, in order to be successful must be carried on in harmony with certain supposed principles of nature. A pseudo science has been built up about these two ideas under the name of Feng Shui, which may be literally translated as Wind and Water. Thus, before an ancestor may be buried or a house built, the Feng Shui experts must be consulted, for a badly situated grave will arouse the wrath of the departed, and any erection which is higher than adjacent habitations may interfere with their Feng Shui, or, if improperly situated may bring misfortune to its builders. The Feng Shui theory, together with the numberless graves scattered over the country in accordance with approved Feng Shui principles, made the building of telegraph and railway lines difficult, as they, it was believed, might easily disturb the repose of the dead or interfere with the Feng Shui of the living.

The Chinese are, however, a pre-eminently practical people. Their fears that ancestral anger might be aroused by the desecration of graves it has been possible to allay by payments of money to the descendants at the

time of the disinterment and the transfer of the bodies of the dead to other suitable places of burial. Indeed, one of the items of expense which appear regularly in railway accounts is for graves. The popular appreciation of the advantages of the telegraph and the railway, and the fact that experience has shown that the building of such lines has not been accompanied by the anticipated misfortune and disaster, also have reconciled the people to this new means of communication whose extension now meets no further opposition.

During the later years of the life of Lao Tzu, another Chinese philosopher appeared. This was Confucius, the Latinized name given to Kung Fu Tzu or Master Philosopher Kung. Under his guidance the practical side of early Chinese thought came to the front. While Confucius never claimed to be an innovator or to be advocating anything particularly original, his influence has been so great that the ideas which he and his followers advocated are commonly grouped together under the general head of Confucianism. Others such as Mencius, Wang An Shih, and Chu Hsi, elaborated what they considered to

be his ideas in their commentaries on his writings, but the system as a whole may be treated as a single one without regard to the contributions which each single writer has made of it, or to the aberrations from it for which any particular commentator may have been responsible.

Confucianism, so conceived, is a philosophy of life. It is at once a system of ethics and of politics. But, comprehensive as it is, it is confined entirely to a mundane life. It does not attempt to solve in any way the problem of the why and wherefore of man's existence, nor to explain nor even postulate a future life or other life than the one we know in the world in which we are now living. Confucius' position was distinctly that of the agnostic. He says: "When you know a thing, to hold that you know it, and when you do not know a thing, to acknowledge that you do not know it—this is knowledge."

He was therefore silent upon supernatural questions. In answer to the inquiry how best to serve the spirits, that is, the ghosts of the departed, he said, "When one cannot serve man, how can he serve the spirits?" When asked as to what lies beyond the grave, he

answered, "So long as we cannot know life, how can we know death? * * * To give oneself earnestly to the duties due to men and while respecting spiritual beings to keep aloof from them may be called wisdom. * * * If you wish to know whether the dead have consciousness or not you will know it when you die. There is no need to speculate upon it now."

Confucius' agnosticism was accompanied, however, by a very keen sense of duty and by an abounding belief in the existence of an all pervasive, all controlling moral law. The Chinese Classic called the "Chung Ying," translated originally as the "Doctrine of the Mean," but given in a latter translation the more appropriate title of "The Conduct of Life," consists for the most part of the sayings of Confucius which were collected and published by his grandson. It begins as follows:

"The ordinance of Heaven is the law of our being. If we would fulfill the law of our being we must follow the moral law. The moral law is a law from whose operation we cannot escape. Our moral being is the great reality of existence, and moral order is the

universal law of the world. When true moral being and moral order are realized, the universe becomes a cosmos, and all things attain their full growth and development."

This moral law is not, however, according to Confucius of divine or supernatural origin. In another place in the Chung Ying he is reported as saying: "However excellent a system of moral truths, appealing to supernatural authority, may be, it is not verifiable by experience; what is not verifiable by experience cannot command credence; and what cannot command credence the people will never obey." Nor may the moral law rely upon force for its compelling power. For, he adds, "however excellent a system of moral truths, appealing merely to worldly authority, may be, it does not command respect; what does not command respect cannot command credence; and what cannot command credence the people will never obey." Mencius, the most brilliant expounder of Confucius, who lived about 300 B. C., expresses the same idea when he says: "When one by force subdues men, they do not submit in heart. When he subdues them by virtue, in their hearts' core they bless him

and sincerely submit to him." This being the case, concludes Confucius, "every system of moral law must be based upon man's own consciousness. It must be verified by the common experience of men. The moral law is not something apart from actual human life. Wherefore, the moral man in dealing with men appeals to the common human nature. When a man carries out the principles of conscientiousness and reciprocity, he is not far from the moral law. What you do not wish others should do unto you, do not do unto them."

The practical character of Confucius' mind is shown in the recognition of man's limitations which is contained in the following passage. He says: "I know now why there is no real moral law. The wise mistake the moral law for something higher than it really is; and the foolish do not fully comprehend it. I know now why the moral law is not understood. Noble natures wish to live too high, high above their ordinary moral selves; and ignoble natures do not live high enough, not even up to their ordinary moral natures." An example of this side of Confucius' teaching is to be found in the rather

famous dialogue reported in the Analects. "Some one said to Confucius," referring to Lao Tzu's command, "what do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?" The master said, "With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and reward kindness with kindness."

This eminently practical character of the Confucian ethical system and its almost complete divorce from the supernatural have had for their effects to develop a sense of purely moral obligation which would seem to be rarely reached elsewhere. A recent Chinese writer, Ku Hung Ming, who by reason of living abroad has been able to acquaint himself both with European thought and with European life, has said that the European has never been able to follow the dictates of the moral law without some ulterior motive. The mere desire to do what is right is not sufficient. He has always in the past obeyed, and even now obeys the moral law, not because he is convinced of its all compelling force, but because he either hopes for a reward or fears a punishment of some sort.

In former days Ku says the European was

prone to regard the moral law as promulgated by a supernatural authority, which had the power to reward obedience and punish disobedience. He was good because of his fear of God. On the basis of this fear were built up a theological system in which heaven and hell played a most important role, and an ecclesiastical organization with a priesthood who were ever present to warn the wicked and encourage the righteous. The result in Europe was, in his opinion, the development of an intolerable ecclesiastical tyranny which was only partially overthrown as a result of the Protestant Reformation.

He adds, finally, that with the overthrow of ecclesiastical tyranny the European endeavored to bolster up his moral code by force—by "worldly authority" as Confucius calls it—as exemplified in the policeman and soldier, with the result that Europe has for years been dominated by militarism. China has on the one hand been spared the evils of ecclesiastical tyranny because its "system of moral truths" did not "appeal to supernatural authority," and, on the other hand, has been able to develop along pacifist lines because that system did not appeal to "worldly

authority'' and therefore did not find its sanction in force.

Confucius himself would seem, however, to have been conscious of the fact that rewards and punishments have their effects in producing moral conduct. Thus in one place he is reported as saying: ''There is only now and then a man under heaven who loves what is right without expectation of reward or hates what is wrong without fear of consequences.'' But in many other places he would seem to place almost complete reliance on the force of the moral law and particularly of example. Thus he says: ''Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness and yet live his escape is the result of chance.'' And again, ''The moral man does not use rewards, yet the people are stimulated to virtues. He does not show wrath yet the people are more awed than by spears and battle-axes.''

Confucianism in its practical applications leads to or at any rate permits certain concrete results, of which Westerners would disapprove. But it can hardly be denied that many if not all these results are consistent with the existence of a high sense of moral

obligation. Many things are done by the Chinese because they are thought to be right, which Westerners may think are wrong, and on the other hand many things are left undone because they are thought to be wrong, although we might think them right. For the most part they are, however, thought to be right or wrong because they are enjoined or forbidden by the Confucian system. In other words, the accepted moral code of Confucianism has a great influence on the practical everyday life of the Chinese people.

One of the reasons for the practical influence of Confucianism is to be found in the fact that the Confucian classics have been for centuries the basis of the education of the literary class from whom the officials have in the past been chosen. The literary class has not only governed China from a political point of view. It has as well, for more than a thousand years, exercised the controlling intellectual, social and moral influence. It has been the only learned class.

The only outlet for intellectual activity has been along classical literary lines. The artificial and conventional literary standards which have developed have in China, as is

frequently the case elsewhere as well, caused the literati to live in a world by themselves, peopled with fancies which have little in common with everyday human life. To these standards the would-be scholar has had to conform if he would attain eminence and exert influence in the world of thought or of action. But, in order to be able to comply with these standards, he has been obliged to pursue an arduous and long continued course of study in the classics, and has not been able to escape from the ethical influences with which the classics are permeated. There is probably no classical literature in which ethical influence so abounds as in the Chinese. The Chinese classics are almost exclusively devoted to philosophy and ethics, and contain none of the stories of the frailties of anthropomorphic gods and goddesses which are so commonly found in the Greek and Latin classics. There have been reasons, therefore, why the Confucian ethics have been able, probably more than any other system of purely ethical theory, to exert controlling influences on the practical life of a people, in a way almost to mould that people.

Confucianism is on the one hand a philos-

ophy of individual life. On the other hand it is as well a social and a political philosophy.

Originating as it did, Confucianism could not as a philosophy for the individual escape from the influences of quietism and indifferentism which are so characteristic both of thought and of individual conduct in the Orient. The sayings of Confucius reveal in a measure the same disregard for what we Occidentals consider the good things of the world, which appears on almost every page of Lao Tzu's *Tao Teh Ching*. They also frequently express the uselessness, from the viewpoint of the wise and moral man, of striving to better one's position in the world. In one of his characteristic passages Confucius thus says:

"The moral man adapts himself to the circumstances of his life; he does not desire anything outside of his position. If he finds himself in a position of wealth and honor, he lives as becomes one living in a position of wealth and honor. If he finds himself in a position of poverty and in humble circumstances, he lives as becomes one living in a position of poverty and in humble circum-

stances. If he finds himself in uncivilized countries, he lives as becomes one living in uncivilized countries. If he finds himself in circumstances of danger and difficulty, he acts according to what is required of a man in such circumstances.

"In a word, the moral man can find himself in no situation in life in which he is not master of himself. In a high position he is not domineering to his subordinates. In a subordinate position he does not court the favors of his superiors. He puts in order his personal conduct and seeks nothing from others, making no complaint against Heaven nor railing against men. Thus it is that the moral man lives out the even tenor of his life, calmly awaiting the will of Heaven; whereas, the ordinary man takes to dangerous courses, trusting to the uncertain hazards of chance."

In the writings of either Confucius or his disciples the attributes of the moral or superior man, as some of the translators render the term into English, are set forth with great particularity. In one of the most interesting passages in "The Conduct of Life," which reads almost like a Messianic

prophecy, Confucius is reported as saying: "It is only the man with the most perfect moral nature who is able to combine in himself quickness of apprehension, intelligence, insight and understanding, qualities necessary for command; magnanimity, generosity, benignity and gentleness, qualities necessary for patience; originality, energy, strength of character and determination, qualities necessary for endurance; dignity, seriousness, order and regularity, qualities necessary for self-respect; grace, method, delicacy and lucidity, qualities necessary for critical judgment. * * *

"As soon as such a man shall make his appearance in the world, all will reverence him. Whatever he says, all will believe it. Whatever he does, all will be pleased with it. His name and his fame will spread and fill the civilized world, extending even to savage countries. Wherever ships and carriages reach; wherever the labour and enterprise of man penetrate; wherever the heavens overshadow and the earth sustains; wherever sun and moon shine; wherever frost and dew fall; all who have life and breath will honour and love him."

Confucianism seems, however, to lay particular emphasis on absolute intellectual honesty, which is the text of many of the master's teachings, and on the ability of the individual without outside aid to act in full conformity with the moral law. Thus Confucius says of himself:

"At fifteen I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty I stood firm. At forty I was free from doubt. At fifty I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy I could follow my heart's desires without transgressing what was right." Again he says: "The scholar may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop; is it not long?"

The cultivation of individual character is in Confucianism the necessary prerequisite not merely for an individual philosophy, but as well for a social and political philosophy. In the Chinese classic entitled the "Great Learning," Confucius says:

"The ancients, when they wished to exemplify illustrious virtue throughout the empire first ordered well their states. Desiring to order well their states they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families they first educated themselves. Wishing to educate themselves, they first made pure their purposes. Wishing to make pure their purposes, they first sought to think sincerely. Wishing to think sincerely, they first extended their knowledge as widely as possible. This they did by investigation of things.

"By investigation of things their knowledge became extensive; their knowledge being extensive, their thoughts became sincere; their thoughts being sincere, their purposes were made pure; their purposes being made pure, they educated themselves; being educated, their families were regulated; their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed; their states being rightly governed, their empire was thereby tranquil and prosperous."

The passage just quoted is a typical example of Confucius' method of teaching. It is of course prolix and rather tiresome, but it

shows very clearly how he tries to lead on step by step to his conclusions. It is interesting as well in that it indicates the process by which the superior or moral man is to develop; by broad study, by intellectual honesty, by purity of purpose and by self-culture. It also shows how important in Confucius' mind was the development of individual character to a proper social and political system.

Finally, one of the fundamental principles of Confucianism is that "Man is by nature good." These words form the opening line of what is called the "Three Character Classic," which is one of the first books placed in the hands of children when they begin their education. Man being by nature good, self-development even to the point of perfection is possible. Reliance on aid outside of man is unnecessary.

Confucianism is in the second place a social philosophy. As such a philosophy it starts with the family rather than with the individual as the unit, and bases itself upon the fundamental obligation of filial piety. One of the Confucian Classics is the Hsiao Ching, or Book of Filial Duty, which is supposed to

date from about 400 B. C. In this Confucius is reported as saying:

"The duty of children to their parents is the fountain, whence all other virtues spring and also the starting point from which we ought to begin our education. The first duty of a son is to pay careful attention to every want of his parents. The next is to serve his government loyally and the last to establish a good name for himself."

It will be noticed that the duty of a child is primarily to his parents and only secondarily to the state. This is by no means the only time that Confucius places the obligations of family ahead of those of the state. In the Analects it is stated that: "The Duke of She informed Confucius saying 'Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact!' Confucius said, 'Among us in our part of the country those are upright who are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.'"

The claims of family members are recog-

nized in some passages to such an extent as almost to justify nepotism. Thus Confucius says that, "The Duke of Chow addressed his son, the Duke of Lao, saying, 'The virtuous prince does not neglect his relations.' " And himself expresses the opinion that, "When those in high stations perform well their duties to their relatives, the people are aroused to virtue. When old friends are not neglected by them, the people are preserved from meanness."

Confucius' idea in thus emphasizing family loyalty and filial piety seems to have been due to his belief, expressed almost everywhere in his writings, in the force of example. As he says: "The best way to teach a people to love their sovereign is for the sovereign first to love his own parents * * * When a ruler wishes to teach his own people to love their parents, he does not go to their families every day to teach them. He teaches them by showing reverence to all old people. * * * There is nothing so great in human nature as filial piety. The feeling of affection is fostered in infancy and from that affection springs reverence. Since every man has a natural reverence, the great sages teach him

how and when to show it; and since he has a natural feeling of affection, they teach him when and how to cultivate it. As the teachings of the sages are based on the principle of filial piety, their doctrine is propagated without effort and their government is effectual without resort to force."

Confucius' reverence for the moral law was, however, so great that he felt that, notwithstanding the force of the obligation of filial piety, the command of a parent to do what was wrong should not be obeyed. On being asked by one of his disciples "Whether it is filial that a son should obey every command of his father, whether right or wrong," he replied, "What do you say? What do you say? * * * When the command is wrong a son should resist his father and a Minister his august Master. * * * How can he be called filial who obeys his father when he is commanded to do wrong?"

Finally, Confucianism is a system of political philosophy as well as a system for the individual both as an individual and as a member of society.

We have seen how much emphasis Confucius lays on individual character as the neces-

sary foundation for proper social and political relations. He not only is continually calling attention to the necessity of the development of individual character, but he is as well just as continually laying stress on the necessity of securing good character in public officials. Perhaps no passage sets forth better his belief in the close connection between good government and the individual character of public officials than the following: "With the right men," he says, "the growth of good government is as rapid as the growth of plants in the right soil. The conduct of government therefore depends upon the man. The right men are determined by the ruler's personal character. To put in order his personal character, the ruler must understand the moral law. To understand the moral law, he must use his moral sense, which is the characteristic attribute of man. Justice consists in the recognition of what is right. To honor those who are worthier than ourselves is the highest expression of the sense of justice. The relative degree of honor we ought to show to those worthier than ourselves is what gives rise to the forms and distinctions of social life. For unless social

inequalities have a real moral basis the government of the people is an impossibility. Therefore it is necessary for a man of the governing class to be a man of good personal conduct and of high character."

This reliance on the effect of individual character combined with the belief in the perfectibility of man has led the apostles of Confucianism to pay little regard to systems and organization as effective means of attaining good government.

In Confucius' history of China there is an interesting passage which indicates his opinion of the comparative value of the rule of law as opposed to the decision of the wise and upright official. In the spring of 536 B. C. one of the leading statesmen of the day decided to publish the laws on tablets of brass for the information of the people. One of the ministers of a neighboring state made to him a written protest which Confucius sets forth in full, apparently with approval. This protest reads in part as follows: "When the people become cognizant of a written law they will cease to fear their superiors and moreover will acquire a contentious spirit.

Having a book to refer to they will employ every device to elude the letter of the law. This will not do at all. * * * The advent of a written law has on three occasions connoted a decay in government. * * * You are now proceeding to embody three special collections in a new popular code, which you have had cast in metal characters. If you are doing it with a view to pacify the people, surely you will not find this an easy matter. The Book of Odes says: 'King Wen took virtue as his guide and thus gradually pacified the four quarters of the world.' It also says: 'The methods of King Wu secured the confidence of all the other countries.' Where were the written laws in those times? When people begin to get the contentious spirit in them, they will have done with the principles of propriety and only stickle for the letter; they will haggle upon every tiny point accessible to knife's edge and awl's tip. We shall witness a flood of litigation; bribery and corruption will be rampant."

This insistence on the inexpediency of the written law, this emphasis on the individual character of public officials, and this belief that man is by nature good, all combined to

justify if not to produce autocratic government to which all Asiatic peoples are prone. Furthermore, the obligation of filial piety, it was recognized, was owing to the Son of Heaven in whom as the possessor of the Mandate of Heaven all powers of government were centered. Chinese political philosophy might easily have developed into a justification of theocracy had it not been for the great stress which Confucianism laid on the omnipresence and omnipotence of the moral law, and had it not been as well for a democratic attitude of mind which would seem to be almost as old as the Chinese people themselves.

The Son of Heaven was believed to possess the Mandate of Heaven not because he was of divine or heavenly origin, as is the case with the Japanese Emperor. He had obtained the right to rule because he had conformed to the moral law and was justified in retaining it only so long as he remained virtuous. Mencius, amplifying the statement of Confucius to the effect that when a command was wrong a son should resist his father and a Minister his august Master, says: "If the king is false he should be admonished. If warned several

times and he heeds not, change him,'' and asserted that putting a bad monarch to death was not murder. When asked how a bad monarch should be overthrown he said: ''The first to act should be the royal family. If the royal family refuses to put away a bad ruler, then the ministers should act. If the ministers fail in their duty, then the Minister of Heaven.'' By the Minister of Heaven Mencius seems to have meant some one to whom the people could turn when they were dissatisfied with the Son of Heaven. For the fundamental democracy of the Chinese has caused them to feel that it is for the people to determine when and if the Mandate of Heaven has been withdrawn from a particular person or dynasty. There is an old Chinese saying which Mencius delighted to quote, to the effect that

''Heaven sees as the people see;
Heaven hears as the people hear.''

When the Mandate of Heaven was believed to have been withdrawn there was no longer any obligation of filial piety due its former possessor. And it was commonly believed to have been withdrawn after a series of misfor-

tunes and disasters had been attendant upon a dynasty. For the belief in the force of the moral law was so strong that it was inconceivable that these misfortunes would have come had the members of the dynasty acted in conformity with that law. Their troubles were due to their lack of virtue.

It is interesting to note how for thousands of years the Chinese have acted in accordance with the principles of this political philosophy. For some reason or other, whether because of an increase in the severity of the struggle for existence due to the growth of a superabundant population, or to the moral deterioration of dynasties, there have been in China since the days of Confucius great political disturbances which have occurred with an almost periodical regularity. Each such disturbance has usually been followed by the overthrow of an old dynasty and the establishment of a new one through the agency of what Mencius calls a "Minister of Heaven." Sometimes the Minister of Heaven has been a domestic rebel, as was the case with the founder of the Ming dynasty, who was a Buddhist monk. Sometimes the "Minister of Heaven" has been a foreign con-

queror, as was the case with the founder of the recently overthrown Manchu dynasty.

Such are, in brief, the general principles of Chinese philosophy, and particularly of Confucianism. That they altogether explain Chinese life may not be asserted. They may be an effect rather than a cause of the conditions which have for so long existed in China. But that the actual life of the Chinese people has been for centuries, and to a large extent is now, carried on in accordance with the principles advocated by Confucius and his followers cannot be denied. The close accord between theory and practice cannot, it would seem, fail to be of interest when we remember to how large a mass of humankind this particular philosophical system has made appeal, and for how long a time this appeal has continued with almost no diminution of its force.

We must not, however, conclude that the appeal of Confucianism will continue in the future without abatement. Forces have been for some time and are now, with increasing strength, at work, which cannot fail to change the economic conditions for which Confucianism was formulated, and to which it was

adapted. The energy and enterprise of the Occident are causing new wants to be felt, the desire to satisfy which is changing the quietism of individual Chinese life. The gradual change from an agricultural to an industrial civilization is having the effect of undermining the obligation of filial piety and making necessary the formation of social groups larger than the historic Chinese family. The greater complexity of the social organization, due to contact with the Occident, is calling for a greater governmental regulation of individual activity. More and more appeal will be made in the future to the "worldly authority" which Confucius deprecated, and less trust will be given to the mere force of moral obligation.

All of these influences will unquestionably cause a restatement of Confucian principles. On the other hand, the practical abandonment of the hitherto exclusively literary education which has resulted from the abolition of the old-time competitive examinations for entrance into the official service will make it comparatively difficult to instill into the minds of the young the moral precepts and teachings with which the Chinese classics

abound. It is, however, doubtful whether the Chinese will in the visible future abandon the distinctly agnostic and non-religious character they have had for so long. The most important thing which the West in all probability will do for them, will be, through scientific instruction, to emancipate them from their belief in the malevolence of evil spirits which must be propitiated, and both by precept and example to teach them a greater spirit of altruism and self-sacrifice in the interest of the large social groups which the change in economic conditions will unquestionably bring into being.

V

SOCIAL CHINA

V

SOCIAL CHINA

The character of the social organization of China is in very large measure determined by the family. The family is the social unit rather than the individual. As a member of a family the individual counts. As an individual alone, without regard to his family relationships, he is almost negligible. Not only is the individual submerged in the family. The family itself occupies so important a position in the social system that there is little place left for any other social group.

The importance which is accorded the family at the expense both of the individual and of other possible social groups is in accord with if not based upon the teachings of Confucianism, and particularly with the obligation of filial piety upon which Confucius lays so great an emphasis. This obligation ceases not to exist until the death of the last living ancestor, be he father, grandfather or great-grandfather. Even then the obliga-

tion of filial piety may be said to continue in the duty of ancestor worship.

One of the results of this obligation of filial piety is that the Chinese family is not, like the ordinary modern European family, a group consisting of parents and offspring, but tends rather to approximate the clan. It is composed of all the descendants of the senior living male ancestor in the male line, excluding females and their descendants, who by marriage have come under the *patria potestas* of the head of another family and including the wives of all male descendants. The head of such a group has in the past held autocratic and well-nigh unlimited powers over its members and was himself responsible for their behavior. He it was who arranged for their marriages, and his arrangements must under the penalty for filial impiety be carried out. He had the power to control their lives in other directions as well. What property they acquired and the money they earned was his should he choose to claim it. His word must be obeyed even under penalty of death for disobedience.

The only theoretical limit to the power of

the family head which was recognized under the Confucian code was that he himself must follow the moral law. As we have seen, Confucius recognized that a son should resist his father in the case of a command to do what was wrong. The only practical limit to the powers of the head of the family was the fear of public disapproval in case he should use his powers arbitrarily and oppressively. This fear of public disapproval, because of violation of the moral law, was, furthermore, a vastly greater check upon arbitrary action than would be the case among a people who relied upon force as the sanction of morals. It really seems in the case of Chinese family relations to have brought about conditions under which life could be carried on with reasonable smoothness and without undue friction.

One of the results of the emphasis laid on the obligation of filial piety was the lack of any such distinction as is made in European social life between minor and adult. No woman ever became an adult, since when she passed by marriage out of the *patria potestas* of her father, she came under that of her husband's father, and on the death of her hus-

band after the death of all his male ancestors, under the control of her eldest son. No man, whatever might be his age, passed out of the *patria potestas* of his father or other living male ancestor. Only when he was without living ancestors could he consider himself a free agent. This long continued subordination of child to parent practically denied to the young most opportunities for independent action. Very few persons in China really had in the olden days the chance to act as they wished until they reached maturity. Society therefore is and for centuries has been conservative in character. The enthusiasm of youth has had to yield to the caution of age. The development of the qualities necessary for leadership has been discouraged. Conditions in Chinese social life have in the past been much what they are in a public service in which promotion by seniority is the rule.

In modern China, that is the China which has had the closest contact with the Occident, the force of the obligation of filial piety has considerably diminished. Young Europeanized China has been in a measure emancipated from parental despotism. This eman-

cipation has not, however, been general throughout the country and where it has come, has come so recently that it may not be said that the obligation of filial piety has so diminished as seriously to have changed the historic conditions of the country. It is to be remembered, however, that it is the first step which costs. The first step has, it would seem, been taken. Much more rapid progress in the direction of limiting the power of the father may be expected in the future. If China becomes industrial in character, the migration of population which will follow, the grouping of operatives in factories, away from parental control, cannot fail to have the same effects in China as are noticeable in Japan, where the obligation of filial piety in the Chinese sense has almost ceased to exist in the industrial districts.

The subjection to the family head of all the members of a family group so comprehensive as is the Chinese family has had the further effect of producing great economic solidarity in that group.

The holding of property in common even after the death of the common ancestor has thus been encouraged. The habits engen-

dered during his life are not easily broken after he passes away. The management of the family property is assumed either by the eldest son or by the son who by common consent is regarded as most worthy of the trust. As the means of communication are generally very poor and as the duty of ancestor worship at the family shrine is an imperative one, there is comparatively little migration of population. Large family groups often therefore form the bulk if not the entirety of the population of particular villages. The family system thus often brings about what is really village ownership of property, notwithstanding that individual ownership may theoretically be recognized.

This economic solidarity of the family has its advantages and disadvantages. It evokes a sense of family responsibility for family members which makes unnecessary much action upon the part of the government required under a more individualistic regime. There is, thus, little need of anything in the nature of public poor relief. For the family is there to assist its necessitous members. Nor is there any great demand for an elaborate police system, since the comprehensive

powers of the head of the family together with the general respect for the moral law may be relied on to secure proper behavior on the part of individuals.

It must be admitted, however, that this sense of family solidarity has as one of its coincidents if not one of its effects, a diminished sense of individual responsibility. If one may believe what one hears, family solidarity leads to the existence of a too numerous class of persons who, if not exactly ne'er-do-wells, are perfectly willing to take life easily, knowing, as they do, that they may look to their family for assistance. On the other hand, it is a great drain upon the energies of those members of the family who are successful. Because of their sense of family loyalty they alone must bear burdens whose weight should be distributed among all the members of the family group. It offers a great temptation for those in positions of trust to use their powers in the family interest.

The economic solidarity of the family, particularly in so far as it has had as one of its results the common ownership of property, has brought about also a closer approxima-

tion to equality in the distribution of productive wealth than is ordinarily to be found elsewhere.

The main form of property in China is, because of the agricultural character of its civilization, landed property. Apart from the securities of foreign controlled enterprises, which are beginning to be purchased by the Chinese, really the only investments which a Chinese can make are in land and pawnbroking establishments. These latter undertakings are much more dignified in character than their analogues in European countries. They partake somewhat of the nature of banks, but, like European pawnbrokers, also loan money on personal property as security, charging inconceivably exorbitant rates of interest. But the amount of capital which is invested in this way cannot but be comparatively small. It is in the land in which the great mass of Chinese capital is to be found. Family ownership of land therefore means family ownership of practically all property.

This family ownership of land acts in a measure in somewhat the same way as does a suspension of the power of alienation. For

every member of the family must give his consent in order that an alienation of property may be made. Even in the case of land legally owned by an individual and not by the family, the members of the family have the right to purchase it before it can legally be purchased by an outsider. Furthermore, while mortgages of land have long been recognized, there was in the olden days no limit to the time in which the power of redemption might be exercised, and there was no such a thing as the foreclosure of a mortgage. That is, at any time any member of the family, even a descendant who might be of a generation or two subsequent to the date of the mortgage could redeem by paying the sum advanced by the mortgagee regardless of the increased value of the property if its value had increased. He furthermore could in many cases redeem from the mortgage without the payment of interest charges. For there were often no interest charges, since the mortgagee commonly took possession of the property at the time the mortgage was made and himself enjoyed such profit as could be made out of it.

It was in the old days difficult therefore for

anyone whatever might be his wealth to obtain possession of great amounts of land. Landed property consequently was held ordinarily in very small parcels. The purchase of large tracts was difficult if not impossible because of the great number of sellers whose consent must be obtained, as well as because of the prior right of purchase possessed by members of the family. Acquisition by mortgage was still more difficult because of the difficulty of foreclosure and because of the unlimited period of redemption. Transfer by execution in satisfaction of a debt could not be made because an individual debt was not a liability which must be met out of family property. Indeed, and probably for this reason, the law knew no such thing as a civil execution for debt and relied almost entirely on the threat of criminal punishment for failure to carry out a civil obligation. It has been said that family property was not liable for the debt of an individual family member. This is strictly true. At the same time the family was ordinarily informed when the criminal penalty, which usually consisted of corporal punishment, would be inflicted, so that it might have the opportunity by paying the

debt to save its defaulting member from the pains and penalties of the law.

Seldom would resort be had to the courts whichwere not, as we have seen, in good odor. A disappointed creditor might, of course, commit suicide on the family doorstep of the debtor. This action on his part would often start an official investigation into the circumstances of the case with results usually disastrous to the debtor's family who were thus brought into court with the prospect of financial ruin. Whether it did or did not lead to such an inquiry, the suicide of a creditor would it was believed in such circumstances have the certain effect of causing the enraged spirit of the deceased to exercise from the spirit world a malevolent influence over the fortunes of the debtor's family.

It must not be understood that there have been no large landed estates. There have been some which were worked by tenants rather than by the owners. But the law, or perhaps we should say the custom of tenancy, has been quite favorable to the tenant. It was not considered the proper thing for a landlord arbitrarily to raise the rent of a tenant in possession. If a landlord felt that he might

justly demand a higher rent he would confer with the tenant. If the two could agree, well and good. If an agreement were impossible, a council of the neighbors would be called, probably on the occasion of a dinner, which in China possibly even more than elsewhere conduces to good feeling. The matter would be laid before this council and the parties concerned would ordinarily abide by the judgment of the arbitrators.

The penalty for failing to accept that judgment would be again the disapproval of the public. When a Chinese thus loses the approval of his neighbors he "loses face," to use the literal translation of the Chinese term. Losing face involves a good deal more than would at first appear. It connotes loss of self-respect, which it is thought must come, as the result of the feeling that one has failed to observe the moral law as commonly conceived.

Finally very imperfect powers of testamentary disposition were recognized. Normally all land on the death of the owner vested in his sons, or in their male issue. The daughters received nothing since if married—and there are practically no unmarried wom-

en of marriageable age—they have passed under the *patria potestas* of their husband's family. In case there was a widow or unmarried daughter the obligation of filial piety compelled the sons or brothers to provide for them.

For these various reasons a landholding class which has political or great social influence because of the economic dependence of a host of tenants was impossible in China. The absence of such a class, furthermore, made impossible that exploitation of the many by the few which is frequently due to the obligation to pay rent.

Contact with the west is, however, changing the old law with regard to land, which is becoming more easily purchasable. If the course adopted in India under British rule follows in China we may expect to see in the latter country the development of a land-holding class on the one hand and of tenants on the other. Whether this will be of advantage to the country is a question. That such a development will very greatly modify the Chinese social system cannot be doubted.

The character of China's industrial system also has been such that any large industrial

exploitation of the poorer classes has been impossible. The problems which have loomed so large in European economic history under the name of rent and wages have thus been non-existent. Equality in the distribution of wealth, due to the influence of the family on the ownership of land, to household industry, and to the close union of the employer and artisan have relieved China's social organization from many of the perplexities which have vexed the European. The class struggle which socialists are accustomed to emphasize so much appears hardly to have occurred.

The social and economic troubles which China has experienced would seem to be due almost exclusively to the growth of a superabundant population which seems to have taken place regularly during periods of prosperity. For this plethora of people the family system and the obligation of filial piety would seem also to have had some share of responsibility.

It has been said that the obligation of filial piety continues after the death of the father in the obligation of ancestor worship. This worship must be continuous. Any break in it is regarded as deplorable, whether from the

point of view of the dead or of that of the living, it is difficult to say. Ancestor worship must, however, be carried on, and it must be carried on by the male descendants. The female descendants pass into another family when they marry and as there are practically no old maids in China the women of the family may not be relied on for the purposes of ancestor worship even if they were regarded as worthy to officiate, which they are not. The great wish of all fathers, therefore, is for sons. One result is early marriages, for no one with the uncertainty as to the sex of possible future offspring, can begin too early to ensure the existence of qualified posterity. Furthermore, as the infant mortality rate is frightfully high, posterity of the desired sex can ordinarily be assured only through large families. This desire for male offspring is responsible for two other peculiarities of Chinese social life. The first is concubinage. The Chinese are from one point of view a monogamous people. No man can have more than one lawful wife. It is, however, quite proper for him to have as many secondary consorts, to use a Chinese euphemism, as he may desire. These consorts live in the home

with the wife and are theoretically subject to her control. Such children as they may have are legitimate and are regarded as the children of the lawful wife to whom rather than to their natural mother they owe the obligation of filial piety. It is said that the custom of concubinage is in some measure at any rate due to the desire that male offspring may be assured and that it is frequently the case that a wife who has had no sons will urge her husband to take a secondary consort so that provision may be made for the proper continuance of the worship of the family ancestors. The institution of concubinage, however, may not probably be regarded as promoting domestic felicity. For the Chinese character for "quarrelsome" has developed out of a pictograph which represents a house with two women in it.

The desire for male offspring is also responsible for the institution of adoption. Where early marriages, secondary consorts and a great number of children have not had for their effect male offspring to carry on the worship of the family ancestors, custom both permits and requires as a last resort that a suitable person be adopted into the family.

Usually it is a near relative, perferably a nephew, who is chosen. One thus adopted inherits his adopted father's property as well as the obligation of ancestor worship.

Early marriages, secondary consorts and large families, for all of which the family system is in a measure responsible, have naturally favored the growth of a large population. If a child is an economic asset rather than a liability in an agricultural state of civilization we have an economic motive coinciding, with the injunctions of a philosophic, quasi-religious system in encouraging men to breed regardless of the relation which the means of subsistence bears to the numbers to be fed.

Population under these conditions increases very rapidly and is subject only to the repressive checks which come from disease, famine, pestilence and political disturbance. The vigor of the Chinese race has been so great that disease, famine and pestilence have not been effective in keeping the population within the margin of subsistence. The standard of living has under the pressure of population fallen very low even in normal times. In times of scarcity it has dropped so far that

many have in despair abandoned the effort to get a living in a legitimate way. They have formed bands of robbers and brigands who have preyed upon the peaceful and law-abiding. Either these bands have been put down with a ruthless severity which has caused the loss of many lives, or, if successful for any length of time in their depredations, they have caused the people to believe that the "Son of Heaven" has offended against the moral law and has therefore forfeited his mandate to rule. Civil war has resulted. Usually when this has occurred, the war has lasted for years. Millions of people have died. A new Son of Heaven, who has obtained the mandate to rule as a result of victory on the field of battle, has placed himself on the dragon throne. Quiet is restored. The population begins again to increase until its pressure is too great, and the same troubles appear and the process is repeated. This is what has happened time and again in the long history of the country. Furthermore, these political disturbances seem to occur with an almost rhythmic regularity. No dynasty since the days of the First August Emperor has lasted more than four hundred years. Pres-

ent conditions in China would seem to exemplify one of these periods of disturbance which have been so characteristic of Chinese history. Whether as one of their results a new Son of Heaven will emerge or whether the influences of western ideas will bring about a change in the normal development of the past, it is, of course, impossible to predict.

The extreme pressure of population upon subsistence which has so long been characteristic of China has had two other quite marked effects, either on individual character, or on Chinese society.

In the first place the standard of living, as has been said, is normally very low. This is true of diet, of clothes and of general habits of life. The diet, it must be confessed, is nourishing but monotonous, being almost exclusively vegetable and relying for the fats, which ordinarily give flavor, upon vegetable oils. The clothes are of the simplest description, are worn for long periods, and it may be said almost never change in style. The general habits of life are such as to encourage a thrift, which seems to the European to border on parsimony. Almost nothing is wasted. Things which almost anywhere else go into

the scrap heap are in China treasured with care.

It is interesting to note how at any place where many persons are gathered together will be found men who have collected and offer for sale a miscellaneous assortment of apparently worthless articles, such as odd buttons, empty tin cans, glass bottles or pieces of metal, articles which we would never take the trouble even to pick up. A story is told by an American resident in China which well illustrates how this economy is carried at times to the nth power. He was traveling through rural China and came across one of these junk dealers. There was exposed for sale among other it is to be hoped more valuable articles the body of a dead cat. He asked the merchant for what purpose he intended to sell it. The answer was: "That is not my business. That is the affair of him who buys it."

This great economy with which the Chinese must live has apparently had the further effect, paradoxical as it may seem, of producing an extremely cheerful race, blessed with an abounding sense of humor. For it is not possible for men to live after the manner of the

great majority of the Chinese, unless they have to some extent at any rate risen above the delights of the flesh, and have acquired the feeling that such things do not really count, and unless they have a saving sense of humor which enables them to take pleasure in little things. For ordinarily life is very monotonous, devoid of amusement and devoted to unremitting toil. The colorless character of existence is unquestionably in large measure responsible for the opium habit about which we have heard so much. The alcohol question does not exist and is replaced by the opium problem. One has not in China either the money or the inclination to drink and forget one's troubles.

This disregard of what we deem the good things of life, while it enables the Chinese to live the life into which they have been born, has, however, as one of its effects the discouragement of material progress. The Chinese, like most other Orientals, are passive rather than resistant. They accept what falls to them with resignation even perhaps with cheerfulness. They endeavor to adapt themselves to their environment. They have little of that desire to conquer nature which is so

characteristic of the European and which would seem to be a compound of intellectual curiosity and an aggressive spirit. This is probably one of the chief reasons why the Chinese have not of themselves made any progress in science. They lack the incentive to study systematically the ways of nature, and fail therefore to better their material conditions.

It may well be imagined that this extraordinary economy and this remarkable cheerfulness in the face of adversity make a combination which is of great value to them when they come into economic competition with other peoples. It is difficult to see how such competition could result in anything but a Chinese victory if the Chinese ever change their philosophic attitude of mind and devote their unquestionable intelligence to the pursuit of science.

A social effect of the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is the inability to accumulate capital. Where so many mouths are to be fed and so many bodies are to be clothed and housed, there is little left over when the year comes to an end, what-

ever may be the economy which is practiced. Accumulation of capital can come only from saving. Where property is equally distributed, where there is little if any exploitation of the many by the few, it is difficult to comprehend how great saving can result. For much of what the many lose by economic exploitation is saved by the wealthy few, who cannot spend what they thus obtain. A man of wealth has only one mouth to be fed and one body to be housed and clothed. He may, it is true, eat somewhat more than a poor man, he may wear more expensive clothes and inhabit a more luxurious dwelling. But even conceding this he will find it more difficult to spend his income than will the poor man. The accumulation of capital is by and large due to the saving of the well-to-do. Where there are none or a very few of this class accumulation of large amounts of capital is not possible in a social scheme based on individual ownership of property. In China prosperity promotes increase of population and is not followed by accumulation of capital.

Capital has not then been accumulated in any amount in China and apparently because of the great pressure of population and of the

equality in the distribution of property. There are very few large undertakings requiring any considerable draft on domestic capital which are entered into by the Chinese. Furthermore, almost everything that is done in the way of building for example is done in a temporary and makeshift manner. One of the most common things to be seen in the wet season is the fallen walls of houses which have been undermined by the rains. When they fall they are rebuilt out of the old bricks and in the same old flimsy manner. This operation is repeated year after year. Finally, nothing is repaired except under the compulsion of necessity. "A stitch in time saves nine" is not an adage which finds very wide application in China.

So while the Chinese are economical and cheerful under conditions which would be discouraging to other peoples they are quite the reverse of efficient. One can hardly repress the feeling that this inefficiency is itself one of the causes of their unfavorable economic conditions. These would seem, of course, to be due in part to their manner of living combined with the lack of capital. But that the Chinese contempt of the benefits of a

materialistic philosophy of life has a measure of responsibility one can hardly doubt.

The long duration of the social system without serious interruption, or any real relapse of civilization into barbarism, the tremendous pressure of population, which makes disorder and violence excessively dangerous to social progress or even to social life itself, the non-militaristic habits of the people and the acceptance of a philosophy of life which denounces force as a proper sanction of morals, have all combined to produce a gentleness and courtesy of behavior which it would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere. The small acts of life must, in accordance with the dictates of an elaborate code of etiquette which finds its sanction if not its origin in Confucianism, be performed with a ceremony always bewildering to the European. When European conduct is compared with that of Chinese even of a humble social station it seems distinctly crude. By the side of the high-grade Chinese the high-grade European smacks of the barbarian.

Certain of the conventions required by Chinese courtesy unquestionably give the impression of insincerity. They would seem to

have originated partly at any rate in the desire to avoid giving offense which might cause disturbance, since disturbance serious in nature might disarrange the social system. As Professor Ross says in his interesting book, "The Changing Chinese," the Chinese are like people in a crowded boat. Under such conditions any behavior must be avoided which will disturb the boat's balance. "Don't rock the boat" is a principle which must be sedulously applied if the boat in a condition of unstable equilibrium is not to be upset.

At the same time the Chinese are a very faithful and kindly people. The severe discipline to which their conditions of existence have subjected them would seem to have caused them to realize that social life is impossible unless the individual recognizes that he has duties as well as rights. Their cheerful disposition together with the character of their system of morals would seem to have had as a result a very kindly attitude on their part toward their fellows.

This kindly disposition would seem, however, not to be accompanied by any very marked outward manifestations of practical altruism toward those not members of the

family. The family system has so moulded the social life as to have made, under the conditions for which it has been responsible, such a thing as charity almost unnecessary. It has, furthermore, so emphasized family obligations as to have little room for the recognition of obligations to outsiders. When one considers the simple nature of China's agricultural life, one can understand how under these conditions economic co-operation on any large scale has been impossible. When one remembers how perilously near to the advocacy of nepotism are the admonitions of the Confucian philosophy, one can understand some of the difficulties which beset the growth of political co-operation.

The social conditions of China, which would seem to be in large measure the result of her agricultural life and her family system, are characterized then by great equality in the distribution of property; by the consequent absence of influential social classes based upon the possession of wealth; by little if any economic exploitation; by the lack of capital and of capacity for social co-operation; and by the absence of initiative and qualities of leadership. When we consider in connection

with these characteristics that her philosophy of life is largely one of quietism and that her educational system, if such it can be called, has until very recently embraced exclusively philosophical and literary studies which in the nature of things are not of much assistance in the conquest of nature, we can readily understand why Chinese society has not been progressive. Someone has said that through our education we should learn not merely to make a living but as well how to live. If we adopt this distinction perhaps we might justly say that while China has learned how to live she has not learned how to make a living when judged by the standards of western life.

The observations which have so far been made with regard to social China have been made more particularly with the conditions of old China in mind. But notwithstanding the long period during which the country has been subjected to the influences of the occident, it is nevertheless true that apart from the treaty ports, those observations would still probably hold good with regard to what we are accustomed to speak of as modern China. Their truth is seen when we observe the difficulty which China is having in trans-

forming herself under the pressure put upon her by foreign nations.

That China can adapt herself to the conditions of modern European life without outside assistance is inconceivable. She has not the capital necessary for her economic reorganization. She cannot without funds derived from abroad build the railways necessary in order to improve her means of communication, particularly between the north and the south—an undertaking which must be accomplished if she would preserve her national unity. Without resort to foreign capital she cannot enter upon the exploitation of her vast mineral resources, or erect and equip the factories necessary in order that she herself may fashion into their finished form the raw materials which she produces. Even had she the capital it is doubtful if she could use it effectively. For owing to the character of her educational system and to her exaggerated sense of family loyalty, she has neither the technical ability nor the present capacity for the social cooperation necessary to enable her to manage successfully large undertakings, which are quite foreign to her historic economic life.

China must therefore, if she is to modernize

herself, rely greatly upon outside assistance. Her great problem is to secure that assistance under such conditions as will not place her in a position of abject dependence upon the foreigner from either a political or economic point of view. This is a problem which is by no means easy of solution. But it must be solved to enable China to retain her independence. Her resources must be made available for the world which is becoming hungrier and hungrier as the days go by for the abundant mineral stores which she possesses but which she has as yet hardly begun to touch.

China's solution of this question is undoubtedly tied up very closely with her solution of her domestic political problems. She must devise a form of political organization which will be satisfactory to her own people and will at the same time give her the strength to secure peace at home and resist aggression from abroad. The more specific nature of China's political problem will be the subject of the next chapter.

VI

POLITICAL CHINA

VI

POLITICAL CHINA

The political system which China possessed at the time of the recent overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the republic was, as we have seen, fixed by the First August Emperor, about 250 B. C. It was in form an autocracy. This form was favored by the social and economic conditions of the country and found its theoretical justification in the principles of Confucianism.

Social and economic conditions favored the development of autocracy for a number of reasons. In the first place, the family system and the recognition of the obligation of filial piety encouraged habits of subordination. The individual who during his years of greatest vigor and energy had without serious protest yielded obedience to the commands of the family head was not likely, when he reached maturity, to disobey the injunctions of those who were set in authority over him, particularly when the ethical system which enjoined

submission to parental authority likewise required obedience to the father of his people, the Son of Heaven, and to his representatives.

Furthermore, the sense of family loyalty upon which so much emphasis was laid, made, as has been explained, social co-operation outside of the family group extremely difficult. Experience has shown that a successful struggle against autocracy requires concerted action by large groups, from the members of which great sacrifices are often demanded. The development of this capacity for sacrifice in the interest of a group not composed of members of the same family was not favored by the Chinese social system.

Again the great equality in the distribution of wealth, which was the result of the property arrangements, did not encourage the growth of social classes based on the possession of property. The history of the rise of popular government in Europe reveals the fact that all attempts to establish the absolute monarchy met with the resistance of the landholding aristocracy conscious of common interests which were irreconcilable with those of the Crown. It was the great feudal

nobles, secular and ecclesiastical, who on the field of Runnymede wrested Magna Charta from King John. In China, however, there has not been since the days of the feudalism destroyed by the First August Emperor any class possessed of either economic or political power which could be successfully opposed to the autocratic crown. Economic conditions made impossible the existence of a land-holding aristocracy. Intellectual and religious conditions did not develop any class such as is to be found in the European mediaeval church with its Bishops and Abbots, often themselves large landholders. The economic basis of the mediaeval church which was a part of the European feudal system was lacking in China, while the fact that the Son of Heaven was High Priest as well as Emperor prevented the development in China of any class which could claim authority from a supernatural source.

Indeed, the only classes under the old regime in the Middle Kingdom which were conscious of common interests and on that account could exercise any political influence were the *literati* and the merchants.

The *literati* were by far the more influen-

tial. They owed their position to the great respect which the people paid to learning. Those of the *literati* who were successful at the competitive examinations for entrance into the civil service had the additional prestige which was incident to official station. But those who were unsuccessful still exercised a great influence in the neighborhoods in which they resided. They constituted a class which has sometimes been spoken of as the "local gentry," which would appear to have been the only class consulted even in an informal way by the officials.

The merchants were naturally to be found for the most part in the cities, and in the last years of the old regime the most influential merchants were frequently treated as belonging to the local gentry and as a result had occasionally the opportunity of expressing their opinion on public questions to the officials. The merchants were generally, however, organized in gilds which were at the same time secret societies. In these organizations trade and industrial policies were determined upon and trade disputes adjusted. These gilds had no formal official recognition. Nor in theory were the judg-

ments of the gilds enforceable. As a matter of fact, however, anyone who refused to abide by those judgments soon found that he had made a mistake. He was subjected to a boycott. The boycott was employed by the Chinese centuries before the Irish captain whose name has enriched the English language became entitled to the fame which has since been his. In extreme cases resort was had to violence and even to murder where other means were unavailing in securing obedience to gild judgments. There was a rather famous contest between the European municipality of Shanghai, which endeavored to fix the tariffs of the wheelbarrow men and their gild which because of the strength of the gild organization resulted in the defeat of the municipality.

The victim of a boycott never received any protection from the hands of the government. He was almost an outlaw against whom any man's hand might be raised with impunity. This position of one who did not conform to what were regarded as the rules of conduct befitting one in his station was due partly to the *laisser faire* policy so generally adopted, and partly to the view taken by the govern-

ment that family and commercial relations were beneath its notice. Furthermore, the individual who was not a member of a family and if a merchant not a member of a gild had little if any standing. Individual rights hardly existed as such. Only when one was a member of one of the recognized social groups did he count for anything in the life of the state.

For one reason or another the gilds, perhaps because they were secret organizations, never took any part in politics, or government. They were furthermore formed for business reasons and like the earthen vessels in the fable feared collision with the iron pots which were floating with them down the stream of life.

Neither the *literati* nor the merchants were strong enough, however, to exercise more than a restraining influence on the autocracy.

Apart from the *literati* and the merchants there was no class which could exercise any appreciable political influence. China's social organization consisted of a vast number of persons on a dead level of mediocrity incapable of co-operation and without leadership.

This almost inert mass had, however, a great capacity for passive resistance, and, when it felt it was unjustly treated, was capable of sporadic outbursts of passion which made the position of the subordinate officials uncomfortable if not perilous. On more than one occasion Chinese mobs, angered by what they deemed unjust treatment, have dragged magistrates from their yamens and thrown them into some dirty stream or pond. When such occurrences took place the magistrates thus treated were deemed so to have lost face as to make necessary their transfer to some other station.

While the Chinese under autocratic government had no participation in the selection of their immediate rulers they did through this crude method of "recall" have considerable influence in securing their removal.

This theoretically autocratic government was, however, not nearly so despotic in practice as at first it might seem.

Thus the *laisser faire* policy which has always been pursued had for its effect that the government seldom came into contact with the people except as a result of the collection of taxes and the administration of jus-

tice. In the case of justice it is further to be remembered that family matters as well as affairs of commerce seldom came before the courts. The collection of the public revenues and the administration of the criminal law were therefore almost the only normal functions of government. There was it is true a military administration, but during most of the term of the late dynasty the army was in the main composed of members of the Manchu, the ruling, race. There were in the old days no poor relief, no public schools, no highway administration, no postal service—in fact, few if any of the services apart from revenue and justice which we commonly associate with government.

Government therefore did not mean as much to the people as it has come to mean to the European. Its character was not on that account a matter of great importance, provided it did not use its taxing powers oppressively nor make unjust use of its authority to punish the commission of crimes.

Further, the respect for the moral law was so great, any serious deviation from it was regarded with such abhorrence, custom which

was in a way identified with the moral law had so much force as a rule of conduct, that the theoretically unlimited powers of the Son of Heaven like the powers of the Chinese *paterfamilias* were as a matter of fact subject to serious practical limitations.

The Chinese also had two institutions which tended to add strength to the injunctions of the moral law. These were the Censorship and the Official History.

The Censorship was entrusted to a Board of Censors who were supposed to call the attention of even the Son of Heaven to the error of his ways and to impeach any official no matter how high might be his rank who was believed to be guilty of misconduct. While the Censorship undoubtedly exercised a restraining influence over the actions of the government, on occasion a too zealous censor met with disaster, suffering decapitation or other punishment. Instances are not unknown when censors who knew their animadversions on imperial conduct would be ill received have followed their strictures by immediate suicide. Such action on their part would both attract attention to their opinions which otherwise they might not receive and

also would have, it was believed, somewhat the same bad effect on the person whose conduct was censured, which all suicides under somewhat similar conditions were thought to have.

The Official History was a history which while written during the life of the reigning Son of Heaven was never published until after the fall of the dynasty. But provision was always made for an official historian who, it was known, was writing the history of the reign and was expected to do his work without fear or favor. Such a check upon autocratic action may seem to us practical Europeans a futile one. But it must be remembered that the immortality which the Chinese think of is their memory in the minds of posterity. The fear that they may be execrated and the general respect for the moral law unquestionably made this check more effective than it at first blush would seem to be.

But probably the most important safeguard against oppression was the general acceptance of the principle upon which Mencius laid such stress that the Mandate of Heaven would be withdrawn from the Son of Heaven in case of loss of virtue, and that in

final analysis the people were to judge when this virtue was lost. No such detestable doctrines as the divine right of kings and the duty of non-resistance on the part of the people ever found a place in Chinese thought.

It would hardly be worth our while to attempt anything in the nature of a detailed description of the Chinese system of government and administration as it existed prior to the establishment of the republic. That system certainly so far as concerns its details is now but a historical reminiscence. But as no country, however radical may be the purposes of its leaders, is able to make an extremely violent break with the past, a few words as to the general character of the former system are necessary if we are to obtain an understanding of China's present political problems.

The first thing to be noticed with regard to the system which has now passed away is that with the exception of the choice of the officers to whom powers of administration were entrusted it was very decentralized. All of the important officers, even including the district magistrates, were, it is true, appointed at Peking. Once appointed, however,

they acted in accordance with the dictates of their own discretion within the limits of the province subject to their jurisdiction. At the head of each province there was usually a governor, who had almost complete control within his province. Occasionally two or perhaps three provinces were grouped under the jurisdiction of a viceroy. But the governor or the viceroy, as the case might be, was the representative in every direction of government activity of the Son of Heaven. He had by his side in important strategic points a representative of the army, the provincial Manchu general, as he was called, who shared with him the powers of military administration. But in no other respect was there any check upon his discretion. He was there to govern his district and he himself did not form a part of any particular imperial service. With the Manchu general he administered the army, which was a provincial rather than a national army, and alone he carried on such foreign relations as he was obliged to enter into, though under the Manchu regime the policy of exclusiveness which was adopted was intended to eliminate all relations with foreign powers. He also super-

vised the collection of the revenue and the administration of justice and did what was necessary to preserve the public peace and conserve the public safety against such things as the ravages of bandits and the inundations of rivers.

The duty and responsibility of the governor were, however, strictly limited by the boundaries of his province. If, for example, in the performance of his duties to preserve the public peace he drove a band of robbers into a neighboring province he had acquitted himself of all that was required of him. If in protecting his own province from inundation he adopted a plan of river conservation which had for its necessary effect the flooding of an adjoining province, so much the worse for that province and its unfortunate governor.

There were thus no central services and little if any attempt at provincial co-operation. This system of government was a source of great weakness in the case of hostilities with a foreign power, for it was seldom that the whole force of the nation could be employed against the enemy. We usually speak of the Chinese-Japanese war of 1894-5.

As a matter of fact, however, few of the Chinese outside of the provinces of Chili and Fukien probably knew at the time that there was any war. The war was really waged between Japan on the one hand and two or three Chinese provinces on the other. Under such a system, furthermore, the development of anything in the nature of a national spirit was practically impossible. Every member of the Great Nation thought of himself as an Honan man or an Anhui or a Hupeh man rather than as a member of the great Chinese Empire. That is, he thought of himself in this way if he thought of the subject at all. In all probability the vision of most Chinese was so contracted that they seldom got a glimpse beyond the confines of the little district in which they lived. It is said that in 1861, on the occasion of the Anglo-French expedition to Peking, as a result of which that city was opened to the foreigner, much of the transportation of the European armies was attended to by Chinese coolies who were brought up from the south.

Almost the only relations which the provincial officers had with Peking consisted in sending on to the capital the provincial trib-

ute from which the expenses of the Imperial Court were defrayed and in cementing those personal connections which were necessary in order to secure promotion or even retention in office. Public position was secured, as has been said, through competitive examinations. Promotions up to a certain point were obtained in the same way, but the actual assignment of individual persons to particular positions was made in the discretion of the Peking authorities, often by the choice of what were known as expectant officials, that is, those qualified but not as yet appointed. Furthermore, certain posts were much more desirable than others, and changes were made in almost every important post as often as once in three years. This habit of frequent changes in the incumbents of official billets was originally due apparently to the desire upon the part of the Peking court to prevent any official from securing such a strong position in any locality as to acquire any of the characteristics of a feudal magnate. The same anxiety to prevent the growth of dangerous local power is seen also in the rule in accordance with which no one could be appointed to a post in his native province or

was permitted to marry in the province in which he was appointed. Everything was so arranged as to make an official of high rank a stranger in a strange land.

This scheme of transferring officials from province to province had one curious effect, which was of considerable value in developing national unity. It brought with it a great extension of the official spoken language, the Mandarin, as it is called. For no official could be expected to learn the local tongues of all the districts to which he might be appointed. Those who had to deal with officials found it on that account desirable to acquire a knowledge of official spoken Chinese. In the spread of this tongue lies one of the hopes of China. For it is only as the spoken tongue becomes universal that a phonetic alphabet may be expected to develop, which will be capable of general use, and that the spoken and the written languages may become identical. Progress in this direction has already begun.

The habit of frequent transfers of officials from one post to another and their consequent short terms in any particular province ultimately, however, became the cause of con-

siderable abuse and did much to cause the whole system to deteriorate. The most desirable posts in the later days of the Manchus were often, and largely because of the poverty of the Imperial Court, given to what amounted to the highest bidder. Sometimes the purchase price went into the imperial treasury, but often it found its resting place in the pockets of one of the palace eunuchs who time and time again in Chinese history have exercised great political influence generally pernicious in character.

Inasmuch as official salaries were quite inadequate, and officials were thought to be justified in recompensing themselves in indirect and even in illegitimate ways, the official who had paid a large amount to secure the desired position had to recoup himself out of the revenues of his bailiwick. He must further get his profit in the short term during which he was permitted to remain at a particular post. This he did by squeezing the officials under him, who in their turn squeezed their subordinates, and ultimately the people paid the bill. All officials under the system were between the devil and the deep sea. They must render unto Caesar the things

which were believed to be his, but they must do this in such a way as not to oppress the people to the point of open and violent resistance.

The whole system thus ultimately got to be a system of the farming of offices which usually leads to oppression and is almost always accompanied by corruption. The Chinese theory that man is by nature good, with its application that officials were assumed to be upright, combined with the national reluctance to adopt the rule of the written law with its limitations upon official discretion, brought it about that in the later troubled days of the Manchu dynasty Chinese government was both inefficient and corrupt.

This system of ultra provincial autonomy was gradually modified as a result of contact with the European. The first point of contact was in the south at Canton. The first Europeans with whom the Chinese had relations were the Portuguese, who came to the country in the latter days of the Ming dynasty, the predecessors of the Manchus. The Mings were of Chinese origin and like most of the rulers prior to the Manchus had none of the exclusiveness which characterized

those alien conquerors of China. The Portuguese established themselves at Macao. They were followed by the Dutch. Both the Portuguese and the Dutch, who had a good deal of the freebooter about them, did much to arouse a prejudice among the Chinese against both the European and the Christian. Unquestionably, the behavior of those Europeans whom the Chinese first came to know must have convinced them that the European was a barbarian from whom little that was good could come except such profit as might be incident to a closely regulated commerce and was largely responsible for the policy of exclusiveness which was subsequently adopted.

The English followed the Portuguese and the Dutch; indeed, in large measure supplanted them. The China trade was a part of the original monopoly of the East Indian Company and was at first centered at Canton, where trade was carried on under restrictions and limitations which must have been very humiliating to the British, fresh from their triumphs in India. In the early part of the 19th century America also participated in this Canton trade.

Partly due to Chinese oppression, but mainly because of European aggressiveness, the peaceful relations of the Chinese and the foreigners were disturbed. Wars resulted, in which Great Britain bore the brunt of the struggle and other points of contact between China and Europe were provided. This was done by treaties and the places designated as places where commerce with the European might be carried on were given the name of treaty ports. The most important of these places, outside of Canton, were Shanghai, about the mouth of the Yangste valley, and Tientsin in the north. In addition, Great Britain secured for herself the island of Hongkong, which became a crown colony and altogether exempted from Chinese jurisdiction.

The early part of the 19th century was characterized both in Great Britain and in this country by a great missionary enthusiasm, which resulted in the sending of missionaries to preach the gospel of Christ in heathen lands. The first Protestant missionary to China was Robert Morrison. The British East India Company did not believe that it was desirable to encourage Christian

missions in the East, fearing the problems which it was thought would certainly arise as a result of their activities. Morrison was therefore unable to obtain passage to China on a British ship and was obliged to make his journey to the country by way of the United States.

Prior to the coming into China of Protestant missionaries, the Roman Catholics had made great progress there. Coming as they did before the Chinese policy of exclusiveness had been adopted, they obtained a firm foothold in the country. Indeed, they all but persuaded the Chinese to adopt Christianity as the official religion, and would in all probability have succeeded had they not entered into what now seems to have been a foolish theological controversy with the Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi. As a result they fell into disfavor, although individual men continued to exercise great influence at court.

The opening of certain Chinese ports by the treaties which ended what were primarily commercial wars seemed to those interested in missionary endeavor to be too good an opportunity to spread the gospel to be neglected. Consequently provisions were in-

serted in those treaties which opened China to mission work. All of this happened about the middle of the 19th century, when China was weakened greatly by the breaking out of the Tai Ping rebellion in central China.

The Tai Ping rebellion was an effort upon the part of the Chinese to overthrow their foreign conquerors, the Manchus. It lasted for about ten years and would in all probability have been successful had it not been for the aid given the Manchus by the Europeans, particularly the British. Americans must assume some share of responsibility for thus riveting the yoke of an alien conqueror upon the necks of the Chinese and keeping it there for more than half a century. For the "ever victorious army" which became particularly famous under the leadership of Chinese Gordon and which contributed greatly to the defeat of the Tai Pings was organized by an American named Frederick G. Ward, who commanded it until his death.

Commercial relations with the Occident, with their incident the coming of the Christian missionary, did much to change the political conditions of China.

In the first place, after the march of the

Anglo-French allies to Peking in 1861 in order to enforce their demand for an audience with the Emperor it became necessary to make some provision for a central office through which foreign relations might be carried on. The first office to be established was the rather famous Tsung-li-Yamen, which has now given place to what was later called the Wai-Chiao-Pu. The foreign office now has control of most of the relations with foreign nations. A relic of the decentralization of the old days is to be found in the foreign commissioner, who is often even now attached to the office of the provincial governor.

Furthermore, the necessities of the Treasury resulting from the Tai Ping rebellion caused the government to place greater reliance on customs revenues than had previously been the case. In the feeling that they had a friend in Great Britain because of the assistance against the rebels which Great Britain had rendered, the Manchus consented to the establishment under British guidance of an Imperial Customs Service. This service, under the management of Sir Robert Hart, became ultimately a prolific source of revenue and a model of efficient

administration. In it the present postal service was developed. This is at the present time a separate service.

China in the early treaties which governed the administration of the customs had consented to the insertion of a provision fixing the duties to be imposed on imports from abroad. This seemed to have little importance at the time when it was inserted in the treaties, but later it came to have a most disastrous influence on the welfare of the country.

When the commerce between Europe and the Orient began the purpose of the European trader was the purchase of articles in the east for import into Europe which Europe could not produce but which Europe desired greatly to consume. This character the eastern trade retained until with the development of the factory system Europe was able to manufacture products which she could sell at a profit in the east. The early profits in the East India and China trade were derived from the sale at high prices in Europe of such articles as spices, tea and silk, which could be bought in the east at figures so low

as to make the trade one in which fabulous wealth might be accumulated.

About the middle of the 19th century, however, all this had changed. What Great Britain in particular was looking for in the east was a market for the output of the Lancashire cotton mills, and for the juice of the poppy which was brought from India. Cotton and opium were the main causes of her aggressive action in opening by force the ports of China to the commerce of the world. British plans could not, however, be carried out unless the European could prevent the East from imposing large customs duties. Control over the Indian customs was obtained by the conquest of the country. Chinese customs were subjected to her power by means of treaties into which the Chinese were obliged to enter.

These treaties originally limited all import duties to a flat five per cent. Later this flat rate was changed into specific duties on particular articles. Prices have so risen since this change was made that at present the duties net the Chinese government but little more than a three per cent. ad valorem. Although made with one power alone, the rates of duty became ultimately applicable to

all imports from whatever source, since there has always been inserted in almost every treaty made by China with a foreign power a most favored nation clause which has given to all European nations with which China has made treaties all rights of a general character which any other nation possessed. Some particular nations, such as Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan, have been perhaps more active than others in browbeating China. But all, ourselves included, have shown little compunction in insisting on their own particular share of the loot. China has been so weak from a military point of view that she has been unable to treat her agreements made even under duress as "scraps of paper." She has as a result of these customs treaties had to accept a position which prevents her from making use of the customs either as a substantial source of revenue or as a means of protecting her industries. The attempt was made at the recent Washington Conference, which it is hoped will be successful, to give China greater freedom in customs matters.

The hands of China have been tied in other ways by the treaties made about the middle

of the 19th century. During the period when all business with Europe was carried on at Canton, a European committed an act which it was claimed by China violated the law of the Empire. The Canton authorities demanded that he be turned over to them for punishment. Now, Chinese punishment in those days was not tempered in any way by mercy. The European thus submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities was forced to undergo such sufferings that it was determined that there never should be a repetition of the episode.

The treaties of the middle of the 19th century provided therefore for the exemption of all Europeans in China from the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities—for their extraterritoriality, as it has come to be called. These treaties made it necessary that any suit brought against one possessed of extraterritoriality be brought before the Consul of the defendant's nationality. Some of the nations, such as Great Britain and the United States, have established to exercise this jurisdiction regular courts not connected with the consuls.

This privilege of extraterritoriality was extended to the missionaries, who by the

treaties may purchase land and reside in the interior. Apart, however, from its application to the missionaries, its particular effect is to be found in the treaty ports where foreigners engaged in business must under the treaties reside. But the number of the treaty ports has been so increased as to include almost every place of any size and it is becoming more and more common for foreigners to travel in the interior outside of the treaty ports and without the license which was required by the treaties. When they do so they carry with them their privilege of extraterritoriality.

The result of the recognition of extraterritoriality is that both in and out of the treaty ports and in the cases of both of missionaries and of those engaged in commerce there has grown up a large class of foreigners who are removed not only from the jurisdiction of the Chinese government but as well from almost all legal restraint, since the power of the foreign courts is often not exercised in such a way as to make them a terror to the evil-doer. The recent Washington Conference also took action in the direction of abol-

ishing extraterritoriality, but as yet nothing has been done which actually abolishes it. The Germans and Austrians, however, lost the privilege during the Great War and the Russians have since voluntarily renounced it.

Limitation of her taxing power and of her power to protect her industry, together with inability to tax the foreigner or subject him to her police control, were then by the middle of the 19th century the results of China's dealings with the foreigner. The presence of the missionary also added greatly to her perplexities. The preaching of an alien religion is a prolific source of trouble in any land. Misunderstanding and prejudice are unavoidable, however well intentioned and discreet in their behavior missionaries may be. In China certainly it was the case at one time their presence on occasion led to riots, during which mission property was destroyed and missionary lives lost. These occurrences usually led to the demand for indemnities and sometimes, as in the case of Kiao Chiao, to the seizure by the European of whole districts, as a punishment for the sacrifice of missionary lives.

During almost the whole of the 19th cen-

tury conditions in China were growing worse, worse at any rate from the viewpoint of national independence. The European's grip on the country was continually becoming tighter. There were sporadic outbreaks indicative of Chinese impatience at the way things were tending. But it was not till the Chinese-Japanese war, in 1894-5, that symptoms of a dangerous state of mind were apparent. It is from that time that we may properly use the term Modern China. Modern Chinese life was necessarily preceded by a long period of preparation for what was to come. It was only, however, after the Peace of Shimoneseki, which closed the war with Japan, that any marked tendency to change is to be noticed.

VII

MODERN CHINA

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MODERN CHINA

Modern China may be said to date from the Japanese war of 1894-5. Up to this time the Chinese had regarded the Japanese with contempt. The European barbarians, from whom they had endured so much, they both despised and disliked, but their detestation of the European had gradually given way to fear as they found themselves obliged to submit to his outrageous demands. The Japanese, however, they regarded as in a way tributary to them, if not politically, at any rate intellectually and culturally. For the Japanese had adopted Chinese civilization and were dependent for the expression of their thoughts on the Chinese written language.

The defeat of the Chinese at the hands of the Japanese was, it may be imagined, a rude awakening. A centuries long period of self-satisfaction and complacency was suddenly broken. While they did not as yet doubt their claims to be the Great Nation, they began to feel that there must be something

in the civilization of the West which might be useful to them. For the "little black dwarfs," as they were accustomed to call the Japanese, had adopted many of its features. And lo! the majestic Middle Kingdom had been vanquished by the Empire of the Rising Sun.

The ferment of reform began to work. Hundreds of young Chinese were sent to study in Europe and the United States and thousands went for the same purpose to Japan. Many books illustrative of European thought were translated into Chinese and obtained a wide circulation.

Two things, however, militated at the time against the success of a reform movement in China. In the first place, conditions at court were unfavorable, because of the attitude of the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, who was the real ruler of the country. The second was the literary and non-scientific cast of Chinese thought. The reform leaders, who all belonged to the *literati* class, were too prone to think that reform could be secured by edicts composed in the approved literary form, and did not seem to understand that political and social institutions rest in large measure upon

the foundation of economic and social conditions.

The Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi is one of the most interesting characters in Chinese history. Born in 1835 of the Imperial Manchu clan, she was selected in 1852 as one of the secondary consorts of the Emperor Hsien Feng. Four years afterwards she bore him his only son, who became later the Emperor Tung Chi. Because of the birth of this son she was advanced to a position above that accorded to an ordinary concubine. She became known as the Western Empress, the real Empress being known as the Eastern Empress. The origin of this designation is to be found in the fact that on all state occasions the Emperor sat with his face to the south. The left hand is the place of honor in China, where almost everything is done exactly different from what it is with us. The most important secondary consort sat on the Emperor's right hand. As the Chinese always use in designating position or locality the points of the compass, rather than our terms right and left, the secondary consort first in rank was known as the Western Empress. Tzu Hsi was a woman of great

force of character and ability and after the death of the Emperor Hsien Feng gradually forced the Eastern Empress into the background and on her death in 1881 became supreme. In the meantime her son, Tung Chi, came to the throne. He died in 1873 without having issue, although his widow was expected to give birth to a child. Tzu Hsi had at that time practically ruled the Empire for twelve years. She decided, in view of the uncertainty as to the sex of the expected child, as well as because in case that child should be a boy she would have to give place to his mother, not to postpone the selection of a successor to the throne. She selected as the heir Kuang-Shu, the son of a younger brother of her husband and of her own favorite sister. In making her selection she passed by the son of Prince Kung, her husband's oldest living brother. The Empress A Lu-ti, the widow of her son Tung Chi, died before giving birth to the expected heir, so that no complications arose because of the Empress Dowager's action in passing by her own son's issue. Indeed, the death at such critical times of so many persons who might have stood in the way of the fulfillment of her

plans has always aroused suspicion as to the manner of their passing away.

This choice of the infant Kuang-Shu as the successor to the throne had a marked effect on the subsequent history of the country. In the first place, it gave another lease of political life to the Dowager Empress, who was able to maintain herself in power during Kuang-Shu's minority. Now, Tzu Hsi had been subjected almost exclusively to the influences of the old regime. Furthermore, her experiences as a young woman, when she had, on the occasion of the Anglo-French invasion of 1860 and of the foreign occupation of Peking, to take refuge in the interior with the imperial court, left a lasting impression upon her. Her dislike of the European and all his works never greatly diminished. Furthermore, as a Manchu, she could not divorce the fortunes of the dynasty from her views as to what the welfare of the country demanded, and while she was able to maintain that dynasty in power during her life, her death left the country in a very precarious condition, with most important problems unsolved.

Finally, she had a great many very feminine qualities, notwithstanding her general

strength of character gave her a power which none of her countrymen possessed. One of the results of the Anglo-French occupation of Peking was the looting and burning of the historic Summer Palace, upon which a number of former Emperors had lavished vast sums. This was done as a reprisal for the mistreatment of certain of the British envoys to the Manchu Court. The Empress Dowager missed the luxury of the destroyed summer palace and determined to build a new one which should rival it in magnificence. The money used for her pet project was in large measure derived from funds which had been destined for the construction of an imperial navy. One of the sights in this new summer palace is a marble model of a steamboat built in the water of the lake near the shore. In this the Empress was accustomed to take her tea when on a walk through the palace grounds. This was almost the nearest approach to a navy which the Chinese obtained prior to the Japanese war, and was naturally not of great use in that conflict.

A further effect of the choice of Kuang-Shu was the development of a radical reform party at court, which made itself felt after

the disastrous ending of the Japanese war. The growth of this party was in a measure due to the mental attitude of the young Emperor, which caused him to listen with attention to the reform propaganda to be noticed at this period. But the young Emperor was as well obliged to take a rather radical view of things if he would keep his throne, since the manner of his selection was not satisfactory to the conservatives. They felt that the throne rightly belonged to Prince Kung's son. Furthermore, the fact that Kuang-Shu was of the same generation as the deceased Tung Chi made it impossible for him, in accordance with Chinese custom, properly to perform the ancestral worship due his predecessor. The censor Wu Ko Su had openly rebuked the Empress Dowager for impiety in not providing properly for the worship of Tung Chi, and had emphasized his abhorrence of her impious action by committing suicide.

The time thus seemed ripe in 1898 for reform. This was undertaken and in the first twenty-one days of September of that year fifteen edicts of a most radical character were issued by the Emperor. Beyond the issue of

these edicts little else was done. The radical reformers who had the Emperor's ear seemed to believe that a change made in the laws would be sufficient to give China what she needed. None of the practical measures were taken, characteristic of the reform movement in Japan which had been entered upon only a few years before. Nevertheless, the reforms proposed were so much ahead of the opinion of the time that they had little real effect except to alienate the more moderate members of the large class which thought that change must come.

The consternation which these measures caused among the conservatives was so great that they prevailed upon the Empress Dowager to reassume power. She had in the meantime handed over the government of the country to the young Emperor when he attained his majority. This summons to an active life she accepted at once. She came in at night from the Summer Palace, where she was living, without warning. She seized and imprisoned the Emperor Kuang-Shu, executed a number of his advisers and established herself again firmly in power.

In her desire to arrest the reform move-

ment she was willing even to humble herself. This she did by conferring high posthumous rank on the deceased censor Wu Ko Su, and by selecting as the successor to the throne Pu Chun, the great-grandson of Ta Kuan, the imperial predecessor and father of her husband, Hsien Feng. Pu Chun was of the proper generation to perform the requisite ancestor worship.

But, shrewd woman as she was, the Empress Dowager underestimated the force of the movement for reform and the growing disgust of the Chinese for the Manchu dynasty. The climax was reached when, because of the murder of two German missionaries, China was forced to lease Kiao Chiao to Germany, together with certain rights in the province of Shantung. Great Britain, not to be outdone by Russia, which had forced China after the close of the Japanese war to give her a lease of Port Arthur and by Germany in securing the lease of Kiao Chiao, demanded and received the lease of Wei Hai Wei, on the north shore of Shantung and opposite Port Arthur.

This arbitrary spoiling of China by the foreigner was immediately followed by dis-

turbances through the north which culminated in the Boxer Rebellion. The motives of those engaged in this movement were two fold. They were actuated by hate both of the Manchu dynasty and of the foreigner. The Empress Dowager by placing herself at the head of the movement was able to turn it away from the Manchus and direct it toward the foreigners.

The circumstances of the siege of the legations at Peking are so well known that the episode needs no treatment here. The important result was that an enormous indemnity was demanded of China by the outraged foreigners, an indemnity so great that its weight broke the financial back of the country. Since its imposition the finances of China have been disordered and the difficulty of her problems has vastly increased.

The Empress Dowager lived only seven years after the putting down of the Boxer uprising and the Emperor Kuang-Shu died only a day or two before she passed away. The last years of her life were, however, marked by a considerable change of heart toward the reform movement. She became dissatisfied with her choice of Pu Chun as the successor

of Kuang-Shu. His father, Prince Tuan, had been very closely associated with the Boxers and had because of the failure of the movement fallen into disgrace. Furthermore, she apparently believed that she had still a long life before her and desired to live it as the guardian of an infant Emperor since in that capacity she would continue to rule the country. She therefore chose the son of Prince Chun, a younger half-brother of Kuang-Shu, who was to reign under the regency of his father. This was another violation of the dynastic law of succession. But she was successful in carrying out her plans notwithstanding the protests of some of her most capable advisers, among them the late Yuan Shih Kai.

It has sometimes been claimed that this almost the last action of her life was actuated by sentiment rather than by prudence. Before she became the secondary consort of the Emperor it is said that she was betrothed to a young kinsman named Jung Lu. Jung Lu became a captain of the palace guard and ever afterwards served her faithfully, on two or three crises in her life having rendered her invaluable assistance. He became one of the

leading men in the Empire in the later years of his life and died in 1903. It is said when he lay dying she promised him that if his daughter should have a son she would make that son heir to the throne. In order to carry out this promise she forced Prince Chun, the younger brother of the Emperor Kuang-Shu, to marry Jung Lu's daughter. The issue of the marriage was a boy.

Under the name of Pu Ti he was Emperor after the death of Kuang-Shu until his abdication at the time of the establishment of the republic. He also sat again upon the Dragon Throne for a few days as a result of the abortive attempt in 1917 to restore the Manchus.

Thus ended the life of the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi, who was in control of China's fortunes for almost fifty years. The first years of her lease of power were marked by the great Tai Ping rebellion and by the Anglo-French occupation of Peking. The last saw the second occupation of the capital by foreign armies and the Boxer uprising. Of a surety her rule was a period of stress and storm. While we may admire her strength of character and her adroitness in carrying out her plans we cannot render the same judg-

ment with regard to the wisdom of her policy. She did, indeed, with the help of the hated foreigner, save the Manchu dynasty from destruction but she was unable to make it possible for that dynasty to remain in power for long after her death. For personal and sentimental reasons she meddled with the law of succession with the result that on her death she left an infant on the throne with an incapable regent and a divided loyalty on the part of both Manchu and Chinese.

Furthermore, she delayed too long in reaching the judgment that reform was needed. It was only after the Boxer movement that she reconciled herself to the necessity of endeavoring to do in China what Japan had been successfully doing for a quarter of a century. Had she seen the light of coming events as early as her great contemporary Mitsuhito, the Emperor of Japan, the history of the country would probably have been very different. After the Boxer days, however, she did attempt to introduce the parliamentary idea into the imperial government, and a certain amount of local self-government into the provinces. Had the carrying out of her plans not been prevented by the late revolution

China would have in 1917 become in theory at any rate a limited monarchy with a fully organized parliament. But her death in 1908 left China with an empty treasury, with portions of her fairest provinces in the possession of the foreign barbarian and in a condition of great dissatisfaction with the dynasty.

In our consideration of present conditions we must never forget that the country was until the revolution under an alien rule against which from its beginning there has been resistance, particularly in the south. With the little knowledge of China which we have in this country we have hardly been able to distinguish between the Manchu and the Chinese. Both were orientals, both dressed alike, both wore queues, and both looked alike to us. The Manchus were, however, a totally different race from the Chinese. They spoke a different tongue. They were also uncivilized barbarians when they came from the northern plains of Manchuria. In their northern home they had manifested a warlike spirit and had developed an effective military organization. But they had no literature and had little if any cultivation in the arts of civilization. They had conquered China by

force of arms with some admixture of treacherous cunning, and they had kept themselves in power, although compared with the Chinese they were few in number, by their military strength and their power of organization. They had on the whole treated the Chinese reasonably well and until the beginning of the 19th century had greatly extended the boundaries of the Empire. Coming, as they did, from Manchuria, all of which had fallen under the power of the ruling house, they annexed to China a vast domain when they moved their capital from Mukden to Peking. They had brought Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Thibet under their sway. During the reign of the great Emperor Chien Lung, who lived in the latter half of the 18th century, they had made tributary states of Nepaul and Burmah.

The Manchus had, however, fallen in the course of time under the enervating influences of Chinese culture. They had lost their early vigor but without having acquired the shrewdness and adroitness of the people they had conquered. Their military organization had gone to pieces. The former Manchu soldiery had become a horde of parasitical pen-

sioners battening on the bounty of the thrifty and industrious Chinese. With their loss of energy and vigor misfortunes had come in increasing number upon the land, until it lay helpless at the feet of foreign peoples. The rule of the Empress Dowager was but the glowing embers of the dying dynasty bursting into a final flickering flame. There was not enough vigor left in the Imperial clan upon which to build a lasting government. Of a truth might it be said that the Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn from them.

The people of China were unquestionably not satisfied with the Dowager Empress' projects of reform. The main defect in these plans consisted, however, in the fact that they had not been begun early enough. In themselves they were well conceived and gave promise of better results than either the rather fantastic plans promulgated by Kuang-Shu ten years before or than most of the proposals which have been made since the success of the revolution. But it is very probably the case that no reforms would have been acceptable to the Chinese which originated with the Manchus. What the Chinese above all desired was to be rid of their alien rulers.

The time was therefore auspicious for a revolution. Almost any new grievance would be sufficient to start such a movement. The immediate occasion of the revolution, which broke out in 1911, was the attempt of the Peking government to centralize the railway administration. Attention has been called to the great provincial autonomy which was characteristic of the general governmental system. Certain of the provinces had entered with great enthusiasm into railway construction projects. They had not, however, been able to finance those projects. The central government therefore attempted to take the whole railway administration of the country into its own hands. Sufficient provision for reimbursing those who had ventured their capital was not made. Furthermore, any such centralization as was proposed involved the transfer of provincial squeeze and patronage to Peking. This was unsatisfactory to the provincial authorities.

It will be remembered that the only really emphatic method of expressing disapproval of the government's action under the old regime was the inauguration of disturbances in the nature of riots. Resort was had in some

of the provinces to this time honored expedient. The revolutionary elements took advantage of the situation and soon the revolution was in full swing. The character of the military administration and the conditions obtaining in the army facilitated the movement.

Up to the termination of the Japanese war the old military equipment and the former methods of striking terror in the hearts of the enemy were employed. Bows, arrows, spears and battle axes were the weapons of the soldiery and much supposedly terrifying noise was made by the army in the hope that the hostile battalions would in panic retire. *Vox praeterea nihil* was probably a good description of the Chinese armies of the olden days just before China's transformation.

This method of conducting a campaign was seen to be ineffective against modern troops. Army reorganization was undertaken in 1895 and in the course of a few years armies of considerable size were formed, particularly in the north, which were equipped with modern weapons and drilled in the present fashion. The late Yuan Shih Kai was entrusted with the organization of such an army in the

north and may be regarded as the father of China's new military establishment. The control of this army was the deciding factor in the Empress Dowager's *coup d' etat* of 1898. It was Yuan Shih Kai's refusal to align himself and his troops with the reform party which caused the failure of the policy of the Emperor Kuang-Shu. For this refusal the reformers never forgave Yuan and always regarded him as a supporter of autocracy.

After 1898 the revolutionary party became convinced that if their movement was to be a success they must obtain control of the army. This control they endeavored to secure by a secret propaganda carried on assiduously for years. By 1911 they felt that they could safely start the revolution in case any favorable occasion presented itself.

The revolution was successful particularly in the south where the reform element was stronger, probably because of the longer contact with the west, and where loyalty to the Manchu had never been strong. It had broken out simultaneously at different points. The most important of these was Wuchang opposite Hankow, in the Yangste Valley, and thus

in the center of the country. Here Li Yuan Hung, who became President after Yuan Shih Kai's death, was in command of a regiment. He put himself at the head of the revolutionary army and soon was in control of the district.

The Manchus at Peking in their distress turned to Yuan Shih Kai, who after the death of the Empress Dowager had been sent away from Court in disgrace, it is said because of his failure in 1898 to support the Emperor Kuang-Shu. A story is told of him which well illustrates the Chinese character. Because of the courtesy which is characteristic of the people, no one ever is removed from office and publicly humiliated except in extraordinary circumstances. A disgraced official might thus be advised to commit suicide instead of being executed. While under such conditions his life might be lost at the same time his face would be saved.

Yuan Shih Kai thus in 1908 was graciously permitted by the Emperor to retire to his home on account of trouble which it was alleged he had with his knee. In 1911 when the Manchu court turned to him in their troubles for help, they did not at first offer him the

place which he wished. His answer to the court's overtures was that he greatly regretted that his knee still troubled him so much that he was incapable of doing in the manner it deserved the work which was required of him. Politeness and courtesy thus characterized his removal from office, his recall to power and his refusal to accept the position offered to him.

Later, however, when the Manchus made him the proposition to come to Peking as Prime Minister, his knee immediately showed signs of improvement and soon he was at the helm. Under his vigorous management, the imperial armies were successful in their operations. Wuchang was sorely beset, and it looked as if the revolution were going to fail. At this time, however, another violent outbreak occurred at Nanking, which was then under the command of the same Chang Hsun, who in 1917 attempted to restore the Manchu Empire. Chang Hsun was driven out and Nanking was captured by the revolutionists.

By 1912 then China was practically a house divided against itself. The south was in full and on the whole successful rebellion. The north was, however, still loyal to the Manchu.

It is claimed by the enemies of Yuan Shih Kai that had he so desired he could have at this time put down the rebellion, but that he saw himself as a Minister of Heaven who could assume the Mandate to rule which the Manchus had forfeited. On the other hand his friends say that loyalty to China demanded that he put an end to the civil war which was desolating the country and which if continued would have brought about foreign intervention and lost China her political independence.

The south had, notwithstanding the protests of such men as Liang Chi Chiao, who was associated in the reform movement of 1898, and who advocated the retention of the Manchu monarchy, established a republic with its capital in Nanking. For its formation Wu Ting Fang, the former minister to the United States, was in large measure responsible.

Yuan entered into negotiations with the Nanking authorities with the result that an agreement was reached. This agreement was along the following lines:

First. The Manchus were to abdicate;

Second. The republican form of government was to be adopted;

Third. Sun Yat Sen, who had been elected President of the republic established with Nanking as its capital, was to retire and Yuan Shih Kai was to be elected in his place;

Fourth. A new constitution was to be adopted for consolidated republican China.

This agreement was carried out, but the removal of the capital from Peking to Nanking did not take place as was contemplated. An attempt had been made during the negotiations on Yuan Shih Kai's life at Peking which was all but successful and which caused him to distrust the radicals of the south. A mutiny broke out subsequently among Yuan's soldiers at Peking during which part of Peking was looted and burned. This occurrence was advanced by him as a reason for refusing to go to Nanking. His enemies say that the mutiny was caused by Yuan himself in order to obtain an excuse for not moving the capital as had been arranged to Nanking, where the influence of the southern radicals would have been greater.

Peking remained then the capital and the attempt was made to organize and carry on a

representative republic within sight of the historic dragon throne. Either the autocratic associations of the place or the irreconcilable aspirations of the two factions made the task a difficult one. Governmental traditions in China further made a peaceful contest of political parties such as we are accustomed to see an impossibility. He who was not for the government was regarded as against it. A political opponent was too apt to be deemed and treated as an enemy of the state. Summary executions which savored greatly of political murders, and assassinations made orderly political action difficult and greatly embittered political relationships.

A ruthless partisan strife between the advocates of the President and the supporters of Parliament ensued in which the interests of the country were lost sight of in the desire to obtain party advantage and personal profit.

In the summer of 1913 the bitterest opponents of the President, abandoning the attempt to oppose him by constitutional means, took up arms and endeavored to force him out of the government. In this they were unsuccessful. The rebellion was put down. The President, claiming that he had evidence to

prove that the radical party which controlled one of the houses of Parliament and had a large minority in the other was a seditious organization, took away from the members of this party in Parliament the passes which admitted them to the chambers and arrested some of the leaders. This action left the Parliament without a quorum. Those members of the houses who still possessed their passes were in the main the supporters of the President in the conflict which preceded the rebellion of the summer. Parliament was finally dissolved by the President although no power to take any such action was recognized by the constitution. This dissolution of Parliament left the President not only supreme but, indeed, the only authority in the government.

A new constitution was soon after promulgated by the President, under which a legislature was to be called. That body did not assemble during the life of Yuan Shih Kai. This constitution provided also for a Council of State, the members of which were to be appointed by the President. This body was organized and was to act as a legislature until the legislature provided for by the constitution should assemble. This reorganization

of the government was made in 1914. In the winter 1914-15 the Japanese government, availing itself of the preoccupation of the other foreign nations in the European war, made a series of demands on China, which evidenced an intention to take advantage of the helplessness of the country.

Partly, because of this helplessness, which many Chinese attributed to the republican form of government, partly because of the desire of those in power to make their positions more secure, and partly undoubtedly because a large body of influential Chinese honestly believed that China could when her conditions and traditions were taken into consideration, prosper only under a monarchical government, Yuan Shih Kai decided to change the government into a monarchy with himself as Emperor.

China had, however, as a result of her recent political experiences proceeded so far along the pathway of constitutional reform that those who engineered the monarchical movement felt it to be wise to go through the form of consulting the people. Provincial conventions were called consisting of a small number of carefully hand-picked delegates

and the proposition to offer the imperial crown to Yuan Shih Kai was approved by these bodies. This crown was, as upon a former historic occasion, thrice refused, but finally, after Yuan had thus in the approved fashion emphasized his lack of sufficient merit to accept the throne, he did accept it and preparations were made for a ceremonious coronation.

In the meantime, however, Japan acting in conjunction with the representatives of some of the other foreign governments, had strongly advised Yuan and the Chinese government against the change. This advice was disregarded but the movement failed. Another rebellion against Yuan Shih Kai broke out, this time in the far away province of Yunnan. Province after province threw in its lot with the rebels until Yuan had to give way. The humiliation which he suffered owing to the miscarriage of his plans and the anxiety and excitement incident to life in such troublous times killed him. He passed away in June, 1916.

The death of Yuan Shih Kai brought in as President, the Vice-President Li Yuan Hung, who first came into public notice as the leader

of the revolutionists at Wuchang in 1911. He called together the old Parliament dissolved in 1914 by Yuan Shih Kai. This Parliament sat for a year and accomplished nothing. President Li was more favorably disposed toward it than Yuan Shih Kai had been, but this did not save it. The real rulers of China since the latter days of the revolution have been the generals of the armies in the provinces. Yuan Shih Kai did what he could to centralize the military administration at Peking, but he was unable to carry his centralization so far as to enable him to control the actions of these generals at the time of the ill-fated monarchical movement. Li was not as strong a man as Yuan and furthermore was apparently disinclined to make use of the army to overturn the Parliament. The result was that the generals dissatisfied with his attitude forced him to resign the Presidency. During the struggle between Li and the Parliament on the one hand and the generals on the other occurred the attempt of one of the generals Chang Hsun, a Manchu, to restore the Manchu Monarchy. This failed miserably, and after its failure another one of the generals, Feng Kuo Chang, a former lieutenant

of Yuan Shih Kai, became President. During the struggle Parliament was dissolved.

Under the presidencies of Feng Kuo Chang and his successor, Hsu Shih Chang, matters went from bad to worse. The rift between north and south grew larger; Japanese aggression became more insistent, in large measure because of the opportunities which the Great War afforded, and the power of the generals, who have made themselves quite generally governors of the provinces, became much greater. Under these conditions the prestige and authority of the central Peking government dwindled away until that government has become but a shell of what it was before the Revolution of 1911. The Peking government has, however, one advantage possessed by no other Chinese political organization, viz, the recognition of foreign powers.

This most recent period of Chinese political life has been characterized by great surface disturbance. One after another military chieftains have risen to power only to disappear under the attacks of their rivals and to be succeeded by others, some of whom it would appear are destined for the same fate, and the process seems likely to continue un-

less some really strong man comes upon the scene and establishes himself in somewhat the same position as the former Ministers of Heaven, who will be recognized as having the Mandate of Heaven to rule the country. Whether under such a person constitutional government as we westerners understand it will develop or whether a government more like the old autocracy will be formed, of course, no one can say.

The truth is then that China is governed, so far as it is governed at all, by a military autocracy. The military power which has been created as one of the results of the attempt to adopt western ideas is the real sovereign in what was formerly a pacifist land. The army not having as yet been thoroughly centralized, it is the provincial generals in control of the provincial armies, who through them control the provinces and the central government. No one can become and remain head of that government who does not have their favor. China is, therefore, a republic only in the sense that the possessor of the executive power does not hold by hereditary right. China is certainly not a popular representative republic even in the sense that a small

class of influential people not connected with the army participate in the government.

One of the effects of the Revolution and of the disturbances by which it has been followed has been thus apparently the abandonment, at any rate, for the time being of the centralized form of government established by the First August Emperor. Political power has shifted to the provinces from Peking, and just at present something akin to the old Chinese feudalism would appear to be developing with its local chieftains and magnates.

It would seem, however, to be certain that the Chinese people are definitely opposed to a monarchy. The attempt in 1917 to restore the Manchus was such a fiasco as to justify the belief that the Imperial Manchu house has so lost in prestige that it can never occupy the throne. The failure of Yuan Shih Kai, a Chinese, to make himself Emperor would lead one to think that no Chinese Minister of Heaven will be able to establish a monarchy except perhaps after reducing by military force his rivals to a state of subjection. That a civil war of such severity will be permitted by the foreign powers would seem, however, somewhat doubtful.

China would, therefore, seem to be committed to a so-called "republican" form of government. Furthermore, while the military autocracy is now supreme it is probable that in case the former centralized government is re-established, some body in the nature of a Parliament will be provided and that it will exercise some influence over the policy of a President, who for most practical purposes will be supreme. The very presence of such a body, even if its position is not one of great dignity will, however, be of value in accustoming the people to the belief that a form of government better than a military autocracy can and should be established. Even if such a Parliament at first does little more than furnish a place where grievances can be aired it will do much to help along the development of constitutional government. We must not forget that the mother of Parliaments did little more originally than attempt to redress grievances.

As the simple conditions of Chinese economic life become more complex, as the intellectual life of the country becomes less literary and more scientific, as the claims of the family lessen, and as larger social groups de-

velop, there is much to make us believe that constitutional government can gradually be established and that the government can become in fact as well as in name republican.

In order, however, that China may thus replace her present military autocracy by a more popular form of government it will, of course, be necessary that she retain her political independence. Her ability to do so is dependent not only on her capacity for internal reorganization during which peace will be preserved and serious political disturbance be avoided, but as well on the successful conduct of her relations with foreign powers. The problems of modern China thus are foreign as well as domestic.

In the next and last chapter the attempt will be made to treat of some, at any rate, of the problems which the foreign relations of China present for solution.

VIII

FUTURE CHINA

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One characteristic which distinguishes our modern life from that led by our ancestors is the ease with which we ourselves and the commodities which we use can be transported from place to place. Ease of transportation and facility of communication are what make our modern life what it is. The ocean steamship, the submarine cable, the transcontinental railway and the telegraph have bound the world into an economic unity which transcends by far the political organizations up to the present devised by the intelligence of man.

This economic unity of the world has made it possible for Europe to seek in Asia for those articles which it consumes but does not produce and for America to find in Africa and Australia a market for the goods which it makes but cannot use. Under these conditions an international society has developed none of the members of which can lead self-sufficient lives. The limits of human relation-

ships have become so contracted that willy-nilly every group of human beings is forced into intercourse with other groups. Little that happens anywhere at the present time is not of general interest.

The improvement of the means of transportation which has been responsible for this transformation of human life has been accomplished, further, in the most progressive lands by a change in the industrial system which has made possible production on an unprecedented scale. The factory system, by means of which this enormous production has been attained, has, furthermore, not been confined in its application to the manufacture of those raw materials which originate in the country of production. The rubber of the tropics is fashioned in the factory of the temperate zone. The cotton of America is fed to the spindles of Lancashire. The iron of Spain and Norway is smelted in the furnaces of Sheffield.

The wants of human beings also, which would appear to increase with their satisfaction, have come to include articles unknown in the days when countries were self-suffi-

cient. The spices and sugar of the tropics delight the palate of those who live in northern climes. The humble peasant of China, for a long time accustomed to betake himself to his bed with the setting of the sun, buys with eagerness the petroleum of the western hemisphere. After having lived without complaint for a thousand years without other illumination than that due to the radiance of the sun or moon, the Chinese avail themselves where they are able of the artificial light which Yankee ingenuity has discovered. The sewing machine and the phonograph have also found a market in the lands whose peoples have for centuries been content to rely upon the sewing woman and to obtain their amusement from the native story-teller and the itinerant musician.

This increase in the number of our wants is often denounced as evidence of the growth of a luxurious manner of living which ultimately will bring about our downfall. But the luxury of one generation becomes the necessity of the next, and those of us who fall most easily into these detestable habits of self-indulgence comfort ourselves by the reflection that our standard of living is being

raised and that we are progressing in our civilization.

Whether the judgment of the ascetic or that of the advocate of progress is correct is a matter of little importance so far as concerns the economic development of the world. Every new invention which betters transportation, every new appliance which makes production more effective, every new discovery which makes it possible to satisfy a want of which we may not even have been conscious—in a word, every effort of the human intelligence which is successfully directed to the conquest of nature, has its effect in making closer the economic relations of the formerly scattered peoples of the globe.

The material side of the recent economic development of the world is, of course, its most striking feature. The fact that we of the present day are making greater material demands on life is what impinges most forcibly upon our perception. Those most spiritually minded are perhaps apt to decry this so-called progress and to look back with regret upon the days when life was simpler. It is true that they do not refuse to sweeten

their morning coffee for the reason that sugar may be a tropical product which they would not have been able to use had it not been for the recent material progress of man. But they do, nevertheless, regard with considerable misgiving a civilization which, like that of our own times, puts material progress in so prominent a position.

If, however, we consider for a moment we shall perhaps conclude that the imponderable results of this economic unity of the world are really more important than its material incidents, and are so notwithstanding the fact that they have been made possible by the wonderful material progress which has been noticed. The unmaterial effects of the recent development of human society which our material progress has brought about are many. The most noticeable, however, is the possibility of an approximation to the conception of the brotherhood of man. Self-sufficient communities, and particularly self-sufficient communities of small size, usually regard themselves as the salt of the earth and the rest of the world as in a state of outer darkness. Etymologically, the barbarian was only a non-Grecian stranger and hostile rela-

tions were merely the normal relations existing between independent communities strange to one another. At the present time a barbarian is one who refuses to submit to the restraints of civilized life, and hostility is the exceptional condition in which states usually friendly may find themselves. The change which has taken place in the meaning of these words is symptomatic of a change which is to be noticed in the social and political relations of men as a result of greater ease of communication and a consequent more intimate mutual acquaintanceship.

Color, language and religion are all regarded as earmarks of differences in race and culture which seem to be insurmountable when viewed rarely and at a distance. In most cases, however, those of different race and of different culture develop a mutual respect and tolerance as the result of continued association. They find that each has needs to which the other can minister. The satisfaction of these needs furnishes an economic motive for a decency of conduct which at first produces a mutual tolerance and ultimately a reciprocal respect, if not affection. The discovery is made that all men have

much in common, and that most differences are differences of education and environment which are not really vital.

Further, the meeting of culture with culture, of civilization with civilization, usually reveals the fact that each has something admirable which will supplement what is deficient in the other. It is a commonplace that the Orient has made the most important contributions to the world's religious thought and man's spiritual life. On the other hand, it is just as evident that the European cast of mind has been scientific rather than religious. While Europe has contributed no religion which has even approached permanence and has submitted to Asia the guidance of its spiritual life, it has almost from the beginning of its history had an unsatisfied and insatiable curiosity with regard to the phenomena of nature and has as a result made to the world in these recent days its contributions of modern science. These gifts it is now offering with an open hand to the peoples of Asia. Through modern science Europe is attempting the conquest of nature. To use again the phrase which has already been quoted: The Orient has endeavored to

teach man how to live; the Occident, to show him how to make a living.

When men of different races and cultures have learned to mingle with no thought of enmity, when the Orient has taught the Occident how to live and the west has shown the east how to make a living—and these results can follow only after men have had intercourse with each other—who will say that the imponderables, the spiritual effects of the economic unity of the world due to the modern improvement of transportation do not surpass in their importance and significance the mere material progress which has been made, and which at first sight is brought to our attention with such force?

Race prejudice and belief in a particular culture are, however, at first so intolerant that the meeting of different races and the competition of opposing cultures is frequently accompanied by violence and struggle. The conquest of Europe by Asiatic religious influences was, it is true, an exception to this general rule. Europe became Christian without great disturbance and as the result of the application of very little force. In fact, the spread of Asiatic religions

has generally been the consequence of a peaceful propaganda rather than an incident of a war of conquest. It was in this way that Buddhism, for example, made its advance. But Christianity in its Europeanized form has not hesitated to resort to that force with which the European has seen fit to sanction his morals. The missionary has commonly either preceded or followed the soldier. This has been particularly true of the attempts which the European has made to bring Christianity to the Asiatic.

In their dealings with the Asiatic the European nations have, however, been actuated by mixed motives. They have been seeking not merely the salvation of souls, but as well commercial profits. The first European nation thus to come into contact with Asia as a whole, and with China in particular, was, as we have seen, the Portuguese. The great caravels which were part of Portugal's contribution in the 15th century to the infant art of navigation were constructed not merely to transport to Europe the spices of the east, but as well to bear to the field of their endeavor the missionaries and the soldiers who so clearly evidenced the mixed motives

of the nation in the great work undertaken at the beginning of one of the epochs of European history. The Spaniards of the same day had the same purposes. Columbus, as we so well know, expected to reach Asia when he started out on his perilous voyage, and the priest and the friar were as important factors in Spain's plans as the soldier and the adventurer.

The Dutch and the English, who succeeded the Portuguese in the Far East, seem at first to have had alone the sordid purpose of commercial gain. The Dutch hardly ever rose above the desire for profit, but the English had finally to give way to the pressure at home of the missionary spirit, and missions are now one of the most powerful means through which the European exercises his influence in China. Through them the Chinese not only gain a glimpse of Europe's spiritual life; they are as well introduced in the mission schools to the scientific learning of the Occident, and are taught in the hospitals, which form so important a part of missionary enterprise, some of the effects of that altruism which has become so prominent a feature of Christian Europe.

But from the days of the Portuguese the Christian faith has been propagated in China by force. The missionary's missal has been supplemented by the soldier's sword. However much we may regret that a religion, whose advocates pride themselves on its peaceful proclivities, should have been spread by violence, we can hardly fail to recognize that the ultimate effects of the missionary movement have been good. For Chinese conservatism, the native belief in the excellence of Chinese civilization, has been so strong that it is difficult to conceive that western culture could have been brought to the attention of the people had the European not knocked rather rudely upon the door. And that China is in need of western culture as at least a supplement to its own can hardly be doubted.

For the violence of the European demand to enter China the missionary spirit may not, however, be held even in any considerable measure responsible. The missionaries have, it is true, taken advantage of the opportunity to enter the door after it has been forcibly opened. They have also relied upon the armed strength of Europe to maintain them

in the position which they have secured. But it is more than doubtful if China would ever have been opened as a field merely for missionary endeavor. It was the economic motive of commercial gain which was responsible for bringing European and Chinese culture into contact.

This desire for commercial gain has at different times taken on very different forms. Attention has been directed to the fact that up to about the middle of the 19th century the China trade with Europe was devoted for the most part to the exportation from China to Europe of tea and silk, but that with the development of the factory system in Europe, which facilitated cheapness of production, China also became important as a market for European made goods. Up to about the beginning of the present century most of the treaties which had been made between China and European peoples could be explained because of the desire to assure a safe field for mission work and a profitable market for European products. The skirmishes between the different European powers for strategic position in China were almost all directed towards preventing any

one power from obtaining any advantage over other powers in the sale of their goods in the country. This is the aim, for example, of America's policy of the open door.

With the close of the 19th century China's relations with the foreign powers assumed a new phase. One of the distinctive features of Europe's modern economic system is what is spoken of as capitalism. That is, the economic organization has been of such a character that all that has been produced has not been consumed. Capital has accumulated. Whether this accumulation of capital was due to exploitation or to a high degree of social efficiency is beside the mark. The important thing is its accumulation. By the end of the 19th century this accumulation was so great that the surplus could not be profitably employed at home. This was particularly true of Great Britain. Even the economic development of so large a territory as India did not exhaust the surplus. In other countries, such as France, investment of capital in foreign lands was for political reasons stimulated by the government, even at the expense of domestic development.

In any case, one of the results of Euro-

pean capitalism was the accumulation of surplus capital which sought investment abroad. China was, in the minds of those imbued with western ideas, in great need of economic development. On the other hand, as has been said, China had no capital available for this development. The most logical and natural result of such conditions was that European capital should seek investment in China.

China's greatest economic need was railways, which were absolutely necessary in the north, where there were no means of communication except the camel, the pack horse and a rude cart, which, because of the wretched roads, could carry only small loads. A period of railway building with foreign capital began soon after the termination of the Japanese war. Quite a number of concessions were granted to foreign companies, but they led to so much scandal that this policy was subsequently changed. Most of the concessions were repurchased by the Chinese and the present method adopted. By this the government itself builds the roads out of the proceeds of loans made by foreign bankers, who then dispose of the bonds they receive. In order to protect the interests of the bond-

holders the government enters into an agreement in accordance with which foreigners, of the same nationality as the banks which make the loan, are appointed in the engineering and accounting services of each railway. The railways are operated by the Ministry of Communications, which operates the telegraphs and the postoffice as well, though in these services, as in the railways, foreigners occupy important positions.

Just before the outbreak of the Great War China had made in this way provision for the building of several thousand miles of new line, running not merely north and south, but as well east and west in those districts which were not well served by waterways. The carrying out of this plan was interrupted by the war, which made the financing of large enterprises impossible. Some doubt has been expressed as to whether the completion of the rather extensive plans which were entered into would have been a good thing for China. For, while the railways already built and in operation, even inefficiently managed as they have been, have been a source of profit to the government, some have felt that the expenditures which the plans of con-

struction called for would have been too great a burden for the country to bear.

Another form of European enterprise in China which has been due to the foreigner's desire for gain is to be found in the exploitation of the mineral resources of the country. The construction of railways has, of course, brought with it a larger consumption of coal. Mines generally near the railways have been opened and successful attempts have been made to cultivate a domestic demand for their product. As a general thing these mines have been opened and are being operated with foreign capital, but the Chinese also have begun to put money into them. The mining companies are, however, generally foreign companies and as such enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality, everyone, whether foreigner or native, having preferred the imperfect judicial system of the foreigner to the native courts. These mines are, however, worked altogether by Chinese labor, the only foreigners employed being the manager, accountants and engineers.

China has large supplies of iron as well as coal. The most important iron center is Han Yan, adjacent to Hankow, in the Yangste val-

ley. This enterprise was originally started by the Chinese, but became financially embarrassed. Japanese capital was advanced and is now practically in control of the enterprise, which is quite large.

China has become important to foreign countries not merely as a market for their manufactured goods and for the investment of capital, but also as a source from which the raw materials necessary for their factories may be obtained. She is again in somewhat the position she was before the middle of the 19th century, when Europe was demanding her tea and silk. As a source of supply for raw materials, China is more important to Japan probably than to any other country. Japan has become pretty completely industrialized during the past quarter of a century. She has developed a great cotton industry and she can grow no cotton. This she must get either from India or China if she is successfully to compete in the cotton cloth market. She has also made the beginnings in the development of an iron and steel industry and she has no iron. This she wishes also to obtain in larger quantities than at present from China.

China is also even more important to Japan than to most other countries as a market for manufactured goods, particularly for cottons, and is now becoming valuable also as a place for the investment of the surplus Japanese capital which has been accumulated in the last few years.

The last phase in the economic development of China is the establishment there of industrial enterprises on the approved European model. This phase of development China has only just entered upon. But the vast store of cheap labor which is to be found in the country cannot fail, as time goes by, to attract more and more foreign capital. There is no reason why China should not, for example, manufacture her own cotton goods. She grows the cotton, she has vast supplies of good coal for power, and an unexcelled labor supply.

This economic development of China is of a surety going to continue. China is not sufficiently well organized to prevent it, even if she should wish to. It is doubtful, however, whether, now that the Manchus, with their policy of exclusiveness, are out of power, there will be manifested any further opposi-

tion. Not only the foreigner, but the Chinese as well, will reap a profit from the adoption of this policy of development. The economic motives at work will thus be too strong to resist.

But as this economic development progresses the foreigner will acquire greater and greater influence. For he will invest in the country larger and larger amounts of capital and will send to China more and more managers and engineers. It is only as the Chinese save capital and acquire a technical and scientific education that they can have any great participation in the movement, except in the most subordinate positions. The European who does thus invest his money will insist on his present privilege of extra-territoriality and will not consent to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts, unless those courts and the law of the land undergo a radical reformation. Foreign investors will also in most instances find their country backing them by diplomatic pressure and, it may be, by force of arms, in the assertion of their rights, which will probably be given a liberal interpretation.

The only possible way in which, under

present conditions, the Chinese will be able to curtail greatly the influence of the foreigner will be to adopt some method in mining and industrial enterprises similar to that already adopted in the case of the railways. This plan would, however, involve a pretty complete collectivist or socialistic policy which the traditions of the Chinese have not fitted them successfully to carry out. The Chinese would, furthermore, be handicapped in carrying out such a policy by their present lack of technical capacity. Few have had the engineering or industrial training necessary for managing efficiently industrial undertakings and the Chinese must perforce have to place great reliance on the foreigner until they acquire that training.

In fact, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the economic development of China which has already been undertaken by the foreigner is going to make a great change in the social conditions of the country, and by a process of peaceful penetration, even if resort is not made to force and violence, is going to subject it to the economic if not the political control of the foreigner, unless great changes in present Chinese policy are made.

There are, however, several reasons for the belief that China is not going to be another India, but is, like Japan, so far the only important Asiatic country of which this may be said, going to preserve her political independence.

In the first place, China's remarkable position as the only existing civilization which has continued almost unchanged from the beginnings of its history, and the fact that while more than once she has been the prey of an alien conqueror, she has in the end so absorbed that conqueror and forced him by the arts of peace to accept her culture, where she has not driven him out, can hardly fail to make us feel that whatever the immediate future may have in store for her, she will in the end come out triumphant.

A comparison of China with the Roman Empire would seem to be significant. Like the Roman Empire she had as neighbors barbarian, uncivilized, semi-nomadic tribes of great military capacity. The Tartar, the Mongol and the Manchu were to China what the Goth, the Vandal and the Hun were to Rome. They conquered China in somewhat the same way as Rome was conquered, and

yet China, like her imperial bird the Phoenix, rose supreme out of the ashes of her humiliation. Not only did she successfully assert herself politically, but the outer barbarian became submissive to her culture. Our European civilization—which is in essence Graeco-Roman—would not be understood did we not allow for the influence of the Teuton. Chinese civilization, however, owes little if anything to Mongol influences.

Again, Buddhism, an alien faith, was at one time to China what Christianity, a religion originating in Asia, has been to Europe. But now Buddhism is in China only the refuge of the ignorant and the resort of the superstitious. Compared with Chinese Confucianism, it has little influence on the life of the people.

Material and spiritual influences of foreign origin have thus in the long run been powerless when they have come into contact with Chinese culture. There is a certain tenacity in the national character, a pertinacity of purpose, a power of passive resistance, which have enabled the Chinese to survive where other peoples would have gone under.

Another fact must be borne in mind when

we feel doubt about China's future. China, while poorly organized from the point of view of offering effective resistance of an active character to foreign aggression, is, after all, a unit, while Europe, from which most was to be feared, has been and is now even more than formerly divided. China's policy for more than half a century has been to play one power off against another. For a time her greatest fear was of Great Britain. Aid was sought from Russia. Then Russia became aggressive. Japan was her resource. Now Japan is knocking loudest on the door. To whom can China turn? Apparently at present to no one, and this constitutes her greatest immediate danger. For Japan has taken advantage of the time when her rivals were occupied to make her position as strong as possible. She is the only Asiatic country which has been able to remain independent of Europe from both a political and economic point of view. She fears that the weakness of China may result in some European power establishing itself on the continent in a position dangerous to Japan. The weakness of Korea led to such an attempt by Russia and to the Russo-Jap-

anese war, which Japan regarded as a matter of life and death. If the European situation has offered Japan her opportunity, China's weakness has been her justification. Soon after the seizure of Port Arthur by Russia, both Germany and Great Britain took advantage of China's weakness to establish themselves on the coast of the Asiatic continent directly opposite Japan. Russia, it will be remembered, made Port Arthur almost impregnable, while Germany proceeded to fortify Tsing Tau. Japan could hardly be expected to regard these operations with complacency. Fortifications of such a character were not needed against a state as weak as was China in a military way. There was every reason to believe that they were but symptoms of hostility to Japan. Certainly the united action of Russia, France and Germany had deprived Japan of the most valuable fruits of her victory over China in 1895.

That Japan was obliged to act at the expense of China is to be regretted. But China's weakness goes far towards making Japan's action one of self-defense. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this weakness will, while it continues, be a prolific

source of trouble in the east. So long as we have with us the present system of national states, all striving to expand at each other's expense, all competing for the prizes to be found in the economic development of China, just so long will we have the danger of a European war on the one hand and the expansion of Japan at China's expense on the other. It is to be hoped, of course, that the recent Limitation of Arms Conference at Washington and the proposed Disarmament Conference in connection with the League of Nations will have as one of their results the diminution, if not the removal, of danger from this source.

That China will be able to reconstruct herself without the aid of the European or even with such limited help as she has as yet received from Europe is very doubtful. Her position was a perilous one prior to the time when, because of the recent revolution, her domestic political problems became acute. In the economic situation in which Europe was six hundred years ago, China was called upon almost at once to transform herself. With pacifist traditions centuries old she was required to meet the arbitrary exactions of

militaristic powers. Drugged with the narcotic of a quietist philosophy, she was asked to guide her footsteps along the pathway of the strenuous life. Accustomed to think in terms of the family, she was called upon to organize her social life in a way which seemed to her immoral. With an admiration for literary accomplishment which has never been elsewhere excelled, she was brought face to face with a world in which literary culture was being forced to give way to scientific and technical studies. No wonder the Chinese were dazed both by the strangeness of the demands made upon them and by the violence by which these demands were accompanied. For a time they stood stupefied like men awakened from a sound sleep. It was some time before they were able to comprehend their situation. And when they did comprehend, they were almost at once forced to solve not merely social and economic but as well political problems.

Accustomed during their millenniums of existence to autocracy, they were expected in a few years to organize and operate a republic. With no experience in popular elections, or indeed in any kind of elections, they were

obliged to provide in some way for choosing by popular vote the members of a legislature which would not only legislate for a people with little knowledge of and no respect for the written law, but which as well would select the incumbent of the executive office. A pacifist people, which despised the soldier and deprecated force, they had to attempt the organization of armies for protection against foreign aggression.

Is it to be wondered at that under these conditions they have become the prey of a military despotism which struts under the borrowed plumage of a republic, or that chaotic conditions have resulted from the contest for authority of those who have been successful in obtaining military power?

It is, however, always to be remembered that political disturbance does not mean so much to Chinese as it does to European life. Under the surface, agitated by the storms of politics, by the march of armies, by the rise and fall of military chieftains, the real life of the people goes on with a regularity and tranquillity which are almost inconceivable to westerners, accustomed as they are to look

to the government for so much which the Chinese do individually for themselves. During all the turmoil of the last few years the economic and social life of China has continued along its ordinary path with comparatively little interruption. During all this period the influences of western education have been exerted with an ever increasing force. Owing in some measure to the very troubles which have beset the country a spirit of aggressive nationalism has been developing which has never been known before. It can hardly be doubted that in due course of time—when that will be no one, of course, can say—the fundamental strength of Chinese character will prevail. When that happens a new China will arise, which will present to the world the spectacle of a well ordered land. Such a regenerated China may be expected as well to resume the task China has assumed more than once in her history of contributing to the other peoples of the earth much which they now lack, but of which she herself has an abundant store. We owe to China even now much in art and literature. There is much more which we can learn from her. But for the present we

shall have to give in order that in the future we may receive.

We of America are in a peculiarly advantageous position towards China. For one reason or another we have not been so aggressive in our past policy towards her as have some other countries. If we may believe what we hear, the Chinese like us, and there is every reason to feel that we like the Chinese. Both they and we look out upon the Pacific, which so many think is to be the field of man's future great endeavor. We also have a greater responsibility than any other people, because of the fact that we are guiding in such large measure China's educational life. We have been a republic longer than any other people, while China is striving as best she knows to follow our example. May we do what we can to help her solve the problems which the great changes in her life have forced upon her!

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

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

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